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PRIVATE CORPORA TIO NS 
BY 
HORACE LAFAYETTE WILGUS, 
S. B., S. M. (Ohio Bt:ate University) 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
§ 1. Outline. This subject will be treated in the fol-
lowing order: Chapter I. The general nature of a cor-
poration: 1. Definition and history. 2. The corpora-
tion as a person. 3. ~ The: :c.or-po-l'fiti®: -as·. ~ coU~3tion 
of individuals. 4. The: cio"~pdiatioii: hS :a: f~anchi~~. 5. 
Corporations and other i4~tHritr~s.;~· ~~ :t.r~t!-. of cor-
porate existence. 7. Class~s of :~-i!>.o~ations. Chapter 
II. Creation of corporations:~ .. t.: ~?f~e'.~tate'!l; functions. 
2. The promoter's functions. 3. The corporate charter. 
4. The association agreement. 5. Organization. Chap-
ter III. The body corporate: 1. Members and organs 
of action. 2. Internal relations. 3. Corporate funds. 
4. Corporate name. 5. Corporate life. 6. Corporate 
death- dissolution. Chapter IV. Corporate powers and 
liabilities: L Powers in general. 2. Classes of cor-
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porate powers. 3. Particular powers. 4. Ultra vires. 
5. Torts and crimes. Chapter V. The corporation and 
the state: 1. The state and its own corporations. 2. 
The state and national corporations. 3. The state and 
foreign corporations. 4. The national government and 
state corporations. Chapter VI. Special relations: 1. 
The corporation and its promoters. 2. The corporation 
and its officers. 3. The corporation and its shareholders. 
4. Corporate creditors. 
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CHAPTER I. 
GENBB.AL NATURE OP A OORPO&ATIOlf. 
SECTION 1. DEFINITION AND HISTORY. 
§ 2. Definitions. In a recent opinion Judge Baldwin 
says: "A private corporation may be defined as an asso-
ciation of persons to whom the sovereign has offered a 
franchise to become an artificial, juridical person, with 
a name of its own, under which they can act and contract, 
and sue and be sued, and who have accepted the offer 
and effected an organization in substantial conformity 
with its terms" (1). There are three leading ideas in 
the definition of a corporation, each of them being im-
portant in certain circumstances. These ideas are: A 
person-"a corporation is an artificial being invisible, in-
tangible, and existing only in contemplation of law;" 
a collection of persons-a corporation aggregate is a 
"collection of many individuals united into one body, 
under a special denomination, having perpetual succes-
sion in an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the 
law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an 
individual;" a franchise-" a corporation is a franchise 
possessed by one or more individuals, who subsist as a 
(1) Baldwin C. J . 1n .Mackay T. New York AN. B . R. Oo., 72 Atl. 
088, ~ (Conn). 
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body politic, under a special denomination, and are vested 
by the policy of the law with the capacity of perpetual 
succession and of acting in several respects, however 
numerous the association may be, as a single indi-
vidual" (2). 
§ 3. Theories of the corp<>rate personality. There are 
three of these, viz: (a) The fiction theory, i. e., that 
the corporate personality is not real but artificial only: 
"The abstract idea of a corporation, the legal entity, the 
impalpable and intangible creation of human thought is 
itself a fiction, and has been appropriately described as a 
figure of speech" (3). This is the currently accepted 
American view, and is specially insisted upon by Mr. 
Morawetz and Mr. Taylor. 
(b) The organic theory: This is the German doc-
trine. This view is that the corporation has a personality 
as real as that of the state; that in law a person is any-
thing that is a distinct subject of rights and liabilities. 
"Juristic persons are no more fictitious than, say, the 
conception of ownership is fictitious. In the eye of the 
law they are in the fullest sense persons, that is, subjects 
of legal rights and duties, and to that extent 'real,' as 
far as modern law is concerned" (4). 
( c) The representative theory: This may be sum-
marized as follows: The rights held by a corporation are 
not the rights of any physical person, but those of the 
corporation as a distinct person in the law; the act of the 
(2) 2 Kent, Commentaries, 257. 
(3) Judge Floch, in People v. North River Sugar Reflnlng Co., 121 
N. Y. 582. 
(4) Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law (2d ed.), 204, note. 
GENERAL NATURE 85 
majority is accepted as the act of all and those who act 
bind those who are silent; in other words, the majority 
vote of the quorum is the representative of al~ and this 
is true whether the vote has been by A to X, inclusive, or 
by B to Y, inclusive, in a corporation composed of A to Z. 
'.Any group that is the majority of the quorum is the rep-
resentative of the corporation and is no unreal thing; the 
will of this representative body duly expressed is the 
corporate act or win, whether it be of knowledge, ignor-
ance, error, good or bad faith, or wrong doing or com-
mendable action. This makes up the unity of the corpora-
tion, which it is convenient, if not entirely necessary, to 
treat as a person in the law (5). 
§ 4. Theory of the collective body. Mr. Morawetz says: 
"The word corporation is but a collective name for the 
corporators or memi>ers who compose an incorporated 
association" (6). Mr. Taylor says: "A corporation con-
sidered as a legal institution has two meanings : ( 1) The 
sum or mass of the legal relations subsisting in respect 
to the legal enterprise among the various parties-the 
state, the shareholders, the officers, and the creditors-
resulting from the operation of the rules of law embraced 
in the corporate constitution; (2) the shareholders, vested 
with the corporate powers, since it is through their acts 
or the acts of their predecessors that incorporation is 
caused" (7). Mr. Trapnell analyzes the subject and con-
cludes: "A corporation is an association of individuals, 
(5) Professor Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of a Corporation. 
(6) Private Corporations (2d ed.), § L 
(7) Corporations (3d ed.), H 36, 37, 49, 50, 51. 
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formed under the sanction of the state, for the accomplish-
ment of a distinct and definite purpose"-these being 
the three essential elements. The associl:ltion originates 
in an ngreement between individuals, which becomes 
effective only by the express sanction of the state; this 
association is peculiar in that its rights and liabilities 
persist unchanged without regard to changes in member-
ship; membership is acquired by original subscription, or 
agreement, or subsequent ownership of stock, and is ter-
minated by assignment of stock; the association is dis-
solved, voluntarily with the consent of the state, or, on 
complaint of shareholders or creditors, for various im-
proper acts. The states 's sanction is essential, and is ex-
pressed in a general or special legislative act, which 
operates as a grant of corporate power to the associates, 
constituting a contract with them, and a law prescribing 
the form and mode of exercising these powers, and the 
results thereof. These powers are given only for the 
purpose of accomplishing the expressed objects, through 
the forms prescribed, by means of the funds author-
ized (8). 
§ 5. Theory of the franchise. Blackstone says: ''Fran-
chises are a royal privilege or branch of the king's pre-
rogative subsisting in the hands of the subject;'' and ''it 
is likewise a franchise for a number of persons to be in-
corporated and subsist as a body politic, and each in-
dividual member of such corporation is also said to have 
a franchise or freedom." Mr. Justice Bradley, after 
quoting this, says: "Generalized and divested of the 
(8) The Logical Conception of a Corporation, by Benjamin Trapnell. 
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special form which it assumes under a monarchical gov-
ernment based on feudal traditions, a franchise is a right, 
privilege, or power of public concern, which ought not be 
exercised by private individuals at their mere will or 
pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and 
administration, either by the government directly, or by 
public agents, acting under such conditions and regula-
tions as the government may impose in the public interest 
and for the public security. No persons can make them-
selves a body corporate and politic without legislative 
authority. Corporate capacity is a franchise" (9). The 
state in its political capacity is the holder of all fran-
chises, in trust for the public welfare; and when it makes 
a grant of any such franchises they do not lose their public 
character, but are yet to be exercised in advancing the 
public welfare; this is an essentia~ though implied, con-
dition of the grant; if not performed the state can resume 
the grant as for a con di ti on broken. The right to be and 
act as a corporation, mainly based upon historical 
reasons, is considered, and wisely so, as a right or privi-
lege of public concern. TIP.s is true even though. the busi-
ness to be done is of a private nature;·> such as'"""' refining 
sugar or oil. The business ii! neither more nor less public 
than if done by individuals in their private cai}acity, but 
the privilege consists in bringing into existence and using 
in the business the valuable, efficient, impersonal, and in 
many ways less responsible agency, known as the cor-
poration; this is the matter of public concern, which is 
the essence of the corporate franchise. 
(9) Cnllfornla v. Oentral Pacific Ry. Oo., 12'T U. S. 1, 40. 
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The corporate franchises are frequentJy said to be pri-
mary and secondary. The primary franchise is the privi-
lege to be, to exist and act as a corporation; the secondary 
franchises are such other franchises or special privileges, 
such as the right to take property by eminent domain, 
as may be conferred upon the corporation, just as they 
might be conferred upon naturaJ persons. 
§ 6. History of these ideas. The corporate personality. 
Hearn and Coulanges trace the idea of corporate per-
sonality to the ancient family group, which was a perma-
nent body, enduring forever, with rights and duties dis-
tinct from those of its individual members, who included 
both the living and dead, and whose representative and 
managing director was the house father. In the earliest 
stages of human development, the existence of tribes, 
village communities, families, clans, and nations was 
recognized in such a way as to imply they were collective 
entities with corporate rights and duties. In the ancient 
Babylonian and Egyptian law, the Temple was personi-
fied (10). Long before Justinian, the rule of the Digest, 
"All the members are considered as a single unit or 
being," had thoroughly penetrated the fabric. of Roman 
law. Churches and boroughs and guilds, even in Anglo. 
Saxon times, were personified as owners of lande, fran-
chises, and privileges, in a way different from the owner-
ship of the individual persons who were members of the 
same. Braeton (about 1260), likened a corporation to a 
flock of sheep, which remains the same flock although 
(10) Johns, Babylonian Laws, ~8; Simcox, Primitive Civilizations, 
I, 173, 376. 
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particular sheep successively depart. By 1311 a borough 
is called a "corps," a body. In 1349 the courts said, "the 
corporation is invisible, incorporeal, and cannot be ar-
rested or assaulted;" and in 1461 said, "a corporation 
aggregate of several is invisible, immortal, and rests only 
in intendment and consideration of law"-words fre-
quently repeated ever since. By the reign of Edward IV 
(1461-83) the term "corporacion" bad come into general 
use. In the register of names of persons recognized by 
the private law of Rome, the names of corporations were 
entered in precisely the same way as those of natural 
persons. So too, Lord Coke, followed by Lord Hale, and 
by Blackstone, says: "Persons are of two sorts-natural, 
created by God, and persons incorporate, created by the 
policy of man." 
Ao the family grew into the clan, the clan into the tribe, 
and the tribe into the city, nation, or state, the corporate 
idea of the family seems to have been applied to the state, 
particularly in its external and public relations, and every 
sovereign and independent government or society claimed 
for itsel_f the attributes of perpetuity and personality. 
Such an idea early took shape in the Roman law, and, by 
the end of the Samnite wars (B. C. 282), Rome bad be-
come a government of a city over cities throughout Italy. 
For a long time the property of the city was treated as a 
public matter, standing outside the domain of private law 
and commerce; but, during the Empire, it was brought 
within the range of private law, and the cities began to 
be treated as persons capable of having private as well as 
public rights and duties. Societies created by the con-
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ventions of individuals, but without proprietary capacity, 
had long existed; these were quick to solicit and secure 
from the state, as lawful societies ( collegia licita), pro-
prietary capacity after the example of the cities; and in 
this way "Roman law contrived to accomplish a veritable 
masterpiece of juristic ingenJJity in discovering the notion 
of a co1lective person, distinguishing from its members 
the collective whole as the ideal unity of the members 
bound together by the corporate constitution, in raising 
the whole to the rank of a person (a juristic person), and 
in securing it a place in private law as an independent 
subject of proprietary capacity, standing on the same 
footing as other private persons" (11). Yet it took nearly 
a thousand years after the time of Justinian for these 
same ideas to be appropriated or worked out again by 
the English law. 
§ 7. Same: The corporate franchise. The legal ideas 
involved here are traceable to the doctrines of both the 
Roman and the feudal law. From the Roman law comes 
the doctrine that a corporate franchise is a privilege of a 
public nature conferred by the state; from the feudal law 
comes the view that this privilege is not merely a personal 
privilege or liberty, such as the right to move about, but 
a privilege in the nature of a property right. We have 
just seen bow the idea of a corporate personality was 
traced to the public law of Rome-to sustain a juristic 
personality was originally exclusively the privilege of 
public corporations and institutions. In the Roman law 
(11) Sobm•s Institute& ot Roman Law, Ledlle's Translation (2d ed.) 
Cb.IL 
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"a corporation was an organized body of persons govern-
ing themselves." The Romans were jealous of combina-
tions of individuals for any such purpose. The law rec-
ognized no general freedom of association'; a lawful self-
governing society could not be the creation of individuals; 
many laws were passed from the time of the Twelve 
Tables ( 450 B. C.) down to the Empire against illicit com-
panies. Only such societies were ]awful as owed their ex-
istence to a special public law. Being constituted by 
public law, they became thereby institutions of the state, 
partook of its nature, and acquired thereby a corporate 
personality and proprietary capacity. Julius Caesar and 
Augustus both dissolved ma~ corporations that had be-
come nurseries of faction and disorder ( 12). Based there-
fore upon political instinct as well as upon legal theories, 
it became a maxim of the Roman law that to usurp the 
franchise of being a corporation without due authority 
was unlawful. 
Similar ideas early obtained in the English law. In 
Saxon and early N onnan times the nobles exercised the 
power of conferring corporate privileges within their 
demesnes. Yet, in the time of Henry II (1154-1189), 18 
guilds were fined for being set up without lawful au. 
thority. In the time of Bracton (c. 1260) the right to 
grant franchises and liberties was considered the exclusive 
prerogative of the king. In 1349 it was held that the right 
to sue and be sued as a person could be conferred on a 
guild only by the king, and the absolute necessity of the 
king's assent to the institution of any corporation was 
(12) 2 Kent Ciomm. 268. 
Tol. Vlll-8 
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held in 1376 to have been previously settled as clear law, 
or, as elsewhere stated, by the fourteenth century "the 
foundation is being laid for a rule which will require 
a royal license when a new corporation is to be 
formed" (13). The king, because of political expediency 
and for financial reasons, had begun to interfere with the 
creation of voluntary associations and guilds, for they 
had given trouble in France and might do so in England. 
"Besides, men will pay for leave to form clubs," and 
the medieval guild was not content with the purely private 
status of a club, but aspired "to exercise some juris-
diction and coercive power over its members and per-
haps over outsiders." In the time of Henry I (1100-
1135 ), the weavers of London, and in the time of Henry 
II (1154-1189), the weavers of York, Lincoln, Hunting-
don, and Oxford; the fullers of Winchester; the men of 
Marlborough; and the bakers of London, all pay for the 
privilege of having their guild. 
By the time of Edward I (1272-1307), English boroughs 
had acquired five characteristics- " the right of perpetual 
succession, the power to sue and be sued as a whole and 
by the corporate name, the power to hold lands, the right 
to use a common seal, and the power of making by-
laws" ( 14); but the theory of their personality was not 
yet entirely worked ont. And, when they first appear 
as ideal persons, they still appear not in the character 
of mere private persons, but rather as governmental 
officers. "Their lands, their goods are few, what they 
(13) Po11ock and Mattland, Hist. Eng. J,aw (2d ed. ), 600. 
(14) Maitland, Const. Hist., 54. 
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own is jurisdiction, governmental powers, and fiscal im-
munities;" in other words they were "the owners of 
franchises." Thi~ is so also with the mercl1ants' guilds; 
they seemed to be voluntary associations of traders on 
one hand, and organs of municipal government on the 
other; they had no property engaged in trade, but their 
''property consisted not of lands and goods but of fran-
chises, jurisdictional powers, and fiscal immunities." All 
such franchises or liberties (as they were called in the 
Great Charter, c. 29) "covered feudal rights and inci-
dents of too intangible a nature to be appropriately de-
scribed as 'holdings,'" and were treated by the medieval 
Jaw as private property (15). And so, in this capacity of 
private ownership of franchises, "we may well suppose 
that the juristic person made its appearance at a com-
paratively early time in the guild hall of the brethren.'' 
By the time of Edward IV (1461-83), it was considered 
that in the grant of all franchises there is" a tacit condi-
tion annexed to them that an abuse forfeits them." In 
the argument of the great quo warra.nto case against 
the city of London in 1692, it was said: "A corporation 
is an artificial body, the ligaments of which body are the 
franchises which bind and unite all its members together; 
and the whole essence and frame of the corporation con-
sist therein," or, as expressed by Comyn (c. 1745), fol-
lowed by Blackstone (1765), "a corporation is a fran-
chise created by the king." This theory was made the 
(15) McKecbnle, Magna Carta, 445. Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng. Law, 
Vol. 1, 63. 
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basis of Mr. Justice Washington's opinion in the Dart-
mouth College case in 1819 (16). 
§ 8. BisU>ry of corporations: In Europe. As already 
seen, both public and private or trading corporations ex-
isted under the Roman law; under the convenient cloak 
of the latter, patricians were enabled to engage in re-
munerative trade and business, from which they were 
otherwise excluded by public sentiment. After the fall 
of Rome, most of the commercial corporations disap-
peared, and only those connected with the church sur-
vived. A little later, guilds of workmen and traders 
began to be formed, which gradually took on the cor-
porate form, growing in strength and power until "in 
merchant guild, and church guild, and craft guild lay 
the life of Englishmen who were doing more than knight 
or baron'' to preserve 01· bring safely across ages of 
tyranny or win back the right of self government, free 
speech, and equal justice at the hands of one's equals. 
Lord Coke claimed to have seen ''a charter made by 
Henry I (1100-1135) by which he granted them gildam 
mercatornm, and a confirmation by Henry II (1154-1189) 
by which charters they were incorporated." The Brother-
hood of St. Thomas a Becket was authorized in Burgundy 
before 1250, and a century later transferred to England, 
confirmed by Edward III and Henry VII who changed 
its name to the Merchant Adventurers of London, under 
whose monopoly, in the time of Elizabeth, it had gathered 
five-sixths of the foreign trade of England into the port 
of London and into the hands of two hundred share· 
(16) 4 Wheat. ~18, 607. 
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holders. Other guilds and brotherhoods were formed 
early also; the "Weavers Company" goes back to Henry 
II, if not to Henry I; the Goldsmiths date from 1327; 
Mercers, 1373; Haberdashers, 1407; Fishmongers, 1433; 
Vintners, 1437; Merchant Tailors, 1466. 
The Italian states were engaged in extensive commerce 
in the time of Charlemagne, and about 1150 organized 
a Chamber of Loans which grew into the Bank of Venice 
by 1171, and became the model of later institutions and 
of the custom of paying by cheques. The Company of St. 
George- the Bank of Genoa-dating about 1402, consoli-
dated the public loan into one capital stock to be managed 
by eight directors annually elected by the stockholders 
and creditors. The discovery of America made the world 
larger and soon led to the formation of great companies 
for exploring and exploiting it. The Russian company 
dates from 1566; the Eastland, 1579; the Turkey, 1581; 
the famous East India Company dates from 1600; the 
Plymouth Company, known as the Merchant Adventurers, 
that colonized N~w England, was chartered in 1606, with 
a capital stock of £7000, and the Hudson Bay Company, 
still operating in the Canadian northwest, in 1670. When 
the East India Company was formed, each member traded 
on his individual stock, taking such shares in each voyage 
as he chose, according to the rule laid down by the com-
pany, but in 1612 the stock was converted into a joint 
stock- the aggregate subscriptions of the members-to 
be managed by the governor and directors. The Bank ot 
England was incorporated in 1694. 
§ 9. Same: In America. During colonial days it is 
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said there were but six business corporations of American 
origin: the New York Company "for settling a fishery in 
these parts," chartered in 1675 by Governor Andros, 
under his patent of 1664, with a capital stock divided into 
shares of £10 each; the Free Society of Traders in Penn-
sylvania chartered in 1682 by vVilliam Penn, with a capi-
tal stock of £5400, subscribers for fifty pounds to have 
one vote, one hundred pounds two votes, three hundred 
pounds or over three votes ; the New London Society for 
Trade and Commerce, dating from 1732; the Union Wharf 
Company in New Haven, 1760; the Philadelphia Con-
tributership for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire, 1768; 
and the Proprietors of the Boston Pier, 1772. Before 
the formation of the United States Constitution there 
seems to have been only 21 business corporations formed 
in the United States. The Constitution put commerce 
and vested rights on a solid footing, and, before 1800, 
200 more corporate charters bad been granted. Before 
1830, the improvident increase of corporations was looked 
upon as an evil. In 1822 President Monroe vetoed ex-
tensive projects of national internal improvements; the 
states took up the matter and disastrously failed; then 
the era of private corporations began about 1840 under 
liberal general incorporation laws. Prior to 1870 there 
were few corporate combinations. Railroad consolidation 
began about 1869, and before 1870 scarcely any system 
was over 1000 miles; by 1890, 5000 mile systems ex-
isted; by 1900, 10,000 mile systems, and now Mr. Harri-
man dies in oontrol of 70,000 miles of railroad-one-third 
of all in the country. Before 1870 industrial oombina-
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tions were small, two trusts having been formed with 
capital of $13,000,000; but by 1904 it was stated 445 
trusts existed, formed out of 8664 original companies, 
with a capitalization of over $20,000,000,000-tbe United 
States Steel Corporation alone having $1,100,000,000 in 
stock and nearly $400,000,000 in bonds. 
SECTION 2. THE CORPORATION AB A PERSON. 
§ 10. When a. corporation is considered as a person. 
Rights and duties. For most purposes it is so considered, 
and especially: (1) As having rights of property and 
reputation protected at common law, and under constitu-
tional provisions, very much as natural persons. (2) As 
having duties, arising both from its charter provisions 
and fixed upon it by the common law. Illustrations: 
Where the state grants to a university corporation all 
the property that hereafter escbeats to the state, it can-
not repeal the law so as to divest the university of its 
title to all property that bas escbeated to the state before 
the repealing law takes effect. To do so would violate the 
provision of the Bill of Rights, taken from Magna Cbarta, 
that "no freeman shall be disseized of bis freehold, or 
bis liberty, but by the law of the land" (17). D falsely, 
orally, and publicly accused C, a coal company, during 
the coal famine of 1902-3, of charging exborbitant prices 
for coal and refusing to sen at all to those who were sick 
and suffering. No special damage was alleged. Such a 
charge violates the company's right to its business repu-
tation, and is actionable slander without showing special 
(17) Trustees of University v. Foy, 1 Murphy (N. U) !SS. 
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dalll8ge (18). Where the state constitution provides that 
individuals shall be taxed on their property, after de-
ducting the amount of unpaid mortgages upon it, but also 
provides for taxing the property of railroad companies 
without such reduction, such provision violates the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution that "no 
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws" (19). Where a railroad 
is authorized to build a bridge across a navigable river, 
the state may compel it by mandamus to construct it ao 
as not to obstruct navigation and to remove such obstruc. 
tions as have been erected. Where a canal company is 
bound by its charter to construct its canal deep enough 
to accommodate rafts of a specified size, and negligently 
fails to keep its canals in proper condition therefor, the 
company is liable in damages to one whose raft of the 
proper size is grounded and later destroyed by a storm-
the charter having placed this duty on the company for 
the benefit of persons wishing to use the canal, upon pay-
ment of the proper toll (20). 
§ 11. Sa.me: Statutory construction. (3) Statutes, 
conferring rights or placing obligations upon persons, 
generally include corporations, though not specially 
named. Corporations, however, are not citizens entitled 
to all the privileges of citizens of the several states under 
the United States Constitution; but they are citizens 
within the clause giving the United States jurisdiction in 
(18) GrOBS Coal Co. v. Rose, 126 Wis. 24. 
(19) The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. ll. 722. 
(20) Riddle v. Proprietors, 7 Maas. 169. 
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suits between citizens of different states. For example, 
where a judge was required to order an election to de-
termine whether a court house should be removed, "upon 
applications of persons paying one-third of the taxes on 
real property in the county;'' one-third of the taxes were 
$3333; of this individual owners paid $1300 and corporate 
owners the balance; it was held the judge was justified. 
in ordering the election, as corporations were persons 
within the meaning of the law (21). So statutes allow-
ing persons to appea~ or take notes, or their property to 
be attached or taxed, or forbidding persons from banking 
or taking usury, apply to corporations. So a corporation 
is a living person within the meaning of the statute allow-
ing the party to testify when the adverse party is a living 
per.son. On the other hand, where the statute defines 
homicide as the killing of one human being by another, 
and manslaughter in the second degree as a killing due 
to the culpable negligence of any person, etc., a corpora-
tion cannot be indicted for manslaughter, since' another' 
means another human being (22). And where the statute 
says "any number of persons may incorporate," persons 
here does not include corporations, for it is contrary to 
the policy of the law to allow one corporation to be formed 
from others. So too the constitutional provision that 
''no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself," does not protect a corpora-
tion from the production of its books before the grand 
jury on the charge against a corporation for violating the 
(21) Craft'ord v. Supervisors, 87 Va. 110. 
(22) People v. Rochester Ry. Co., 190 N. Y. 102. 
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anti-trust act (23). Neither is a corporation of one state 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the several states, and so another state may exclude 
it from doing business altogether within that state ( un-
less the business is interstate commerce), or make various 
discriminations against it, such as charging a higher li-
cense fee than is charged to its own corporations, or allow-
ing a preference to domestic corporations. But if C com-
pany is incorporated in state A, with X, Y, and Z, as 
members, all living in state B, C can sue X, or Y, or Z, or 
be sued by them in the Federal courts, which have juris-
diction of suits when the parties are citizens of different 
states; for the corporation is presumed to be a citizen 
of the state where it is incorporated, without regard to 
the citizenship of its members. 
§ 12. Same: Ownership of property. ( 4) In the own-
ership of its property, a corporation is considered as a 
person, it O'wns its property, and its members do not own 
its property. If the property is to be conveyed or re-
covered, it must be done in the corporate name, and not 
in that of the members. Suits must be brought by and 
against it in the corporate name. For example: Where 
the statute provided that ''no vessel should be registered 
which shall not wholly belong to her Majesty's subjects,'' 
a vessel owned by an English corporation is entitled to 
registry, although a large part or all of its members were 
J.i,rencbmen (24). So where A conveyed land to B and 
covenanted that be would not convey any of his remain-
(23) Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. 
(24) Queen v. i\.rnaud, 25 L. J. R. 00. 
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ing land to any person of color, he did not violate this 
covenant by conveying his land to a corporation com-
posed entirely of colored persons (25). P, having ac-
quired all the stock of C company, brought a suit to re-
plevy from D property formerly belonging to C. Held, 
P could not maintain such a suit, for the property be-
longed to a corporation and not to the sole share-
holder (26). 
SECTION 3. THE CORPORATION AS A COLLECTION OJ' 
INDIVIDUALS. 
§ 13. When a corporation is considered as a oollection 
of persons: (1) In the management, the majority controls. 
(2) When justice requires, the corporate personality 
will be ignored, and the rights and duties of the members 
composing it be considered. This appears usually: 
(a) In matters relating to changing the constitution. 
(b) In determining the rights of members among them-
selves in equity. ( c) When corporate sins result from 
the concerted but apparently individual acts of members. 
(d) When the corporate organization is used as a cloak 
to aid in the commission of fraud. As an old case says, 
"where an act is to be done by a corporation all of the 
members ought to be assembled together to consent, but 
this cannot be separately and apart by them at several 
times." Again where C sued D on a note given for a 
subscription to stock in C company, which was organized 
to engage in life insurance, and later the company's 
charter was amended, authorizing it to engage in fire in-
(2ts) People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 61 S. E. 794 (Va.). 
(26) Button v. Hotl'man, 61 Wis. 20. 
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surance also, to which D did not consent, D was held not 
liable (27), for this is an organic change that requires 
unanimous consent, unless otherwise provided in form-
ing the corporation. Where the corporation, through its 
directors, after a shareholder makes a proper demand, 
refuses to resist the payment of a tax levied against it 
under an invalid law, a shareholder may sue in equity to 
enjoin payment, for such payment is a breach of trust 
toward the individual shareholder. So too, where A and 
B, doing business as a partnership, which is in debt, trans-
fer all their partnership property to a corporation, the 
shares of which they cause to be issued to their wives 
without payment, and without making any provision to 
pay the debt, the court will ign:0re the corporate existence 
so far as may be necessary to have the property applied 
to pay the debts of the partnershjp. And again, where 
all the members of several corporations together agree 
to transfer their shares to trustees, who are to issue trust 
certificates in return to the shareholders, for the purpose 
of vesting the management of all the corporations in the 
same bands in order to prevent competition among the 
corporations, the court will treat the acts of the share-
holders as equivalent to formal acts of the corporations 
themselves, and will dissolve the combining corporations 
for becoming members of the trust. So too, when one 
corporation is organized by the officers and stockholders 
of another corporation, making their int~rests identical, 
the court may treat them as identical, if justice so re-
quires; and generally the notion of the legal entity will 
(27) Aehton v. Burbank, 2 Dillon (U. S.) 435. 
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not be permitted "to defeat public convenience, justify 
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime" (28). 
SECTION 4. THE CORPORATION AS A FRANCHISE. 
§ 14. When a corporation is considered as a franchise. 
It is considered as a primary franchise mainly in its re-
lation to the state, and particularly: (1) In the methods 
by which the state retains control over it-by the writs of 
scire facias or quo warranto. (2) In its incapacity to 
alienate its franchise, without the consent of the state. 
These two are based on the doctrine that the franchise to 
be a corporation is granted upon the implied condition 
that the grantees will faithfully carry out the purposes for 
which it was formed. (3) In the power of the state to 
tax corporations, the franchise may be considered prop-
erty. ( 4) In the state's incapacity to change the charter 
without the consent of the members. (5) In the limit on 
the power of the majority to change the constitution of 
the corporation without the consent of all the members. 
These last three are based on the doctrine that a fran-
chise, once granted and accepted, is a vested estate or in-
terest in the members, of which they cannot be deprived 
without their consent. 
From the earliest times, as Lord Holt said, ''a corpora-
tion may be forfeited, if the trust be broken, and the 
end for which it is instituted be perverted;" the state 
does this by a direct proceeding in court to call the cor-
poration to account for "misuser, abuser or non-user." 
It was very early ruled that "royal franchises never pass 
(28) United States v. Milwaukee Retrlg. Co., 142 Fed. R. 247; In re 
Rieger, etc., 157 Fed. R. 009. 
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by assignment, without special words in the king's grant,'' 
and that A could not inherit a right t-0 hold a market 
from his father, to whom King John had granted the 
right, unless the grant itself so provided. Such a rule 
still obtains as to primary franchises, and often as to 
others also. Where C company made an assignment of 
all its property and effects of every kind to A for the 
benefit of its creditors, A petitioned to be allowed to sell 
the "franchise to be a corporation," as part of the prop-
erty assigned, but the court ruled that this primary fran-
chise really belonged to the members and could not be 
assigned unless expressly provided in the grant (29). 
So the franchise-the right to be a corporation-may be 
taxed by the state, as where the constitution provided for 
taxing all property at its actual value, including 
"moneys, credits, stocks, franchises, and all other things 
capable of private ownership "-the right to be a cor-
porate bank is a franchise, and is capable of private 
ownership, and may be taxed to the corporation itself, 
upon a valuation equal to the difference betwe.en the 
assessed va.lue of its tangible property and the market 
value of its outstanding shares (30). While the fran-
chise is intangible, the ownership of it is a vested interest 
in the corporation and the shareholders, analogous to the 
ownership of interests in land under the same grant-
neitber the grantor, nor the grantees can change it with-
out the consent of all. 
(29) Fietsam v. Hay, 122 I11. 293. 
(30) Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276. 
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SECTION 5. CORPORATIONS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS. 
§ 15. Corporation and pa.rtnership. These differ: ( 1) 
In origin: the i~a of corporations is traceable to the 
public law of Rome, as above pointed out, while the part-
nership notion is traceable to the customs of merchants 
in England and on the Continent and back to Roman 
traders. (2) In creation: corporations can be created 
only by express authority of the state; partnerships, by 
mere contract of parties. (3) In franchise: a corporation 
has at least <>ne franchise, a partnership none. ( 4) In 
management: a corporation is managed only through its 
duly appointed officers and agents; in partnerships, each 
partner or member can act for the partnership. (5) In 
powers: the corporation can lawfully exercise no powers 
except those expressly conferred or necessarily implied 
from those granted; these cannot be enlarged except by 
the state's consent; the members of a partnership may 
do anything lawful that they agree to. (6) In duration: 
the corporation is perpetual unless expressly limited; 
the death, resignation, or insolvency of members does 
not dissolve; but either of these dissolves a partnership. 
(7) In ownership of property: the title to the corporate 
property is in the corporation; that of the partnership in 
the members of the partnership-they are all considered 
part owners. (8) In litigation: a corporation sues or is 
sued in its corporate name; the partnership, in the names 
of its members. (9) In transfer of interest: the transfer 
of his interest by a member has no effect on corporate 
existence; but a transfer of interest dissolves a partner-
ship. (10) In liability of members: in absence of 
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statute, a member of a corporation is not liable beyond 
the amount to be paid for bis shares; but in partnership, 
there is an individual liability to the extent of its debts. 
(11) In dissolution: a corporation can be rightly dis-
solved only by or with the consent of the state; partners 
may dissolve a partnership at any time. (12) In theory 
of existence: a corporation is a legal entity; a partner-
ship is not so considered in English law, except in a few 
cases, though business men treat it so. 
From the foregoing it will be seen that there are many 
advantages in the corporate organization: continuous 
succession, indefinite duration, limited liability, unlimited 
division of transferable shares of capital that can be used 
as collateral security, with a uniform and uninterrupted 
management, if found efficient, which readily secures large 
capital from numerous contributors. On the other hand, 
however, there may be less opportunity to scrutinize 
carefully the management, than in the case of a partner-
ship; the chances of double taxation are greater; the 
corporation can be excluded from doing business where 
partners may claim the right to engage in such business 
as citize·ns; and the corporate powers are limited by the 
charter, which can be changed only by consent of the state. 
§ 16. Corporations and joint stock companies. A joint 
stock company is sometimes said to be a "partnership, 
with many of the powers of a corporation.'' It is an 
evolution of partnership law; some of the incidents of 
partnership, such as non transferability of shares, or 
authority of a partner to bind all the others, is excluded 
by the contract or statute under which it is formed. While 
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it can be formed, as between the members themselves or 
the members and those who deal with it with full knowl-
edge, merely by contract, such formation without express 
authority does not exclude the partnership liability to 
those who have no knowledge of the facts. All presump-
tions are in favor of the partnership liability, and it can 
be excluded only by express statutory provision or actual 
knowledge of the party. They are usually authorized by 
statute, with transferable shares, and managed by a 
board of di rectors. 
The presumptions of corporation law are exactly the 
reverse- there is no individual liability here un!ess ex-
pressly created by statute. For example: A, the owner 
of a patent, executed an instrument of trust declaring 
himself trustee for various persons to be known as the 
McKay :Machine Association, which should exist for thirty 
years, with 50,000 shares to be distributed among the 
members in proportion to their interest, evidenced by 
certificates transferable on the books of the trustee; such 
transfer or the death of the owner was not to dissolve the 
association; no member was to have any authority to 
contract for the association, but all the business was to 
be carried on by an executive committee, chosen by the 
shareholders; profits were to be divided by this committee 
from time to time, and paid to shareholders in proportion 
to their interests. There was no statute expressly pro-
viding for the formation of such an association. A, as 
trustee, was taxed upon all the tangible real and per-
sonal property of the association, and the state sought 
to ·tax the association on the aggregate value of the 
vo1. vm-e 
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shares, less the assessed value of the real and personal 
property, as corporations were taxed upon their fran-
chises. Held, it could not be so taxed, as it had no fran-
chi8e, and was only a partnership formed under the 
common law (31). So too, where a statute authorized the 
formation of a "partnership association," with trans-
ferable shares, managed by a board of managers, with 
power to take and hold property, sue and be sued in its 
association name, and use a seal, and such an association 
was formed in Pennsylvania and did business in Massa-
chusetts it could not be sued in its association name in 
Massachusetts, as a corporation could. It must be sued 
as a partnership, in the names of its members (32 ). 
§ 17. Corporation and fraternity or stock exchange. 
An unincorporated society resembles a partnership more 
nearly than a corporation; it is not a legal entity, and 
hence those who claim to be agents of such an institution 
bind only themselves and those who aut!iorize them to 
act. The members are not authorized to act for one an-
other as in partnerships. 
§ 18. Corporations and cost-book mining companies. 
By custom of miners, there has grown up an unincor-
porated association that is quite like a joint stock com-
pany, in which the shares are transferable without affect-
ing the continued existence of the association; only those 
especially appointed have authority to bind others. Other-
wise partnership rules apply. 
§ 19. Syndica.tes. These are in fact temporary pa.rt~ 
(31) Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mnss. 419. 
(32) Edwards v. Warren Llnoline, etc. Works, 168 Mass. 564. 
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nerships organized for a particular transaction, such as 
to purchase or subscribe for a large amount of stock in 
a corporation to ha formed, so as to insure the comple-
tion of the proposed scheme. .As soon as the special 
transaction is completed, the syndicate is terminated. 
They are substantially partnerships (33). 
§ 20. Corporations and state institutions. There are 
in many states, state universities, asylums, penitentiaries, 
etc., managed by boards created by law, and appointed 
by the governor or elected by electors. These are fre-
quently called corporations of a public kind; while in other 
states they are not so considered, although they have 
some corporate powers. They are, in such states, called 
state institutions, and are subject to modification at the 
state's will without violation of the constitutional pro-
hibition against impairing the obligation of contracts ( 34). 
SECTION 6. TESTS OF CoBPORATE EXISTENCE. 
§ 21. Tests of corporate existence. Many times it is 
difficult to tell whether a particular institution is a cor-
poration or not. The following tests have been suggested: 
(1) The merger of the individuals composing the cor-
porate body int-0 one distinct artificial individual ex-
istenc.e. (2) The legislative intent-if this can be clearly 
ascertained it will be contro11ing in the creating state but 
not necessarily elsewhere. (3) The powers conferred-
as to have perpetual succession under a special name, 
and in an artificial form; to take and grant property; 
(33) 5 National Corp. Rep. 455; 8 Q. J. Econ. 98. 
(84) TboDlll8 v. Board ot Trustees, 198 U. S. 207. 
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contract, sue, and be sued in this name; and to receive 
other grants and privileges. (4) In foreign jurisdic-
tions, the powers conferred, rather than the legislative 
declaration will control. For example: The constitution 
of state A provided that the assent of two-thirds of the 
members of each branch of the legislature should be 
requisite to every bill creating any body politic or cor-
porate. A statute provided that any number of persons 
may associate to establish a banking business, upon filing 
a certificate giving name, place, amount of stock, number 
of shares, names of shareholders, and duration of asso-
ciation. Such persons were authorized to do a banking 
business, exercise such powers as were incidental thereto, 
choose a president and other officers; president and 
cashier were to sign contracts, notes, etc. Suits were to 
be brought by or against the association in the name of 
the president, but not to abate by his death; conveyances 
were to be made to or by the president; shares were to be 
personal property, transferable on the books of the asso-
ciation, the vendee acquiring all the rights and liabilities 
of the vendor, and no shareholder was to be personally 
liable for the debts of the association. The act did not 
receive a two-thirds vote. A bank was organized, and P, 
as president sued D to recover on demands due the bank. 
vVhile it was held in the lower court that the powers con-
ferred by the foregoing statute were sufficient to make 
the banking institutions corporations, and hence invalid 
under the constitution, this view was reversed in the 
higher court, and these institutions were held not to be 
corporations within the meaning of the constitutional 
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provision, since there was not a complete merger of the 
members into the artificial being, inasmuch as it could not 
sue or be sued or bold lands in its association name ( 35 ). 
Again the statute provided for taxing "all moneyed or 
stock corporations" on their capital stock. The National 
Express Company was organized as a joint stock com-
pany in 1853, under a law of 1849, and materially dif-
fered from a corporation; afterward by various enact-
ments such powers were conferred upon such express 
companies as to make them appear to be corporations, 
yet in all these acts they were still designated joint stock 
companies, instead of corporations. It was held that 
the legislature did not intend to make them into corpora-
tions and so they could not be taxed as such. So too, 
while an insurance company organized in England, as a 
joint stock company, under a law expressly providing 
that it was not a corporation, could be treated as a cor-
poration in Massachusetts for purposes of taxation, or a 
New York express company, organized as a joint stock 
company under the laws above referred to, could be sued 
in New Jersey as a corporation, yet such an association 
would not be considered as a citizen of the state in which 
it was organized, so as to give the Federal courts juris-
diction, because of diversity of citizenship, when it was 
sued by a citizen of another state (36). 
SECTION 7. CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS. 
§ 22. Classes of corporations. The basis of classifica-
tion may be: (1) As to number of members: Aggre-
(85) Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 103. 
(36) Great Southern Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449. 
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gate and sole. An aggregate corporation is one in which 
there is capacity to have more than one member at a time. 
In a sole corporation, there is capacity to have only one 
member at a time. (2) As to purpose: They are ec-
clesiastical (or religious), and lay; w bicb latter are 
eleemosynary and civil. An ecclesiastical corporation 
was one composed of spiritual persons clothed with a 
spiritual jurisdiction and subject to control by the church 
authorities. They do not exist in this country, for the 
state cannot confer ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as it bas 
none. Religious corporations are, with us, corporations 
of a civil kind, formed to manage the temporalities of a 
church. All other than ecclesiastical were lay corpora-
tions, organized for various secular purposes ; they were 
divided into eleemosynary, formed to distribute the alms 
or bounty of their founder; and civil, which were for any 
other lay purpose. (3) As to completeness of corporate 
existence: Corporations are said to be pure and perfect, 
those that have all the powers of self management in-
cident to corporations at common law; and quasi or im-
perfect, having only part of the powers incident to cor-
porations at common Jaw. A municipal corporation is an 
illustration of the first, and a county or township, of the 
latter. ( 4) As to their relation to the state: Corpora-
tions are (a) public, formed for a governmental purpos-e; 
as a municipal corporation; (b) quasi-public, one that is 
really a private corporation, but charged with the per-
formance of some specially public function, like a rail-
road company; ( c) private, those formed for the private 
benefit of the members themselves, as a manufacturing 
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company. ( 5) As to method of acquiring membership: 
Corporations are non-stock, in which membership is ac-
quired by election or complying with the corporate con-
stitution or by-laws; and stock-corporations, wherein 
~mbersbip is acquired by the complete ownership of 
shares. ( 6) As to validity of corporate existence: Cor-
porations are: (a) de jure, one whose right to exercise cor-
porate powers is invulnerable, if assailed by the state in 
quo warranto proceedings; (b) de facto, one whose e~ 
istence is ordinarily invulnerable against any one but the 
state, in a direct quo warranto proceeding; ( c) by estoppel, 
one which has no legal existence except as against some-
one who is estopped from raising the question. 
114 PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
CHAPTER II. 
OBEATION Ol' OOBPOBATIONS. 
§ 23. In general. A corporation is created through the 
joint act of the state and individuals, usually designated 
incorporators or promoters; these apply to the state for 
the privilege of becoming incorporated themselves, or of 
creating a corporation out of other individuals, or a group 
or association of other individuals or corporations. After 
permission is given, these promoters organize or provide 
for the organization of the corporation; their functions 
then cease ; the members or subscribers contribute the 
capital, elect directors and officers, and take general con-
trol of corporate affairs; the directors and officers then 
start and keep in ooeration the ordinary powers of the 
corporation (1). 
SECTION 1. THE STATE'S FUNCTIONS. 
§ 24. State's power to create. The power to create a 
corporation is an incident of sovereignty, and so does not 
have to be conferred by constitutional provision (2). So, 
too, the sovereign's consent is essential- no other power 
can rightfully create a corporation. None but the sov-
ereign can create, and none but the sovereign that creates 
can take away the franchise to be a corporation. 
(1) 1 Cook. Stock and Stockholders (3d ed.) , § 2. 
(2) McCulloch v. Maryland. 4 Wheat. 316. 
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§ 25. Evidences of the sovereign's consent. These are 
mainly four: (1) By king's charter; (2) by common 
law; (3) by prescription; and ( 4) by legislative act. Lord 
Coke long ago said the essentials of incorporation are: 
1 Persons to be incorporated. 2. A name by which 
they are incorporated. 3. Of a certain place. 4. By 
sufficient words, and although the words ''incorporate,'' 
''found,'' ''erect'' or ''create'' are generally used they 
are not essential; any m:>rds indicating an intention to 
create are sufficient. 
§ 26. By king's charter. In England, by the common 
law, this was the usual way; the power still exists in the 
king, and is sometimes exercised, particularly in creating 
corporations for establishing colonies. In England the 
power, however, is now usually exercised through acts 
of Parliament to which the king's consent is essential. 
The king, however, cannot create a corporation with 
power of imprisonment, give it a monopoly, or jurisdic-
tion contrary to the common law. Private business cor-
porations are now organized under the general law called 
the Companies' Act of 1862, and amendments since; public 
service companies require a special act of Parliament, 
and are incorporated only after investigation and report 
upon their necessity. Several corporations stilJ exist in 
this country under charters granted by the king before 
the American Revolution. 
§ 'rl. ·ereation by common law. The state and the na-
tion, in their organized capacity, are corporations; so, 
also, the king, the bishop, or parson (in the English 
church), or executive officers generally, in their official 
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capacity, are considered corporations sole. They are 
not incorporated, in the ordinary sense, but the common 
law holds these to be corporations, so far as is necessary 
to enable their functions to be performed without break, 
in case of death or removal; the office or state endures 
though the officers die-or, as the c<>mmon law maxim 
was, ''the king never dies." For example, a school super-
intendent's bo.nd made to the "governor of the state," 
can be enforced by any governor, when default occurs, 
though not the governor when the bond was made, and 
though there is no statute authorizing such a bond. It 
is good at common law, and the "governor" is a corpora-
tion sole, so far as necessary to enforce it (3). 
§ 28. Corporate existence by prescription. At common 
law when a corporation could show that it had exercised 
corporate powers for a long period of time, its right to 
be a corporation could not be questioned by any one but 
the state or king; the common law indulged the presump-
tion that the proper charter had once been granted, but, 
through lapse or accidents of time, had been lost; its right 
to exist was then said to be by prescription. With us, in 
the case of public corporations, the same presumptions 
are made; though it has been said that they will not be 
made in case of private corporations. There seems to be 
no very good reason for such a statement, since, in the 
absence of any ev.idence to the contrary, the presumption 
of right doing ought to be indulged, and the statutes of 
limitations relating to quo warranto, should be given 
effect not only against the state, but its citizens as welL 
(3) Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 176. 
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§ 29. Creation by legislative act. In England, the king, 
as supreme executive, was the bolder of all the franchises 
of the commonwealth, and hence his consent was essential 
to the creation of any corporation; with us the legislative 
bodies are the <'ustodians of the state's franchises, and 
hence no corporation can be created without legislative 
consent. Such power inheres in our general legislative 
bodies, and is exclusive and plenary as to time, place, 
method, and purpose, unless limited by constitutions, or 
by the nature of legislative power, or of a franchise. For 
example, where a bank was created by the legislature 
without express constitutional provision, it was held the 
bank was validly created, since the state legislatures can 
d~ all things not prohibited by their constitutions (4). So 
too, Congress can create a corporation to carry out any 
of the express powers conferred by the Constitution, for 
such a power is incident to the legislative authority con-
ferred upon Congress within its provinee (5). 
§ 30. Forms in which the legislative authority is exer-
cised. These are, when constitutions do not prevent: (1) 
By special act; (2) by general act; (3) by implication; 
(4) by consolidation. The last two are really only special 
instances of one or other of the first two. 
§ 31. By special act. Until about 1840, this was the 
usual method in the United States, and to a great extent 
in England; the special act was usually enacted at the 
suggestion or through the influence (good or bad) of 
those who wished to become incorporated, and would 
(4) Bell v. Bk. of Tenn., Peck (Tenn.) 269. 
(ts) Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. ts2tS. 
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give such powers and qualities as the whim or caprice of 
the promoters or the legislature dictated ; corporations 
for like purposes had entirely unlike organizations and 
powers; bribery and corruption were not infrequently 
resorted to for the purpose of proeuring or perpetuating 
charters; "the time of the legislature was unnecessarily 
consumed; the integrity of the members of the legislature 
was unduly exposed; or, through the ignorance or care-
lessness of the legislature, and the astuteness and dili-
gence of designing and overreaching men, there were con-
stantly coming to light clauses in these acts of the legis--
lature, giving powers and granting privileges which were 
unjust, inequitable, and which never would have been 
done with the knowledge of the legislature.'' In this way 
Aaron Burr secured a charter for a company t:o supply 
the city of New York with water, with authority to use its 
surplus capital ''in any way not inconsistent with the 
laws and constitutions of the United States and New 
York," under which the Manhattan Bank has been carry-
ing on its banking business since 1799 (6). 
§ 32. By general act. It is possible that this method 
was in use at Rome; the first general law in use in Eng-
land was in the time of Coke, allowing the erection of b.os-
pi tals; it was not extended to other corporations. After 
the political views of the American and French revolu-
tions, that all men were entitled to equal rights, became 
the motive power of political life, clamor was made for 
equal privileges in the formation of corporations; to meet 
this doctrine and to prevent fraud and legislative jobbery 
(6) Century Magazine, May, 1899; Parton's Lite of Burr, 238. 
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incident t-0 the grant of franchises by special act, general 
laws were enacted for the creation of corporations, by 
complying with easy and simple requirements. As early 
as 1784, New York, foUowed by Pennsylvania in 1791, 
made such a law as to churches; North Carolina in 1795 
provided for canal companies in this way; Massachusetts 
made general regulations for manufacturing corporations 
in 1809; New York provided for the incorporation of such 
corporations in 1811; and by 1840 nearly every state bad 
such provision for one, or all, class or classes of corpora-
tions. But general acts were not sufficient to overcome 
the difficulty, for the legislature could and often did create 
corporations under special acts, though there was a gen-
eral law under which similar corporations could be 
formed. It was found necessary to limit the legislature 
in some way. New York, in her constitution of 1821, pro-
vided that the "assent of two-thirds of the members 
elected to each branch of the legislature shall be requisite 
to every bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing 
any body politic or corporate." In 1838, Florida, in her 
constitution, for bade the creation of churches by special 
act, and required the legislature to pass a general law 
for their incorporation. In 1845, Louisiana did the same 
as to all except municipal corporations. In 1846, New 
York did likewise, and such provisions are now found 
in most of the state constitutions. 
§ 33. By implication. Where rights and powers are 
granted to an association of persons, and there is no mode 
by w hicb such rights and powers can be enjoyed or exer-
cised, without acting as a corporation, such an assooia-
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tion is, by implication, held to be a corporation to the ex-
tent necessary to make such rights and powers available. 
For example, where the statute proYidcd that the board 
of directors of a state university shall have the custody of 
the property of the univP.rsity, and a11 lands shall be 
taken, held, transferred, and managed by said board, and 
it shall make by-laws, elect members of the faculty, and 
fix their salaries, such a board is a corporation so far as is 
necessary to enable it to hold lands and sue and be sued, 
though the legislature had not declared it to be a corpora-
tion (7), yet not to such an extent as to prevent the legis-
lature from modifying it, if it saw fit to do so. 
§ 34. By consolidation. The legislature, by general 
law (or special act, where constitutions do not forbid), 
may provide for the formation of one corporation out of 
two or more existing corporations. This is designated 
consolidation, or amalgamation. This matter is further 
considered below. 
§ 35. Limits upon legislative authority. These are 
such as arise: (1) From the nature of le~slative author-
ity. Since legislatures with us are held to have delegated 
authority only, it is usually said they cannot re-delegate 
their discretionary powers to others, and hence cannot 
delegate to any other body the general power to create 
corporations; this limitation does not prevent the pass-
ing of a general law providing for the creation of cor-
porations by complying with the terms indicated, and di-
recting an executiYe officer to certify to the fact of com-
pliance. A real exception, however, appears to exist, in 
(7) Dunn v. Unh"erslty or Oregon, !) Ore. 357. 
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the power of Congress to delegate to the territorial legis-
latures power to create corporations. (2) From the na-
ture of a franchise. By the common law an.individual 
cannot have even a benefit thrnst upon him without his 
consent, so the state cannot incorporate into a private 
corporation any person who does not consent to be a mem-
ber. It follows from this that there must be an accept-
ance of the act of incorporation by the persons to be in-
corporated before the act becomes operative. Perhaps 
the rule is otherwise as to public corporations. (3) From 
oonstitutionl:'.l provisions. These are found in the na-
tional or state constitutions, and are considered below. 
Illustrations of the first two above are: Where the stat-
ute provides that, when the persons interested shall de-
sire to form a corporation, they shall petition the court 
in writing, setting forth the objects and privileges they 
desire to exercise, with the name to be used, and the court 
shall make an order to have the petition entered upon 
t1ie record, and when this is done the petitioners shall be a 
corporation with certain powers specified in the act, there 
is no improper delegation of legislative power ( 8). Wbere 
a majority of landowners petitioned to be incorporated 
with power to lay out and improve a street, and levy the 
cost upon the adjoining ]ands, it was held that a party 
who had not consented to become a member could not be 
made such, and have his land sold for refusing to pay his 
assessment. The legislature has no ''power over a per-
son to make him a member of a corporation, and subject 
(8) State v. Dawson, 16 Ind. 40. 
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him to taxation, no lens vol ens, for the promotion of a 
private enterprise" (9). 
§ 36. Powers of Congress. The national Constitution 
neither expressly authorizes nor forbids the formation of 
corporations; but ever since Secretary Hamilton's report 
upon the national bank, and the decision of McCulloch 
v. Maryland (10), it is clear that Congress has the inci-
dental power to create any corporation that it deems nec-
essary or convenient in carrying out any of its great sub-
stantive powers; it can create a bank, railroad, bridge, 
turnpike, telegraph, and such like corporations, to be 
located and operated in any of the states either with or 
without the state's consent, so far as necessary to pro-
vide for interstate commerce (11); it has also exercised 
the power to create a corporation for building a canal 
across the Isthmus of Panama; and n'Ow owns and ope-
rates a railroad across the Isthmus. Such corporations 
are not entirely foreign in any state, may exercise the 
power of emnnent domain within the state if so authorized 
for a public purpose, are exempt from state taxation or 
control if such would impair their efficiency as an instru-
ment of the national government, and have the right to 
sue and be sued in the Federal courts unless otherwise 
provided. It is doubtful if the national government can 
create a corporation to engage generally in manufactur-
ing, mining, or agriculture, within the states, without 
their consent (12). Within the territories, or in the Dis-
(9) Ellls v. Marshan, 2 Mass. 269. 
(10) 4 Wbea t. 316. 
(11) Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525. 
(12) Rep. Am. Bar Assn., 1904, p. 732 ff.; 3 Mich. L. R. 264 (Feb,. 
1906). 
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trict of Columbia, Congress bas unlimited power to create 
corporations. 
§ 37. National restrictions on state legislatures. There 
are no express limitations, but there is the implied limi-
tation that no state can create corporations for such pur-
poses and confer upon them such powers as would pre-
vent, the exercise of such exclusive or concurrent power 
as Congress bas over the same subject. A·s where a state 
incorporated a telegraph oompany with the exclusive 
right to construct and operate its telegraph lines along a 
railroad, which, by Federal legislation, was a post road, 
along which any telegraph company organized under the 
laws of any state, might, upon obtaining the consent of 
the railroad company, construct and operate its lines; the 
exclusive grant of the state must yield to the right of a 
telegraph company complying with the Federal laws (13). 
§ 38. Powers of territorial legislatures. The power to 
create corporations inheres in such bodies, subject to con-
trol by Congress; Congress has provided that they can 
be formed only under general laws, which are subject to 
repeal or amendment by the territorial legislature or 
Congress. 
§ 39. State constitutional limitations. The most usual 
constitutional limitation is that the legislature shall pass 
"no special act creating corporations," or "conferring 
corporate powers,'' but they ''shall providoe by general 
law for the creation of corporations, and all such laws 
shall be subject to amendment or repeal.'' By the weight 
of authority, creating corporations, and conferring cor-
(lS) Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel Co., 96 U.S. L 
Vol. VIII-10 
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porate powers, are equivalent, though some cases hold 
that after the corporation is once created under general 
law, other or special powers can be conferred upon it by 
special act. Such provisions do not prevent the classifica-
tion of corporations upon some reasonable basis, and the 
enactment of provisions for the creation of these differ-
ent classes with different powers and functions for each 
class. A law which relates to a class of perso.ns or things 
is general, while a law relating to particular persons or 
things of a class is special. Other constitutional pro-
visions sometimes require that no law shall embrace more 
than one subject, and this shall be distinctly set for th in 
the title; other.s require laws for the creation of corpora-
tions to receive a two-thirds or three-fourths vote of the 
members of the legislature. 
Where the legislature passed a general law for the in-
corporation of water works companies, and the next day 
passed a special ac.t giving E and his associates, as soon 
as they should incorporate under the general law, the right 
to supply water to San Francisco, charge certain rates 
therefor, and have certain rights and be subject to certain 
burdens, different from those granted or imposed under 
the general law, such second act violated the constitutional 
provision that corporations should not be created by spe-
cial act (13a). So, by special act, to authorize a particular 
city to take in additional territory, "confers corporate 
powers," contrary to the constitutional inhibit.ion. But 
on the other han<l, a special act authorizing an existing 
railroad company to purchase the railroad of another ex-
(13a) San Francisco v. Spring Valley W.W. Co., 48 Cal 498. 
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isting company, and, after doing so, to change its own 
name, does not create a corporation contrary to a pro-
vision that corporations shall not be created by special 
act (14). 
SECTION 2. THE PROMOTER'S FUNCTIONS. 
§ 40. Definition a.nd classes. A promoter is a person, 
by whatever name, who sets the machinery in motion, pro-
cures the subseriptions, directs the end, looks after the or-
ganization, prepares the prospectus, and negotiates the 
agreements, necessary in the formation and creation of 
a corporation. For convenience we may call promoters 
(1) statutory, which may be divided into (a) commis-
sioners, under speeial acts, and (b) incorporators, under 
general laws; or, (2) self-constituted. 
§ 41. Commissioners. Under special acts it was usual 
to designate a part or all of the applicants as commission-
ers to open books, receive subscriptions to stock, distrib-
ute the stock, call a meeting f<>r organization, and super-
intend such meeting; their fnnotions then ceased; such 
functions were of a public, discretionary character; the 
commissioners stood toward the corporation and sub-
scribers as trustees. They, however, could subscribe 
themselves, and exercise their discretion in making allot-
ment of shares if there was an over-subscription ( 15 ). 
§ 42. Incorporators. Under general laws, a certain 
number of persons are required to sign and file articles 
of incorporation; they are called incorporators or cor-
(14) Wallace v. T,oomJs, 97 U. S. 146. 
(15) Walker v. Devereaux, 4 Paige Cb. (N. Y.) 229, 
126 PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
porators, and are usually directed or permitted to call 
for sub.scriptions to the stock, call an organization meet-
ing of subscribers, act as inspectors of the first election, 
certify who are elected, and appoint a time and place of 
the first directors' meeting; their functions are about the 
same as the commissioners under special acts; they may 
or may not, as they choose (at least under some statutes), 
subscribe for stock. Their functions cease as soon as the 
organization is complete (16). 
§ 43. Self-constituted promoters. The law allows 
others, besides commissioners or inc.orporators, to take 
many of the steps preliminary to incorporation; anyone 
who actively undertakes any necessary step is a pro-
moter; he introduces the enterprise to desirable persons, 
informs them of its nature, solicits their aid, indicates 
possible profits and the capital needed, and discharges va-
rious other details. In recent years his functions have be-
come important, especially in organizing one corporation 
out of former existing corporations. The steps he usually 
takes are: (1) Securing options on the stock or property 
of the companies to be c.ombined; (2) financing the con-
cern by securing the money necessary to complete the 
transaction, and furnish \rorking capital; (3) organiz-
ing the new company. .A.s soon as options are obtained, a 
proposition is made to some financial house to und'erwrite 
the stock ( i. e., agree to take it, if the public does not) 
of the new corporation, to the extent sufficient to furnish 
all the cash necessary for the lransact.ion, for a commis-
sion usually to be paid in stock of the new company. As 
(16) Nlckum v. Burkhardt, 30 Ore. 464. 
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soon as such agreement is made, the promoter secures the 
fewest possible persons necessary to incorporate with 
the least possible amount of stock, but with authority to 
increase the stock to the amount required. As soon as 
this small amount of stock is subscribed, the corporation 
is organized by the selection of the requisite officers; these 
then increase the stock to the amount necessary, author-
ize the issue of all of it to the pr-omoter, who, in considera-
tion therefor, agrees to have conveyances of all the prop-
erty or stock of the corporations, upon which he holds op-
tions, made to the new corporation; by simultaneous 
transactions, these conveyances, duly executed, are de-
livered to the corporation, the promoter delivers the stock 
or cash to the old companies in payment, and delivers, to 
the financial house, the stock which it was to receive as 
commissions ; if any stock is left the promoter appropri-
ates it as his fee for engineering the deal (17). The legal 
relations of promoters to the oorporation, to sharehold-
ers, and among themselves, are discussed elsewhere. 
SECTION 3. THE CORPORATE CHARTER. 
§ 44. General nature. The legal conception of a. cor-
poration consists in the offer and acceptance of a charter 
-a written or printed instrument-wherein are set forth 
the terms and conditions upon which the state, by legisla-
tive act, will permit an individual or association of indi-
viduals to exercise tbe franchise or franchises granted 
therein. It is both a contract-resulting from the offer 
(17) St. Louis. F . Scott, etc. R. R. Co. v. Tiernan, 37 Kans. 606: Old 
Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 316; Same v. Lewlsobn, 210 
u. s. 206. 
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and acceptance, and also a law enacted by the legislature, 
conferring the powers indicated; it is a contract the obli-
gation of which cannot be impaired by either party to it 
without the consent of the other party (18); it is also a 
law, such that every person is supposed to know Hs con-
tents, under the maxim that'' ignorance of the law excuses 
no one" (19). If general, the courts take judicial notice 
of it; if special, it usually must be pleaded and proved. 
In its first instance, however, the charter or articles of 
association is a license of authority for the persons 
named to convert themselves or other persons, or an asso-
ciation of others, into a corporation by organization, in 
compliance with the conditions indicated. Although the 
statute provides that, upon the filing of articles of incor-
poration, the subscribers thereto "shall thereafter be 
deemed a body corporate,'' such does not in fact make a 
corporation, and it is usually hBld that no company really 
exists until the requisite stock has been subscribed, and 
an organization is completed by naming the directors. 
§ 45. Offer and acceptance. The off er may be made 
either by the state to persons (as is the case in general 
laws), or by persons to the state (as is usual in special 
acts), and the acceptance be by the other party. Accept-
ance is essential, but need not be formal; it can be implied 
from acts, such as organizing and acting under it; to be 
valid, as against the state which makes the offer (unless 
the law otherwise expressly provides), the acceptance 
must be within the state making it, by all to whom the 
(18) Trustees ot Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. 
(19) Hoyt v. Thompson, 19 N. Y. a>7; Central Transportation Co. v. 
Pullman Ol r Co., 139 U. S. 24. 
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offer was made. Renewals, extensions, and amendments 
must be accepted in the same way. For example, a special 
act was passed in .T anuary, 1849, authorizing persons 
named to form a railroad company; November 1, 1851, the 
new constitution of the state provided that ''corporations 
shall not be created by special act;" June 2, 1852, the 
grantees met, accepted the special act, and organized. 
Held, the acceptance was too late, and the corporation 
was invalid (20). But when it appeared that the same 
parties had applied for the charter, in the same words in 
which the state passed the special act in January, 1849, 
there was an offer to, and acceptance by, the state, and the 
corporation was valid (21). \Vhere parties, authorized 
by a law of Maine to form a corporation, met in New 
Y-0rk, accepted the charter, and elected directors, who 
authorized the president, chosen at the same time and 
place, to execute a mortgage, suoh mortgage was void, 
since the corporation had not boon lawfully formed. The 
reason wus that natural persons in themselves have n<> 
power to form a corporation; the charter or law alone 
confers such a faculty; this law is inoperative outside of 
the state enacting it; and the corporate faculty cannot, 
therefore, accompany the natural persons outside of the 
state, and be exercised there (22). This severely techni-
cal view is now modified by the rule that the corporation, 
incorporators, and officers who participated in such acts 
outside of the state are estopped to deny their validity. 
(~) State v. Dawson, 16 Ind 40. 
(21) State v. Dawson. 22 Ind. Z12. 
(22) Miller v. Ewer, 27 l\fe. 509. 
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§ 46. Wha.t makes up the charter. Under a charter 
from the king, or by a special act of the legislature, the 
instrument or act itself makes up the charter, and usually 
sets forth in detail the name, powers, method of acquir-
ing membership, management, etc. Under general laws 
articles of incorporation or association are required to 
be entered· into and filed with some public officer; the char-
ter then consists of ( 1) the provisions of the general law, 
and (2) the articles of incorporation, consistent with the 
general law. Where the general corporation statute was 
silent as to the power of a railroad corporation formed 
under it to lease its road, a power to lease, placed in the 
articles of incorporation, would not give such power, since 
it w·as inconsistent with the general law, on the ground 
that an enumeration of powers excludes those not 
enumerated (23). 
§ 47. Provisions of general law. These enumerate the 
purpose or purposes for which corporations can be 
formed; contain provisions or restrictions as to the num-
ber of incorporators, name, duration, amount of stock or 
debt, location of offices, number and qualification of di-
rectors. and officers, liability of members, method of vot-
ing, notice of meetings, quorum, etc. Also they contain 
certain provisions as to what the articles of incorpora-
tion shall contain, and how they shall be executed. 
§ 48. Articles of incorporation. The general law 
usually requires that those who wish to incorporate (not 
less than a certain number of natural persons competent 
to contract), shall enter into written articles of incorpora-
(28) Oreeon R. R. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U.S. 1. 
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tion, sign, and acknowledge the same (as they would a 
deed), and file the same with some pttblic officer, who is to 
record the same (if found to comply with the law), and 
furnish a certified copy thereof under the seal of the state 
to the applicants ; this copy so authenticated usually ia 
made prima f acie evidence of the existence of the cor-
poration. The general law usually requires these arti-
cles to set forth the name of the corporation, its purpose, 
location, duration, amount of stock, number of shares, 
officers, directors, and, in some cases, other matters. They 
must conform to the general laws (inoonsistent provis-
ions are surplusage and void), and usually cannot, even 
though claimed, secure any powers except such as are ex-
pressly allowed by the general law; in New Jersey and 
Delaware, however, any powers may be created by the 
incorporators, if claimed in their articles of association. 
and not expressly forbidden by the general law. Under 
the first general incorporation law in England for the for-
mation of hospitals, the oorporation was created by a 
deed of settlement, setting forth the organization in the 
· deed endowing the charity. This is not usual in this 
country. Under the English Companies Acts, a memoran-
dum of association, similar to our articles of incorpora-
tion, is to be entered into and filed with a registrar, who 
issues a certificate stating the corporation has been 
formed. In England, after the memorandum is executed, 
the parties may adopt articles of association, which 
correspond to the by-laws adopted by the members 
after the articles of incorpo1:"ation are executed in the 
United States. 
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§ 49. Where to incorporate. In the absence of express 
statutory requirements, incorporators do not need to re-
side in the state in which they seek to be incorporated. So 
also, under the rules of comity that obtain throughout 
the United States, a corporation formed under the laws 
of one state is permitted to do business in another state. 
In some of the states the incorporation laws are much 
more liberal than in others, and confer much more exten-
sive powers. In fact, many states have so liberalized their 
corporation laws as to be fairly open to the charge of 
bidding for the fees arising from incorporation. Busi-
ness men generally pref ~r to incorporate where they can 
secure the broadest powers, be hampered least, and be 
required to give as little information to the public as 
possible. It has therefore become customary to inquire 
"where is the best place to incorporate for certain pur-
poses T" The so-called liberal or desirable states, for one 
reason or another, are genrally stated to be: Arizona, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New• York, Porto 
Rico, South Dakota, and West Virginia. 
The points to which attention and comparison are 
usually directed are: Whether part or all of the incor-
porators or directors musit be residents of the incorporat .. 
ing state; whether there is a maximum or minimum limit 
to the capital stock, and a limit to corporate indebted-
ness; what part of the stock is required to be subscribed, 
or paid in, before doing business ; whether stock can be 
paid for in property or services, and, if so, whether, in 
the absence of actual fraud, the judgment of the directors 
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as to the vame of the property taken in paymenJt of stock 
is conclusive, or only prima facie sufficient, or whether 
the matter is for the court or jury to determine; whether 
the shares may be issued with preferences or not; whether 
the shareholders' or directors' meetings must be held 
within the incorporating state; whether the shareholders 
are authorized to vote by proxy, or to cumulate their 
votes; whether there is any statutory liability upon share-
holders or directors for debts of the corporation, or for 
failure to make certain reports; whether directors are 
liable for paying dividends out of the capital, or whether 
shareholders are liable for receiving iucb dividends, not 
knowing they have been so paid out of capital; whether a 
transfer of unpaid shares releases the transferror; 
whether the records, minute-, account-, and stock-books 
must be kept within the state, and be open to inspection 
of shareholders or pnblic officers; whether annual reports 
as to names of officers, directors, shareholders, and de-
tails as to paid up capital, debb, and operations are re-
quired; whether the corporate property, surpJus, and 
franchise are subject to tax, and if so bow; whether shares 
are taxed to the shareholders also, and whether they are 
subject to an inheritance tax; what are the powers as to 
consolidation, leasing and selling property, and holding 
its own shares or shares in other corporations; can ma-
terial amendments be made without unanimous consent; 
can directors prefer themselves as creditors; are direc-
tors liable only for gross negligence, or must they exer-
cise the reasonable care of competent business men in the 
management and control of the corporate business; what 
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are the organization and filing fees; are the provisions 
of the law under which it is proposed to incorporate plain 
and clear, and have the courts passed upon their mean-
ing (24). 
It will be readily seen that the foregoing questions and 
others like them require the careful attention, compari-
son and advice of a competent attorney before any defi-
nite conclusion can be reached. Sometimes it is consid-
ered desirable to incorporate in a foreign rather than 
the domestic state, or the reverse, so that suits may or 
may not be brought or removed to the Federal courts. 
SECTION 4. THE AssocIATION AGREEMENT. 
§ 50. Its necessity and nature. Since a corporation 
aggregate is composed of more than one person, the or-
ganization of which is not thrust upon any one, some as-
sociation of a contractual character necessarily precedes, 
accompanies, or results from, the formation of a corpora-
tion; it need not be, though it usually is, a formal or writ-
ten transaction, and sometimes it is very complex and in-
tricate. Its general nature, however, is an agreement by 
each associate with bis fellows to organize for the pur-
pose contemplated, and to contribute bis proportion of 
the funds agreed, the consideration being the mutual 
promises of the parties. 
§ 51. Forms of association contracts. These are vari-
ous, but may be classed as: (1) An exclusively statutory 
contrac.t; or, (2) a common law agreement. These latter 
(24) See Mechem. Modern Law ot Corporations, 2 Vols. 1008; Cor-
poration Manual with Forms 1907-8; Frost, Incorporattoa (3d ed.) 1908; 
Clepbane, Business Corporations. 
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are: (a)° An agreement to subscribe for stock in the cor-
poration to be formed; (b) an agreement subscribing for 
s*ock in a corporation to be formed, or after it is formed; 
( c) subscriptions to promoters, agents, or trustees; ( d) 
underwriting contracts; ( e) application, allotment and 
notice; (f) conditional subscriptions. 
§ 52. Statutory contract. In some states where the 
statutes provide that articles of incorporation shall be 
filed, in which shall be stated the names of the incorpora-
tors, and the number of shares which each agrees to 
take, all who wish to become members must subscribe for 
the stock in the articles of incorporation, and no other 
method of subscribing will be valid. This view, how-
ever, seems to be confined to a few cases in New York 
and Missouri, under special statutes; the general rule in 
other states is otherwise. For example, where the statute 
provided that any number of persons not less than five 
might incorporate by making and subscribing articles of 
association, "by signing bis name and place of residence, 
and the number of shares be agrees to take," and A, on 
a preliminary subscription paper, "agreed to take the 
number of shares written opposite our names' '-$5500-
but did not sign the articles of incorporation, and died 
before the articles of incorporation were executed and 
filed, such subscription could not be ·enforced against 
the estate of A, the court saying" the statute neither con-
templates nor alludes to any preliminary paper of sub-
scription," and one can become a member in no other 
mode than the one pointed out in the statute (25 ). 
(25) Sedalia, W. & S. Ry., .. Wilkerson, 83 Mo. 235. Compare: Shel~ 
Co. Ry. v. Crow, 119 S. W. 435 (Mo. App.). 
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§ 153. An agreement to subscribe for stock in a corpora-
tion to be formed in the future, contemplates a subscrip-
tion upon the books of the company after they are prop-
erly opened; the person does not by such an agreement, 
become a member, nor can the corporation enforce the 
subscription. Where T signed a paper agreeing "to sub-
scribe the sum set against our names, when the books 
may be opened for subscription"-$3000-and T refused 
to subscribe when the books were opened and he was 
notified, T could not be held as a member and be lia bl9 
for the whole amount of the stock, but only for such 
damages as the corporation could sh.ow it had suffered 
by T failing to subscribe as agreed (26). Some authors 
claim there is no difference between an agreement to sub-
scribe, and an agreement subscribing; i e., a present sub-
scription, particularly when the corporation is not yet 
formed (27). The courts, however, take a different 
view (28). 
§ 54. Agreements subscribing for stock in a corporation 
to be formed have occasioned much conflict as to their 
legal effect, and at least four theories exist: (1) That 
it is a mere offer, withdrawable at any time before tha 
corporation is organized and accepts the offer; death or 
insanity revokes it, and any one may withdraw upon giv-
ing notice to the person who took the subscription (29). 
(2) That it is an offer, until acted upon in accordance 
(20) Thrasher v. Pike Co. R. Co., 25 III. 393. 
(27) Prof. Colllns, Rules given in 1 Cook, Corporntlons (5th ed.), 
175. 
(28) Yonkers Gazette Co. v. Taylor, 30 N. Y. App. Div. 334. 
(29) Bryant's Pond Co. v. Felt, frl Me. 234. 
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with the provisions, and then becomes a binding con-· 
tract. (3) That it is a binding contract from the time 
it is made (30). (4) That it is an offer to the proposed 
corporation before its inoorporation and acceptance, but 
a binding agreement between the subscribers from the 
time it is made (31). The first view probably has the 
weight of authority. If the subscription is made to the 
stock of the corporation already formed, which accepts 
the subscription, the contract is binding from the time of 
acceptance. Illustrations of the foregoing views are as 
follows: F signed for 20 shares on a paper reading ''we 
hereby agree to pay for the number of shares set opposite 
our names, etc." This was signed by several others, all 
before the company was incorporated; and, before in-
corporation, F notified the person who had taken his sub-
scription that he wished to withdraw, and asked that bis 
name be taken off the list. Held, he could so withdraw 
(note 29, above). So too, where H, along with others, 
signed "we hereby subscribe for and agree to purchase 
the shares set opposite our names,'' under seal, he could 
withdraw before incorporation by notifying the person 
who took his subscription. So, where a party signed a 
sim·ilar paper, but not the articles of incorporation, and 
waited until after incorporation to withdraw, it was too 
late. On the other hand, where a party signed a pre-
liminary paper of the same kind before incorporation, 
and died before incorporation, his estate was held liable 
on the subscription, on the theory that such an agreement 
(30) Tonica & Petersburg R R. v. l\lcNeely, 21 Ill. 71. 
(81) Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Davie, 40 Minn. 110. 
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was valid between the various parties when made, and 
was a continuing contract with them in their corporate 
name as soon as formed (note 30, above). So also, where 
D subscribed a preliminary paper, but with the•'oral agree-
ment that the subscription should not be delivered until 
other parties named had subscribed, but which was in 
fact used to secure other subscriptions, he was liable, al-
though the parties named never subscribed, and D did 
not know the paper bad been so used, or delivered to and 
acted upon by the corporation. Under these last two 
theories withdrawal requires the unanimous consent of 
the subscribers. 
§ 55. Subscription to promoter or trustee. If made to 
a statutory promote·r, as a commissioner or incorporator, 
it is a binding contract from the time of making; if made 
to a self-constituted trustee, who is to organize the cor-
poration, deliver the subscription list to the corporation, 
and deliver certificates of stock to the subscribers, it is a 
binding contract between the promoter and subscribers, 
in accordance with its terms, from the time it is made; 
he M8 a right to enforce it, if he performs his part (3la); 
and when it is delivered to the corporation and accepted 
by it, the corporation can enforce it (32). 
§ M. Underwriting. This is a form of subscription 
entered int-0 before subscriptions are called for from 
the public, whereby, for an agreed commission or protit, 
the underwriters undertake to take all the shares, except 
what the public subscribes for after the books are regu-
(31a) San Joaquin T..an<l Co. v. West, 94 Cal. 399. 
(32 ) West v. C'rawtorcl, 80 Cal. 1!>. 
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larly opened and subscriptions called for (33). If prop-
erly drawn it is an enforceable contract from the time 
it is made. 
§ 57. Application, allotment, and notice. Under the 
English law an application for shares is made to the pro-
moters, very similar to our subscriptions to stock in a 
corporation to be formed; after the subscription books 
are closed, the promoters make allotment among those 
who have subscribed, either pro rata, or in such way as 
the promoters deem for the best interests of the corpora-
tion. After allotment is made, the subscriber must be 
notified of the number of shares alloted to him; the con-
tract is not complete until then; before that time it is a 
mere withdrawable offler. 
§ 58. Conditio.nal subscriptions. Subscriptions may be 
upon conditions: (1) Express or implied; (2) prece-
dent or subsequent; (3) before or after incorporation; 
(4) or the delivery of the subscription may be conditional 
§ 59. Express and implied conditions. Express condi-
tions may be found either in the subscription, or in the 
statutes relating to subscription; the former may be of 
infinite variety, if not inconsistent with the charter; the 
most usual condition found in statutes is that payment 
of a certain amount shall be made at the time the sub-
scription is made; if such subscription is made before in-
corporation, two views are taken as to the necessity of 
payment under such a statute-one that it is necessary, 
and failure to pay makes the subscription void; the other 
(supported by the weight of authority) is that such pro-
(33) Electric Welding C.O. v. Prince, 193 Mass. 242. 
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vision is meant for the benefit of the corporation only, 
and it may waive it if it chooses. The principal implied 
condition, attaching to subscription at common law, is 
that no one can be called on to pay anything to the cor-
poration for carrying on its busmess until the whole 
amount of stock agreed upon is fully subscribed. 
§ 60. Conditional subscriptions prior to incorporation. 
If these are necessary for purposes of organization, two 
views are held: the New York view, that they are entirely 
void, and cannot be counted; and the Pennsylvania view, 
which holds the con<lition to be void, and the subscription 
absolute, unconditional and valid, so it may be counted as 
.one of the necessary subscriptions. If such conditional 
subscriptions are not necessary for organization, in either 
state they would probably be held valid according to their 
terms. 
§ 61. Conditions precedent and subsequent. A sub-
scription upon condition precedent is one which requires 
the condition to be performed, unless waived, before the 
subscriber can become a member; if made after incorpora-
tion two theories exist as to their legal effect: (1) That 
they are mere withdrawab1e offers until the condition is 
fully performed; (2) that they are binding contracts from 
the time of making, to a wait the time of performance, and 
the subscriber cannot withdraw unless the corporation 
fails to perform. Subscriptions upon conditions subse-
quent are valid, and have the effect of making the sub-
scriber a member from time of acceptance by the corpora-
tion; if the corporation fails to perform the condition, the 
subscriber cannot withdraw, but has an action for dam-
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ages against the corporation for its failure. Courts con-
strue conditional subscriptions to be conditions subse-
quent if possible (34). 
§ 62. Conditional delivery of subscriptions. Subscrip-
tions, absolute in form, may be delivered to someone to 
be delivered to the corporation only upon the happening 
of some event; if the delivery is made to some one un-
connected with the corporation it does not become effective 
until delivery to, and acceptance by, the corporation; if 
delivered to an agent of the corporation, one line of au-
thorities holds that the legal effect is the same as if de-
livered to an outside party, while another line bolds that 
it becomes an absolute delivery to the ·corporation at once, 
and the condition is waived. 
§ 63. Fraud a.nd mistake. These vitiate the subscrip-
tion the same as in other contracts, and make it voidable 
at the option of the subscriber. He must, however, be 
diligent in discovering the fraud or mistake and prompt 
in repudiating the subscription after ascertaining the 
fact. The English and some American cases bold that, 
even if the subscriber has acted With due diligence, be 
cannot repudiate the subscription after insolvency and 
creditors' rights have intervened (34a); others hold he 
can if be is not guilty of !aches (35 ). 
§ 64. Parties that may subscribe. The general rule is 
that subscribers must be persons capable of contract-
ing, so far as an subscriptions necessary for organization 
are concerned. An infant may subscribe, but if he does be 
(34) Rnllroad Ol. v. ParkR, ~ Tenn. 5!i4. 
(34a) Oakes v. Turquand. L. R. 4 App. Cas. 615, 2 H. L. 325. 
(85) Hinkley v. Oil Co., 132 Ia. 396. 
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may repudiate the subscription as in other contracts ; at 
common law, the subscription of a married woman was 
said to be void, but under statutes in most states her sub-
scription is now valid; an alien friend or non-resident, 
or person of any nationality or vocation may subscribe; 
neither private nor public corporations can subscribe for 
shareij unless specially authorized; in the absence of con-
stitutional provisions forbidding, the state or nation, by 
legislative permission, may subscribe for stock in pnblic 
service corporations, but not private manufacturing com-
panies. The statutes now often permit one corporation 
to acquire by original subscription or purchase the shares 
of other corporations. 
SECTION 5. ORGANIZATION. 
§ 65. Schemes of organization. As before indicated, 
under a king's charter, or a special act, or a deed of 
settlement, the organization was distinctly set forth in the 
instrument itself, and usua11y the persons who were to 
act as the first officers were designated; methods of con-
tinuing the succession were also specifically provided 
Under general incorporation laws, it is usual for the or-
ganization to be completed, before the articles of incor-
poration are filed, by electing the proper officers and 
agents, and certificate of this fact is made when the 
articles are filed with the public officer; in other cases 
the incorporators call for subscriptions, and, after these 
have been received, the incorporators can the subscribers 
together and they elect officers, adopt by-laws, etc., and 
start the machinery running. In other states more formal 
proceedings are essential, such as having a hearing be-
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fore a court or commission esitablished for the purpose, 
with a finding of such court or commission entered upon 
a public recor<l, and sometimes publications thereof made. 
§ 66. Proof ~f organization. Usually un<lcr general 
laws a certified copy of the articles of association, filed 
with the secretary of state and duly certified by him under 
the great seal of the state, is prima facie evidence of the 
existence of the corporation; it is, however, usually not 
conclusive, and the facts of organization may be inquired 
into. Under special acts, the act itself, or an exemplified 
copy thereof with evidence of user, was sufficient to es-
tablish corporate e~istence (36). General reputation has 
been held to be sufficient. 
§ 67. Commencement of corporate existence. As to the 
exact time of corporate birth, there are divergent views, 
based more or less upon the peculiar provisions of the 
statutes. These are: (1) There is no corporate life 
until organization is complete; (2) corporate life begins 
as soon as the articles are filed with the proper officer, 
without stock subscription or organization; (3) only a 
qualified corporate existence begins when the articles are 
filed, and the adult or perfect corporate capacity is not 
acquired until the stock is provided as required; ( 4) cor-
porate life begins as soon as the articles are filed, but, 
until the stock is divided into shares, the incorporators 
are tenants in common of the proposed capital; ( 5) under 
special acts, the statute may make those named, ipso facto 
and eo instanti, a corporation without further act on their 
part. Thus, where the statute required the names of ~he 
(36) Mokelumne Hill, etc. Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 424 .• 
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directors for the first year to be stated in the articles 
of association, and provided that the "existence of the 
corporation should date from the filing of the articles with 
the secretary of state," and this was done, yet it was held 
that it was not in existence before the stock was sub-
scribed, and a full and complete organization perfected, 
and those who incurred obligations in the name of the cor-
poration were personally liable (37): On similar facts it 
was ruled otherwise in South Dakota (38). In another 
case on like facts it was held that those who participated 
in incurring the obligation, or were careless in permitting 
it to be incurred before organization was complete, were 
personally liable, since a ''corporation'' without organiza-
tion was like "the bull of a ship, without rudder or masts 
or gearings" (39). 
§ 68. Conditions of de jure existence. A substantial 
(but not necessarily literal) compliance with all manda-
tory conditions of the general law is essential to de jure 
existence, that is, such as will avail against the direct 
assault of the state. The implied condition that there 
must be good faith in s.eeking corporate powers is man-
datory; mandatory express conditions are: (1) that there 
shall be a certain number of incorporators; (2) written 
articles of agreement; ( 3) giving the names and resi-
dences of subscribers to stock if that is required; (4) nam-
ing place of business; (5) stating definitely the purpose 
or purposes; ( 6) subscribing articles of association; (7) 
acknowledging them; (8) filing them as required by law; 
(37) Walton v. Ollver, 49 Kans. 107. 
(38) Singer Mrg. Co. v. Peck. 9 So. Dak. 28. 
(39) Wecbselberg v. Flour City Bank. 64 Fed 90. 
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all these have been held to be matters of which the state 
may complain if not substantially followed. Some con-
ditions however are merely directory, as where the statute 
provided that the first meeting of the incorporators should 
be called by a majority of the persons named in the act 
of incorporation, the meeting was called by only one of 
the incorporators, and all were notified and attended the 
meeting, the corporation was validly formed ( 40). So 
some conditions are subsequent, as where the statute pro-
vided that before a corporation could commence bitsiness, 
the president shall cause the articles of association to be 
published, and a certificate thereof to be deposited with 
the secretary of state, and a duplicate with the clerk of 
the court, the making and depositing of the certificate 
was not a condition precedent to corporate existence, but 
a condition to the lawful carrying on of business after 
incorporation ( 41). 
§ 69. Conditions of de facto existence. Something less 
than a substantial compliance with all mandatory pro-
visions will suffice for de facto existence, i. e., such as 
is valid as against any one but the state. The following 
are conditions of de facto existence: ( 1) A valid law 
under which such a corporation could be formed; (2) a 
bona :fide attempt to organize under the law; (3) an ap-
parent compliance therewith ; and ( 4) corporate user. 
When these things concur, by the weight of authority, 
no one but the state can successfully question the cor-
porate existence, and then only in a direct proceeding for 
(40) Newcomb v. Reed, 12 Allen (Mass.), 362. 
(41) Harrod v. Hamer, 32 WI& 162. 
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that purpose. The matter however is very much involved, 
and the courts do not seem to follow any settled doctrine. 
Much of the confu:;ion arises from the great variety of 
opinion that exists as to the necessity of pleading and 
proving corporate existence, and the presumptions relat-
ing thereto. These are noted elsewhere. 
§ 70. Conditions of existence by estoppel. Estoppel is 
founded in the obligation which every man is under to 
speak and act according t.o the truth of the case; so, 
wherever an act is done by a party which cannot be con-
travened or contradicted without fraud or misconduct on 
his part, and such act has induced another to believe in 
the existence of a fact ·or condition and thereby to change 
his position, the party who did the act is not permitted to 
show the contrary. It does not shut out the truth, but 
rather lets in the whole truth. If persons, therefore, have 
acted as if a corporation were in existence, in such a way 
as to recognize it to be such, where it is equitable ( 42) to 
hold them to such recognition and inequitable ( 43) not to 
do so, they will be estopped to deny such corporate ex-
istence, even though it is really neither a de jure nor a 
de facto corporation. This seems to be the rule by the 
weight of authority, but there are many cases to the con-
trary; a different view is that there can be no estoppel 
upon a matter of law, and hence if there is no law, or 
an unconstitutional law, there can be no estoppel; still 
another view is that there can be no estoppel unless there 
is at least de facto existence; still another view is that 
(42) Doyle v. Mizner, etc., 42 Mich. 3.'l2. 
(43) Estey Manufacturing Co. v. Runnels, 55 Mich. 130. 
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it is against public policy to allow persons to claim 
corporate existence unless they have substantially com-
plied with a valid law, hence there can be no recognition 
of corporate existence arising merely by estoppel, even 
against the pretended corporation itself ( 44). 
§ 71. Parties estopped. Where existence by estoppel 
is recognized, the parties estopped to deny corporate ex-
istence are: (1) The pretended corporation itself; (2) 
those who act as, or claim to be, members, either among 
themselves, or in regard to their liability upon their 
subscription, or statutory liability to corporate creditors 
(45); (3) the promoters and officers of the apparent cor-
poration; ( 4) persons who have dealt with the apparent 
corporation in such a way as to recognize it to be such; 
either when they seek to avoid their liability to it, or to 
hold its members liable as partners ( 46); but dealers 
with such pretended corporation, without knowledge that 
it claims to be such, are not estopped to deny it is a cor-
poration; ( 5) persons who have injured such corpora-
tions by their torts or crimes, w-hen called to account, 
are also estopped. 
§ 72. Effect of failure _to comply with conditions. (1) 
The state may complain for failure substantially to 
comply with any mandatory conditions in quo \\arranto 
proceedings and prevent further action as a corporation. 
(2) If there is neither de jure nor de facto existence, a 
(44) Boyce v. Trustees of M. E. Church. 46 Md. 359. 
( 45) Canfield v. Gregory, G6 Conn. 9; McCarthy v. TAvascbe, 89 Ill 
270. 
(46) West Winsted Sav. Bk. v. Ford, 27 Conn. 282; Snider's Sons' 
Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224. 
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person not estopped for other reasons can question the 
validity of the pretended corporate existence in any pro-
ceeding in which it is of any importance to him to have 
it determined. (3) If there is de facto existence (ex-
cept as against the state), the powers, rights, duties, and 
liabilities of the corporation and its members are the 
same as if de jure. ( 4) And where there is neither a 
de jure nor a de facto corporation, as to a party other-
wise estopped by his own acts, the corporation is to him 
the same as it would be if it were de jure. (5) But to 
one not so estopped, by one line of authority he may treat 
the members (if it is for a business purpose) as if they 
were partners ( 47 ), and by another bold them as mem-
bers of an unincorporated association ( 48)-tbe liability 
resting only upon those w:ho have participated in the acts, 
or authorized them to be done, or ratified them. 
( 47) Martin v. Fewell, 79 Mo. 401. 
(48) Fay v. Noble, 7 Cnsb. (Mass.) 188. 
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CHAPTER III. 
THE BODY CORPORATE. 
SECTION 1. MEMBERS, INTEGRAL p ARTS, AND ORGANS OF 
ACTION. 
§ 73. Necessity of members. In a corporation aggre-
gate there must be members, otherwise it cannot exist. 
If it is a non-stock company, the death of all the mem-
bers terminates the existence; but, if it is a stock com-
pany, the representatives of deceased members who suc-
ceed to the shares become members, and consequently the 
corporation is not dissolved A practice has lately grown 
up whereby a corporation purchases and retires its own 
shares of stock. When that is done, if all shares are so 
retired, it would seem the corporation would be dissolved. 
No case, however, bas yet been decided so holding. The 
ownership of all the shares by one member does not dis-
solve the corporation (1), although it has been said that, 
for some purposes, ·the corporate existence is suspended 
until other persons become members by becoming owners 
of some of the shares, but this is not according to gen-
erally received views. 
§ 74. Acquisition of membership. Membership in non-
stock companies is obtained by complying with the con-
(1) Louisvllle v. McAteer (Ky.), 81 S. W. 698. 
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ditions set f or·th in the constitution and by-laws. In stock 
corporations, membership is acquired through ownership 
of stock and this may be: (1) subscription to the stock 
accepted by the corporation; or, (2) by a completed trans-
fer of shares; or, (3) in some cases, by estoppel such as 
acting or holding one's self out as a member without in 
fact having subscribed. "\Ve have already considered ac-
quisition of membership by subscription. Transfer of 
shares is considered below. Where one held himself out 
as a member of a corporation and allowed the pretended 
corporation to incur obligations, the member was estopped 
to allege the corporation was illegal because the law under 
which it was formed was unconstitutional (2). 
§ 75. Integral parts. Sometimes one corporation is 
composed of two groups of individuals in such a way 
that the continuance of both is essential to the continued 
corporate existence; if, therefore, from any cause all of 
one group should die, and there was no method of supply-
ing their place, the corporation would necessarily be dis-
solved. It was once contended that directors were such an 
integral part, but the cases have decided otherwise. It 
is not usual now to find a corporation created with in-
tegral parts, although St. 1'iary's church in Philadelphia 
is said to be so created. 
§ 76. Organs of action. Since a corporation is an arti-
ficial entity, it can act only through representatives. 
These are: (1) The majority of a quorum of corporate 
members duly assembled in corporate meeting; (2) a 
majority of directors duly assembled in directors ' meet-
(2) McCarthy ¥ . Ln,·nscbe, 89 Ill. 270. 
THE BODY CORPORATE 151 
ing; (3) officers of the corporation who are considered 
parts of _the organization; ( 4) agents, who are not con-
sidered parts of the organization but who represent it 
as any agent does bis principal; and (5) servants, who do 
not represent it but simply work for it. For example, 
where a minister, without a formal meeting of the church 
trustees so directing, solicited subscriptions on Sunday 
to complete the church, the names and amounts being 
written down by a clerk as they were announced, a sub-
scriber could withdraw at any time before the trustees 
met and accepted the subscription list, or ratified the 
act of the minister, since be was not duly authorized be-
fore tha.t time (3). 
§ 77. Qualifications of agents and officers. Unless stat-
ute or charter prevents, a corporation may select any 
persons it pleases to be its officers, agents, or servants. 
It is usual either by statute, charter, or by-law provision, 
to require directors to be shareholders and in some states 
they are required to be citizens of the United States. 
§ 78. Functions of shareholders and directors. Share-
holders wield the extraordinary and unusual powers, such 
as electing directors, accepting and rejecting amendments, 
increasing and reducing the capital stock, making by-
laws, admitting members, and in some circumstances re-
moving officers or restraining ultra vires transactions; 
disposing of all the corporate property; winding up the 
corporate business or surrendering the corporate fran-
chises, and dissolving the corporation (4). The directors 
(3) Methodist Church v. Sherman, 3G Wis. 404. 
(4) MetropoJltan Elevated Ry. Ot. v. Manhattan El. Ry. Co., 11 Daly 
(N. Y.) 1173. 
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control the ordinary business affairs, such as the policy 
of management; the expediency of acting or contract-
ing; and the selection of inferior officers, fixing their com-
pensation, directing their actions, etc. Within this scope 
of their authority, if they act in good faith, the stock-
holders cannot dictate to them nor control their acts in 
any particular; the stockholders must wait until time for 
a new election for selecting such directors as will con-
form to their wishes, unless the power of removal of 
officers has been reserved to the shareholders by statute, 
charter, or by-law provisions. 
§ 79. Functions of other officers. The president, 
merely as president, presides over corporate meetings 
and has no greater power in managing the corporate busi-
ness than any other shareholder; but, by statute, or 
charter, or by-law, or by a course of action acquiesced in 
by all, he is usually given the power to represent the cor-
poration in most of its ordinary business transactions. 
He usually executes conveyances, and signs contracts and 
certificates of stock. The vice-president performs the 
function of the president, when he is unable to perform 
his duties. The secretary keeps the minutes, records of 
corporate meetings, and has no other duties unless spec-
ifically conferred upon him. · He is usually made the cus-
todian of the 'corporate seal, and is required to attest 
it and affi..~ it to all documents executed by the corpora-
tion. He frequently is allowed to issue shares, and is 
often made the transfer agent of the corporation. The 
treasurer is custodian of the corporate funds, and bas 
power to endorse checks for collection by the corporation. 
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He is sometimes said to have implied authority to draw 
checks or bills of exchange, or sign promissory notes for 
money borrowed by the corporation, but it is doubtful if 
he can do this without special authority. The corpora-
tion can select such other officers and agents and confer 
such authority upon them, within the corporate powers, 
as may be necessary or convenient, subject to the general 
rule that directors should not delegate to others their 
discretionary powers and duties ( 5) , although some cases 
hold that this may be done under a general authority "to 
appoint such subordinate officers and agents as the cor-
poration may require" (6). 
SECTION 2. INTERN AL RELATIONS. 
§ 80. Contracts contained in the charter: Da.rtmouth 
College case. In 1769 the king of England incorporated 
twelve persons by the name of Trustees of Dartmouth 
College, and granted to them and their successors the 
usual corporate powers, and also authority to fill up any 
vacancies which might occur in their own body. In 1816, 
the legislature of New Hampshire attempted to amend the 
charter by increasing the number of trustees to 21 - the 
nine additional members to be appointed by the governor 
- and also by putting over the trustees a board of over-
seers, with power to inspect and control the most im-
portant acts of the trustees. The corporation refused to 
accept the amendment, and brought suit for the con-
version of its corporate seal and records by those who 
took possession under the amendment to the charter; the 
(5) First National Bank v. Commercial Assn., 185 N. Y. 575. 
(6) Sheridan Light Co. v. Chatham Bank, 127 N. Y. 517 • . 
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supreme court of New Hampshire sustained the legisla-
tion, but the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, where it was held, reversing the New 
Hampshire decision, that the charter constituted a con-
tract originally between the king and the corporation, 
and, after the American Revolution, between New Hamp-
shire and the corporation; and that contract was one the 
obligation of which could not be impaired by the state of 
New Hampshire without violating the provision of the 
national Constitution: "No state shall pass any law im-
pairing the obligation of con tracts" (7). 
§ 81. Same: Variety of charter contracts. From this 
case, has grown up a great body of corporation law. Re-
sulting from this decision it has been held that in the 
formation of a corporation there are: (1) A contract 
between the state and the corporation; (2) a contract be-
tween the state and corporate creditors ; (3) a contract 
between stockholders and corporate creditors, in the case 
of a special statutory liability; ( 4) a contract between 
the state and the corporators or member3; (5) a con-
tract between the corporation and the members, or among 
the members themselves, as to the amount to be con-
tributed, or that subscriptions are made in good faith. 
All these contracts, whether express or implied, are pro-
tected by the constitutional provision. For example, where 
the statute under which the corporation was formed pro-
vided that stockholders should be individually liable for 
corporate debts to double the face value of the shares, 
this liability could not he taken away, so as to divest a 
(7) Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wbeat. ~18. 
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prior creditor of the right to resort to this fund for pay-
ment in case the corporation could not pay-there is an 
implied contract between the st.ate and the existing cor-
porate creditors which cannot be annulled by the state 
alone (8). So, too, on the other hand, when a person has 
become a shareholder in a corporation in which there is 
no individual statutory liability of the shareholders to 
the creditors, the state cannot, unless the right to amend 
is reserved, impose such a liablity on the existing share-
holders without their consent (9). 
§ 82. Same: Effects of the doctrine. The Dartmouth 
College decision bas been severely criticised from time to 
time by writers and judges, but, while reasonably definite 
limits to it have been worked out by later decisions," the 
original doctrines of the case have become so imbedded 
in the jurisprudence of the United States as to make 
them to all intents and purposes a pa.rt of the Consti tu-
tion itself," and have given "solidity and inviolability 
to the literary, charitable, religious, and commercial in-
stitutions of our country." ·Although for a time, "it was 
under the protection of this decision that the most enQr-
mous and threatening powers in our country have been 
created," yet, for the most part, under the reservation 
in state constitutions of the power to r epeal or amend 
corporate charters without let or hindrance, most of the 
danger threatened bas been obviated or averted. 
Under this decision all vested property rights acquired 
by executed contract, as well as all such rights as are 
(8) Hawthorne v. Cater, 2 Wall. 10. 
(9) Ireland v. Turnpike Co., 19 Ob. S. 369. 
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necessary to the fuH and complete enjoyment of the 
original grant, or of property legally acquired subse-
quent to the grant, are protected. So too, any valuable 
privilege, such as an exemption from taxation, or an ex-
clusive right to supply water or gas, or to occupy streets 
for railway purposes, or that the bills or notes of the 
grantee shall be received for taxes, given by the cor-
porate charter, and which conduced to the original ac-
ceptance of it, is protected by the constitutional provision. 
On the other hand, since grants by the state are strictly 
construed against the grantee, an exclusive grant is never 
presumed, a tax exemption dooo not extend to property 
not used or not necessary, police regulations necessary for 
the prE!servation of the public safety, health, and morals 
are not forbidden, laws authorizing municipal subscrip-
tions, not yet actually made, may be repealed, unneces-
sary and unexecuted contingent privileges, such as an 
unexecuted right to consolidate in the future, and subse-
quent grants not supported by a good consideration, may 
be revoked without violating this constitutional provi-
sion (10). For a full discussion of the doctrine of the 
Dartmouth College case, see Constitutional Law, §§ 230, 
236-42, in Volume XII of this work. 
SECTION 3. CORPORATE FUNDS. 
§ 83. In general. By incorporation for business pur-
poses there is a dedication of certain funds by the im-
plied and express command of the state and the corpora-
tors to the attainment of certain purposes in a certain 
(10) Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 646. 
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way. Because the state believes the purposes desirable, 
.it authorizes the peculiar method; because the corpora tors 
deem the method necessary or desirable and the purpose 
profitable, they contribute the funds; the peculiar method 
is by the state authorizing a changing body of persons, 
through a specified form of organization and under a 
designated name, to act and be considered as one person, 
in whom are vested the funds, and upon whom is placed 
the duty of applying them to the purposes named. These 
funds are designated capital or capital stock. 
§ 84. Capital and ca.pita.I stock. There is much con-
fusion in the use of these terms. The best usage, how-
ever, is to say the capital of a corporation is the whole 
amount of its property of whatever kind, and to say that 
capital stock is the amount which it bas obtained or is 
authorized to obtain by way of subscription (11). The 
latter is the sum fixed by the corporate charter as the 
amount paid in or to be paid in by the subscribers for 
the prosecution of the business and for the benefit of the 
corporate creditors. 
§ 85. Purpose of capital stock. Corporations acting 
through their proper officers, within the scope of cor-
porate powers, fix no liability on their officers or on any-
one else than the corporation itself. Hence the purpose 
and policy of requiring a capital stock as security and in-
demnity for persons who become its creditors; the law-
making power confers upon the members a privilege-a 
franchise-a right to make contracts in its artificial name 
without fastening a liability on any natural person; and it 
(11) People v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. 433. 
• 
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exacts from them, as a condition on which it grants this 
franchise, that they place a capital stock in safe pledge 
for the security of their creditors. This is a permanent 
investment, with no power in a shareholder to withdraw 
it unti l the corporation is wound up and all its debts paid, 
and with no power in the managing board to permit it to 
be withdrawn at the expense of creditors. It is looked 
upon as a trust fund for the benefit of the corporation 
and its members, and the protection of corporate cred-
itors. The capital stock ''is the aggregate amount of 
the funds of the corporators, which are combined to-
gether under a charter for the attainment of some com-
mon object of public convenience or private utility. This 
amount is usually fixed in the act of incorporation. It 
is thus limited in reference to the convenience of the in-
tended corporators, and for the information and security 
of the public at large. To the corporators, it prescribes 
the amount and subdivisions of their respective con-
tributions to the common fund; the voice which each shall 
have in its control and management; and the apportion-
ment of the profits of the enterprise. To the community 
it announces the extent of the means contributed and 
forming the basis of the dealings of the corporate body, 
and enables every man to judge of its ability to meet its 
engagements and perform what it undertakes. The 
capital stock is like that of a co-partnership or joint stock 
company, t11e amount which the partners or associates 
put in as their stake in the concern. To this they add, 
upon the credit of the company, from the means and re-
sources of others to such extent as their own prudence 
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or the confidence of such other persons will permit. Such 
additions create a debt; they do not form capital, and, 
if successful in their career, the surplus over and above 
their capital and debts becomes profit, and is either di-
vided among the partners and associates. or used still 
further to extend their operations" (12). 
§ 86. Capital stock, franchise, surplus, and shares of 
stock. These are different things. The capital is the 
money or property, or both, of the corporation; the share-
holders' shares are representative of the capital, the sur-
plus, the dividend earning power, the franchises, and the 
good will. The capital stock of the company is owned 
and held by the company in its corporate character; the 
share capital stock of the shareholders, they own and 
hold in different proportions as individuals ; the one be-
longs to the corporation, the other to the corporators. 
The franchise of the company, which may be deemed its 
business opportunity and capacity, is the property of the 
corporation, but constitutes no part or element of its cap-
ital stock, while the same franchise does enter into and 
form part, and a very essential part, of the shareholders' 
capital stock. While the nominal or par value of the 
capital stock and of the share stock are the same, the 
actual value is often widely different. The capital stock 
and surplus differ also. The capital stock of the company 
may be wholly in cash or in property, or both, which may 
be counted and valued. The company may have, in addi-
tion, a surplus, consisting of some accumulated and re-
(12) Sanford, V. C., In Barry v. Merchants' Exchange, 1 Sand. Ch. 
(N. Y.) 280. 
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served fund, or undivided profits, or both, but that sur-
plus is no part of the company's capital stock, and there-
fore, is not itself capital stock. Neither the capital nor 
capital stock can be divided and distributed, but the sur-
plus may be, yet that surplus does enter into and form 
part of the share stock, for that represents and absorbs 
into its own value surplus as well as capital, and fran-
chise in addition. So it may be said that the property of 
a corporation consists of three things, which are its 
capital stock, its surplus, its franchise; but these three 
things, distinct in the ownership of the company, are 
united in the ownership of the shareholders. The share 
stock covers, embraces, represents, all three of these in 
their totality, for it is a business photograph of all the 
corporate possessions and possibilities (13). Hence, 
where the statute requires the "capital stock and the sur-
plus'' of a corporation to be taxed, the value of such 
cannot be determined by taking the aggregate market 
value of the outstanding shares, for such would include 
the value of the franchise and good will also. There is 
however much confusion in the taxing laws in the use of 
the terms "capital," "capital stock," and "property," 
and the cases cannot be reconciled. 
§ 87. Kinds of shares of stock Shares are of various 
kinds, such as common, preferred, guaranteed, interest-
bearing, treasury, deferred, founder's shares, watered, 
fictitious, or spurious. 
Common shares entitle their owners to an equal pro-
(18) Largely quoted trom Judge Finch in People v. Coleman, 126 
N. Y. 483. 
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portional participation in the management and profits, 
during corporate life, and in the net assets in case of dis-
solution. Preferred shares entitle their owners to some 
preference in the distribution of profits or of assets over 
the owners of the common stock. They may be either 
cumulative or non-cumulative as to profits, up to a certain 
fixed amount; if cumulative, a deficiency in paying the 
dividend for one year must be made up out of the profits 
of succeeding years. In the absence of express provision 
making preferred stock cumulative there is a tendency to 
hold it, nevertheless, to be so, but this is not so strong 
as to make it entirely certain it will be so held, where 
it is not really so ·expressed. Preferred shareholders 
usually have a right to participate in the management, 
and are subject to liabilities, as other shareholders. "Six 
per cent cumulative preferred," means that the owner 
of such shares will receive six per cent on the face value 
of bis shares before the common shareholders receive 
anything. In case in any one year there is enough profit 
to pay only three per cent on the preferred shares, then, 
in the subsequent years w.hen there are sufficient profits, 
the preferred shareholder will be entitled not only to the 
six per cent for those years, but also to all arrears in the 
payment of the dividends of previous years, before the 
common shareholders are paid dividends (14). After 
the pref erred shareholders have been paid in full, if 
there is then a surplus, this may be divided among the 
common shareholders even though they will thereby re-
(1.4) Roberts v. Roberts, etc. Co., 184 N. Y. 2~; .Jermain v. L. S. 4; 
M. S. Ry., 91 N. Y. 488. 
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ceive much more than the six per cent paid to preferred 
shareholders-unless the preferred shares are made par-
ticipating in the profits, after the common shares receive 
a dividend equal to the preference dividend. Preferred 
dividends are not debts, like interest, and to be paid at all 
events, but are to be paid only out of profits (15 ), when 
they have been duly declared as dividends by the proper 
authorities ( 16). Neither is a preferred shareholder 
a creditor of the company, even though his shares so 
state, so as to give him claim prior to that of unsecured 
creditors (17), unless the statute so authorizes (18). 
Guaranteed shares in the United States now mean sub-
stantially the same as cumulative preferred shares. In-
terest-bearing shares are such as bear int~rest upon all 
sums paid in, until the corporation is completed and 
profits are earned out of which to pay dividends. Such 
payment out of capital instead of profits, however, is held 
to be illegal as against creditors who might be injured 
thereby. 
§ 88. Same (continued). Treasury stock is often 
stated to be that part of the authorized stock left in the 
possession of the corporation to be issued in the future 
by the corporation or upon further subscription. The 
term, however, is more properly used to designate stock 
that has once been issued, but surrendered or forfeited 
to the corporation, and afterward re-issued or sold by 
it. It cannot be voted nor does it draw dividends while 
(15) Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 81 Mich. 76. 
(16) N. Y,. et<!. Ry. Co. v. Nlckals, 119 U. S. 296. 
(17) Hamlin v. Trust Co,. 78 Fed. 664. 
(18) Heller v. Natl Bk., 89 Md 602. 
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held by the corporation. In recent years, a practice has 
grown up, particularly in speculative ventures such as 
involve mining and patent properties, for the owner of 
the mine or patent to organize a corporation with a cer-
tain authorized amount of capital stock, in exchange for 
all of which the mining property or the patent right is 
to be conveyed to or aceepted by the corporation, in full 
payment for the whole of the stock, the directors usually 
passing a resolution that in their judgment the value of 
the property to the corporation is equal to the value of the 
stock. The person to whom the stock is so issued then 
generally is to, and does, donate to the corporation a cer-
tain part of the stock received by him as treasury stock 
fully paid, to enable the corporation to sell it at the best 
price that can be obtained for it, in order to get the money 
-"working capital"-actually necessary to start and 
carry on operations. The buyer of such shares takes a! 
a purchaser, and not as an original subscriber, and, in 
the absence of fraud, is not liable to pay any more than 
the purchase price, even though this is much less than 
the face value. Such a procedure has been held valid, 
if there is no fraudulent purpose or over-valuation of the 
property, and creditors are not thereby injured (19). 
Deferred stock draws no dividend until some one class of 
shares receive their ~ividends. They are practicaJly com-
mon shares. Debenture-stock is not stock at all in our 
American sense, but rather a bond, the holder of which 
is a creditor and entitled to interest, and it is issued in 
(19) Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Drexel, 90 N. Y. 87; Iron Co. v. 
Ha,.a. 185 Pa. Sl 489. 
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such a way that any fraction of it may be transferred. 
Founder's shares entitle the holder to all the profits, after 
certain fixed maximum dividends are paid to the other 
shareholders. Watered stock is that which upon its face 
purports to have been paid for at its full value, but which 
in fact has been issued without the corporation having 
the right to demand the full face value thereof. Fictitious 
shares are substantially the same as watered shares. 
Spurious stock is that issued in excess of the amount 
authorized. It is void, and the holder does not become 
a member of the corporation. 
§ 89. Right to create capital stock. The power to 
create, increase, or decrease, capital stock is a franchise 
which can be exercised only under the authority of a 
legislative grant (20). At the time a corporation is or-
ganized, however, it may provide for both common and 
preferred stock, and call for subscriptions for either; 
if the corporation is first created, and the stock sub-
scribed upon the understanding that only common stock 
shall be issued, by the weight of authority the corpora-
tion cannot (except by unanimous consent of share-
holders) create shares that shall have a preference over 
the common shares (21). By express legislative au-
thority, however, it has been held that the majority of 
members, contrary to the wishes of the minority, may 
issue preferred shares; it is said to be analogous to bor-
rowing money and the majority certainly have the right 
to do that, if done in good faith. 
(20) Cook v. Marshall, 191 Pa. St 315. 
'21) Campbell v. Zylonlte Co., 121 N. Y. 4M. 
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§ 90. Nature of shares of stock. A share of stock is an 
intangible property right to participate in the profits of 
the corporation, and, in the event of dissolution, to par-
ticipate in the division of assets after debts are paid. 
Such shares are personal property, goods, wares, or mer-
chandise within the seventeenth section of the statute of 
frauds, and choses in action. They are not negotiable 
instruments, and at common law could not be taken by 
attachment, or on execution, or in replevin, because of 
their incorporeal nature. By statutes in most of the 
states provision is made for attaching shares of stock or 
taking them upon execution, by notifying the company 
not to transfer them otherwise than as directed by the 
court. They are usually considered as being located at 
the domicile of their owner, though the state may give 
them a situs at the domicile of the corporation (22). They 
are evidenced by a certificate which usually says: "This 
is to certify that A. B. is the owner of Ten Shares of the 
Capital Stock of X Company of the par value of $100 
each, fully paid up and transferable only upon the books 
of the corporation upon surrender of this certificate duly 
endorsed.'' This is usually signed by the president, and 
countersigned by the secretary under the seal of the cor-
poration. Upon the back is usually a form of assignment 
which will read: "For value received, I hereby assign 
and transfer all my right, title, and interest to the shares 
in X Company, evidenced by this certificate, to Y, and I 
do hereby irrevocably appoint Z to be my agent, or at-
torney in fact, for me, and in my name, to have the trans-
(22) Plimpton v. BJ&elow, 93 N. Y. 592. 
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fer of the same made upon the books of the c-0rporation." 
This will be signed by A. B. and delivered to Y. It is 
not necessary to fill in the name of the purchaser, nor the 
name of the attorney, to make the transfer. These may 
be left blank and then, after delivery of the certificate 
to Y, the purchaser, he may, by mere delivery of the cer-
tificate, sell it to some one else, and this party to another, 
and so on; the last purchaser may fill in his own name 
and the name of any proper person to have the transfer 
made on the books of the company, who can then take 
the certificate to the corporation, surrender it, have the 
transfer made to the purchaser upon the books, and re-
ceive a new certificate in the name of such purchaser. 
SECTION 4. CORPORATE NAME. 
§ 91. Necessity of a name. It was said long ago that 
names of corporations are given of necessity, for the cor-
porate name is as a baptismal name, and the very being 
of their constitution, "and though it is the will of the 
king that erects them, yet the name is the knot of their 
combination, without which they could not perform their 
corporate acts." Such is the rule yet. 
§ 92. Acquisition of a name. A name is usually given 
in the charter or articles of association, and the law now 
generally requires it to be so given; and sometimes specific 
and definite provisions exist which must be carefully fol-
lowed; but in the absence of specific provisions, it is not 
perhaps indispensable that it should be so given; it may 
be derived from usage. The corporation perhaps can-
not select a name already in use by another corporation 
organized in the same state. 
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§ 93. Rights in the corporate name. If lawfully ac-
quired, the right to a corporate name. is a franchise (23), 
and the corporation which bas acquired a name bas the 
same right to use it as it would a trade mark, and may 
enjoin its subsequent appropriation and use by another 
corporation, association, or person, if it would be damaged 
thereby (24). It has been held, however, that a foreign 
corporation cannot prevent the use of a corporate name 
afterwards selected by a domestic corporation; and no 
exclusive right can be acquired in geographical names. 
The secretary of state or the proper registering officer has 
discretionary power to refuse to register a company that 
chooses a name that too closely resembles one already in 
use. 
§ 94. Effect of misnomer. In the case of contracts this 
has no effect, if the identity of the corporation can be 
established. In process against the corporation by the 
wrong name, a suit is not validly begun, but it may be 
corrected by amendment; if the corporation issue process 
for itself in a wrong name, it is ground for plea in abate-
ment; slight variations, not misleading as to the identity 
of a corporation, are not usually material. 
§ 95. Change of name. The corporate name can be 
changed only by consent of the state and of the share-
holders; such change, if legal, does not affect the rights, 
duties, or liabilities of the corporation (25). It has been 
held, however, if the change is illegal, members consent-
(2~) Boston TI11!,her Rhoe ('o. , •. Roi:.lon Rubber C'o., 140 l\lnss. 436. 
(24) Armington v. Pnlmer. 21 Il. I. 100. 
(25) Cinctnnntl Cooperage Co. v. Bate, 96 Ky. 350. Compare: 
Netf v. Covington. etc. Co., 108 Ky. 457. 
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ing thereto are liable as partners afterwards. Statutes 
usually provide a simple method for changing a corporate 
name. 
SECTION 5. CoRPORATE LIFE. 
§ 96. Mode of existence. Perpetual succession. In the 
absence of any provision to the contrary the duration of 
a corporation is perpetual. It is however usual, by con-
stitutional or statutory provisions, to fix a limit to the 
corporate life. Some statutes require a limit to be fixed 
in the articles of association. Within the time fixed how-
ever the corporation is said to have perpetual succession, 
by which is meant the power to provide other members in 
the place of those who drop out. In the case of non-stock 
corporations, this is usually done by the election of other 
members; in stock corporations, the successor in the 
ownership of stock becomes a member. For example, the 
general corporation law provided that "every corpora-
tion shall have succession for the period limited in its 
charter, and, when no period is limited, for twenty years." 
Afterwards a special act was passed incorporating a gas 
company with "perpetual succession," with the exclusive 
right to manufacture gas for thirty years. At the end 
of twenty years the state brought quo warranto to pre-
vent the corporation from continuing to act as such. 
Held, corporate life bad expired, and that "perpetual 
succession" meant continuous succession for the twenty 
years fixed by the general law, and not everlasting ex-
istence, or existence for thirty years (26). 
(26) State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 468. 
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§ 97. Mode of action. Shareholders' meeting. So far 
as the members control corporate action, they must do so 
in a duly called corporate meeting. This meeting must 
be called by the proper officers; in the absence of other 
provisions, the directors have this authority; it is usual 
to put such authority in the hands of the president or 
secretary. Regular meetings of shareholders are also 
usually provided for in the by-laws, the time and place 
being designated there. Wbere no corporate meeting was 
held, and the secretary called on a majority of the share-
holders individually, and they separately authorized a 
mortgage of the corporate property to be given, which 
was executed by the president and two stockholders at 
the request of the mortgagor, to whom it was delivered 
to secure a $3000 note given by the corporation for the 
loan of that sum of money, it was held that such mortgage 
was not valid (27). 
§ 98. Notice of shareholders' meeting. At common 
law, notice of corporate meetings, definite as to day, hour, 
and place was necessary to be given personally to each 
shareholder in order to make the meeting valid, as against 
a shareholder who had no notice, was not present, and 
complained promptly; and, in the absence of charter, by-
laws, or statutory provisions, this is still the rule; the 
matter, however, is usually regulated by the charter or 
by-laws; these frequently allow notice to be given by pub-
lication, or through the mail. If the meeting is a special 
one, or the business to be done extraordinary or unusual, 
the notice must state what the business to be done is, 
(27) Duke v. Markham, 105 N. C. 131. 
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but one who is present and participates in the business, 
without objecting, is estopped to deny the validity of the 
meeting. No further notice is necessary of an adjourned 
meeting, or the business to be done thereat, than the record 
of the resolution adjourning the meeting, if the time and 
place are fixed by the resolution; otherwise notice should 
be given. Since regulations concerning meetings are for 
the benefit of shareholders, they may waive informalities 
by attendance and participation, or acquiescence in the 
results. 
§ 99. Quorum. At common law if all of an indefinite 
number of stockholders are duly notified to meet, those 
who assemble constitute a quorwn; but charter, by-law, 
or statutory provisions now usually require a majority 
of the shares outstanding to constitute a quorum. It has 
been held that members may vote by proxy, and in such 
a case it seems that one member, holding the proxy of 
enough shareholders to make a majority of the shares, 
may by himself hold a corporate meeting and elect the 
officers, providing this meeting was duly called. This is 
frequently done by corporations organized in New Jersey 
and in other states with liberal corporation laws. And 
where there is no provision as to what oon.stitutes a 
quorum, one member, with the proxies of a few others 
(not however, with his own stock, constituting a majority 
of shares), can bo.Jd a lawful meeting at the time and 
place fixed in the by-laws of the corporation, without 
notifying any other shareholders, although the corp-Ora-
tion bas been defunct for seventeen years; and the direc-
tors so elected at such meeting are validly elected, since 
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due notice is given in the by-laws, and since, at common 
law, those who attend, one or many, if all are duly notified, 
constitute a quorum ( 28). 
§ 100. Place of meeting. In order to make a valid meet-
ing, against shareholders who do not attend, the meeting 
must be held within the state creating the corpora-
tion (29); but those who attend the meeting held out of 
the state (30) will be estopped from denying the validity 
of the action taken. A corporation formed by the con-
solidation of two corporations, created in different states, 
may hold a shareholders' meeting in either state (31). 
So, too, the rule that corporate meetings should be held 
in the creating state does not apply to non-stock, bene-
ficial organizations. Statutes frequently provide that 
shareholders' meetings may be held out of the state, if 
the articles of incorporation so provide. 
§ 10L Directors' meeting. The directors must also 
act in a duly called meeting. They have no authority to 
bind the corporation by their individual acts done outside 
the corporate meeting (32). The rules as to the notice of 
meetings are the same as ·in the case of shareholders. 
There are cases, however, holding with much reason that 
a person dealing with a corporation, having no notice 
to the contrary, has a right to presume that the rules and 
regulations have been followed by those acting for the 
company, and, if not, the company is bound anyhow (33). 
(28) Morrill v. Little Falls Mtg. Co., 53 Minn. 871. 
(29) Miller v. Ewer, 27 Me. 509. 
(30) Missouri Lead, etc. Co. v. Reinhardt. 114 Mo. 218. 
(31) Graham v. Boston, etc. Co .. 118 U. S. 16L 
(32) Bank or L. R. v. McCarthy, 55 Ark. 473. 
(33) Loulsvllle, etc. Ry. v. Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, rs73. 
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In the absence of a provision to the contrary, the quorum 
of the directors' meeting is a majority of all the directors. 
They vote as individuals and not according to shares, 
and cannot vote by proxy. Being agents of the corpora-
tion, there is no necessity to meet within the state, as 
in the case of shareholders. Exercising delegated power 
themselves, it is usual to say that they cannot, without 
special authority, delegate their discretionary duties to 
an executive committee. There are many cases, however, 
and perhaps the weight of authority, to the contrary (34). 
§ 102. Records of meetings. Corporate meetings, both 
of shareholders and directors, being de1iberative assem-
blies, should be conducted according to parliamentary 
usages. It is not necessary to the vaJidity of corporate 
actions that records be kept, yet, if they are kept, they 
are the best evidence of the action taken, and other evi-
dence is not admissible until it is shown that the records 
cannot be obtained. When no records were kept, or they 
have been lost or destroyed, oral evidence is admissible 
to prove corporate actions, and the ordinary presump-
tions made in other cases apply here. 
§ 103. Execution of contracts. The contracts of a 
corporation should be made in the corporate name. Con-
veyanc.es of land should be to the corporation in its cor-
porate .name; so, too, the conveyance by the corporation 
should purport to be granted and executed by the corpora-
tion in its corporate name. So, also, notes by the cor-
poration should be signed by the corporate name, and 
(34) Sheridan, etc. Co. v. Bank, 127 N. Y. 517; Cnloo, etc. Ry. Co. 
v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564. 
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notes payable to the corporation should be made to it 
in .its corporate name. Yet courts often hold contracts 
and conveyances, not executed in conformity to the fore-
going rules, to be the contracts and conveyances of the 
corporation, when it is entirely clear they were meant to 
be such (35). Where a deed read "I, Thomas H. Benton, 
President of the Sulphur Springs Land Company, do 
hereby convey, etc." and it was signed by Benton in the 
same WB;Y, it was held that this did not pass the title of 
the land company to the grantee (36). It should have 
read ''The Sulphur Springs Land Company hereby con-
veys, etc.'' and should have been signed ''The Sulphur 
Springs Land Co. by Thomas H. Benton, President.'' 
The American Bar Association has recommended a form 
for corporation acknowledgments that is sufficient in 
most states. The use of the corporate seal is discussed 
below. 
SECTION 6. CoRPORATE DEATH. DissoLUTION OP 
CORPORATIONS. 
§ 104. Methods of dissolution. A corporation may be 
dissolved: (1) By expiration of the time mentioned in 
the charter. (2) By the happening of a condition or 
contingency prescribed by the charter to have that effect. 
(3) By death of all the members in the case of non-stock 
corp<;>rations; but in the case of a stock corporation the 
shares of the deceased members are distributed as per-
sonal property, and consequently the successor in owner-
ship becomes a member, and the corporate life is not 
(35) Rawlings v. Gas Light Co., 105 Tenn. 268. 
(36) Zoller v. Ide, 1 Neb. 439. 
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affected. ( 4) By the loss of an integral part (in case of 
corporations consisting of integral parts), without the 
power to replace such integral part. ( 5) By a surrender 
of the f rancbise, accepted by the state. It is both said 
and denied that acceptance by the state is essential to the 
dissolution; this is usually now provided for by a general 
law prescribing a method whereby this may be done. 
Mere non-user or insolvency of the corporation does not 
alone amount to a dissolution (37). ( 6) By repeal of 
the corporate charter by the legislature, when the state 
bas reserved such power. (7) By forfeiture of the cor-
porate franchise, by a proceeding in the courts for that 
purpose, because of non-user or misuser of the franchise 
granted. 
§ 105. One man companies. In the case of stock cor-
porations, there is usually nothing to prevent one member 
from acquiring all the shares of stock. By the weight of 
authority, if the corporation was validly created, the fact 
that one person acquires all the stock in good faith bas 
no legal effeot upon the continued corporate existence; 
acting in the corporate name and through the corporate 
officers, the action taken is corporate action (38). And, 
on the other hand, the individual acts of the sole owner 
do not bind the corporation; though the individual owner 
mig.ht himself be estopped to deny that such action was 
in effect corporate action. In ~1aryland and Kentucky, 
it has been held that the ownership of stock by one person 
virtually suspends corporate existence during such sole 
(87) Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 456. 
(88) Durlacher v. Frazer, 8 Wyo. 58; Chase v. Tel. Co., 121 Mlcb. 
681. 
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ownership. And in equity, or in cases of fraud, or evasion 
of corporate duties, the acts of all the shareholders or a 
single shareholder owning all the stock, may be treated 
as the acts of the corporation if necessary to work out 
justice (39). As, for instance, where a sole shareholder 
in a corporation without creditors set fire to the corporate 
property, there could be no recovery upon the insurance 
policy (40). 
§ 106. E1f ect of dissolution ( 41). ( 1) The corporate 
franchises can no longer be exercised. (2) Involuntary 
dissolution at common law extinguished executory con-
tracts, and no damages could be recovered for non-per-
f ormance. In equity and by statute, in most states, the 
obligation of such contracts survives, and may be enforced 
against the corporate assets, and it is said that voluntary 
dissolution does not extinguish such contracts. (3) At 
common law, debts due to or from the corporation were 
extinguished; but now such claims are preserved in equity 
and generally by statute. ( 4) Personal property at 
common law, upon dissolution, vested in the crown or 
state; but now it is preserved as an asset for the payment 
of creditors, or, after payment of creditors, for distribu-
tion among the shareholders (42). (5) Real property, 
at common law, reverted to the grantor; but now a cor-
poration whose duration is limited may take or grant 
an estate in fee; and, upon dissolution, all real property 
(39) Bundy v. Ophir Iron Co., 38 Ob. St. 000. 
(40) Melly v. Insurance Co., 148 Fed. 683. 
(41) State Bank v. State, 1 Blacld. (Ind. ) 267; In re HJgglnaon 
(1899], 1 Q. B. 325. 
(42) Bacon v. Robert.son, 18 Bow. 480. 
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then belonging to the corporation becomes assets for the 
payment of debts and distribution among shareholders, 
there being no reversion either to the gran tor or to the 
state in the case of private business corporations (43). 
In eleemosynary and non-business corporations the com-
mon law doctrines of the escheating of personal property 
to the state and reversion of real property to the 
grantor are applied ( 44), though this has recently been 
denied (45). (6) Actions by a corporation at common 
law abate upon its dissolution, but statutes usuaJJy now 
prevent such a result by allowing the representative of 
the defunct corporation to continue the suit in its place. 
At common law no valid judgment could be rendered 
against a dissolved corporation, and attachment and gar-
nishment proceedings were terminated by a dissolution. 
Statutes now usually provide that dissolution shall not 
abate pending suits, nor prevent the bringing of suits 
within a certain time against the defunct corporation ( 46). 
Upon dissolution, either by voluntary surrender of the 
charter, by repeal, or by forfeiture, statutes usually pro-
vide either that the corporation itself shall continue to 
exist for a certain time, in order to wind up its affairs. 
or a receiver shall be appointed for such purpose. 
In the case of public service corporations which are dis-
solved, or to be dissolved, a receiver is appointed to take 
charge of the property and continue its operations for the 
(43) Wilson v. Leary, 120 N. C. 90. 
(44) Titcomb v. Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Me. 311:) : Mormon Church v. U.S., 
136 u. s. 1. 
(45) Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412. 
(46) Shayne v. Post Pub. Co., 168 N. Y. 70. 
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benefit of the public, until a re-organization can be made 
by forming a new company to take over the property dis-
charged of its debts. Usually the property is sold, under· 
foreclosure of some mortgage lien, to a committee who 
purchases for the benefit of the lienholders, who have 
agreed upon some plan of organizing a new company to 
carry on the business, the stock and bonds of which will 
be issued to the former creditors and shareholders, in 
proportions agreed upon in the re-organization plan. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
CORPORATE POWERS AND LIABILITIES. 
SECTION 1. POWERS IN GENERAL. 
§ 107. Theories of corporate capacity. There are two 
of these: (1) Special capacities; (2) general capacity. 
The doctrine of special capacities is that corporations 
have such powers, and only such, as are expressly grantoo 
or necessarily implied from those granted ; all others are 
excluded. The doctrine of general capacity is that a cor-
poration once duly created has all the powers and ca-
pacities of a natural person, so far as they can be ex-
ercised by an artificial person. While the rule of special 
capacities is almost universally adhered to in this country, 
there is a tendency in the decisions of the state courts, 
where no public interest or policy is specially involved 
and creditors' rights are not affected, practically to allow 
a general capacity to do everything in every way that 
an individual could do within the field covered by a busi-
ness in which the corporation was organized to en-
gage (1). Where the corporate charter authorized the 
company "to make contracts and engagements with other 
corporations or with individuals for the transporting or 
conveying of f reigbt and passengers,'' the company 
(1) Remick v. Hardware Co., 73 Neb. 800. 
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leased its railroad and rolling stock to another company 
for twenty years at a fixed rental per year, with a power 
in the lessor to terminate the lease at any time, the damage 
done thereby to the lessee to be assessed by arbitrators. 
The lessor terminated the lease. The damages were 
assessed for the loss of the unexpired term at $150,000, 
which the lessor refused to pay. Held, the lessor was not 
liable, as, under the doctrine of special capacities, the 
company had only such powers as were expressly con-
ferred, and the charter provision above given only re-
ferred to traffic contracts for the through transportation 
of freight and passengers (2). On the other hand, where 
a corporation was organized ''to make, sell, or lend on 
hire railway carriages and rolling stock, and carry on the 
business of mechanical engineers and general contrac-
tors,'' under the doctrine of general capacity it could ac-
quire, build, and operate a railroad, since such authority 
was not forbidden (3). This doctrine, however, is not 
now followed in England in parliamentary corpora-
tions (4). 
SECTION 2. CLASSES OF CORPORATE POWERS. 
§ 108. Corporate powers are of three classes: ( 1) In-
cidental; (2) express; (3) implied. The incidental powers 
are such as are annexed tacitly, without any express 
words, to any corporation duly created. They include: 
(a) The power to have perpetual succession for the 
period designated in the charter or statute; (b) to have a 
(2) Thomas v. Ry. Co., 101 U. S. 71. 
(3) Riche v. Ashbury Ry. Co., J,. R. 9 Ex. 224. 
(4) Same case, reversed in the House ot Lords, L. R. 7 H. L. 653. 
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corporate name and to contract, grant, receive, sue, and 
be sued therein; (c) to purchase and hold the personal 
and real property necessary to carry on the business for 
which it was formed; (d) to have and use a corporate 
seal; (e) to make by-laws; (f) to remove members and 
officers under some circumstances. 
Express powers are such as are specifically enumerated 
in the charter or general law: and constitutionally granted 
therein, together with such as are lawfully inserted in 
the articles of incorporation. But powers not authorized 
by the general law cannot be acquired by placing them in 
the articles of incorporation. 
Implied powers are such as are reasonably necessary or 
proper for the execution of the powers expressly granted, 
and oot expressly or impliedly excluded. In this connec-
tion, necessary does not mean indispensable but does in-
clude that which is convenient and usual in carrying out 
the express powers. But where a corporation was formed 
''to manufacture cars, and to purchase, acquire, and hold 
such real property as may be deemed necessary for the 
successful prosecution of its business," such corporation 
had no authority to build a town for its employes,. put 
up 2200 houses for them, construct streets, sewage, sewage 
farms, gas and water works, erect school houses, churches, 
hotels, theaters, market-houses, concert and dancing halls, 
and provide for carrying them on, establish and operate 
groceries, dry goods and other stores for furnishing their 
employes with supplies, at a place about 18 miles from 
Chicago, where land was much cheaper than in Chicago, 
and where it was desirable to locate their extensive shops, 
PO\VERS AND LIABILITIES 181 
and where, at the time, there were no dwellings, stores, 
schools, and places of amusement and subsistence suffi-
cient for the needs and convenience of the large number of 
employes needed to carry on the business. On the other 
hand it had implied power to acquire 55 acres of vacant 
land upon which to dump cinders, and 25 more acres upon 
which to store cars, also to build larger boilers than were 
then needed in order to meet future needs, and in the 
meantime to furnish power to adjoining plants, and un-
der the power to "sell supplies" on its palace cars, it 
might sell beer, wine, and whiskey, as beverages, but could 
not bold shares in a steel company, all the product of 
which was used by the car company in the construction 
of its cars (5). 
§ 109. Rules for construing corpora.t.e charters. The 
legislative intention is to be ascertained, if possible, and 
given full effect; the language is to be construed neither 
strictly nor liberally, but according to its fair import; 
words are to be given their ordinary meaning, unless cus-
tom or usage has given them a different one; the whole 
law or charter is to be considered; but the enumeration 
of certain powers, by implication excludes all other un-
necessary powers. When the question is one between the 
state and the corporation, or when the public interest is 
involved, a strict construction against the corporation 
and in favor of the state will be applied, and then, if the 
charter is silent about a power, it does not exist; if the 
language is susceptible of two meanings, that construc-
tion is to be adopted which works least harm to the state. 
(5) People v. Pullman Car Co., 175 Ill 125. 
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The rules of construction of the charters of corporations 
formed under general laws are the same as those formed 
under special laws (6), although some courts make an ef-
fort to apply a different rule to articles of incorporation 
under general laws, on the ground that they are private 
contracts similar to partnership association articles (7). 
SECTION 3. PARTICULAR POWERS. 
§ 110. Power to contract. In general, in order to de-
termine the validity of a corporate contract, three ques-
tions must be answered: ( 1) Did the corporation have 
power to make iU (2) Was it made by an authorized 
agentT (3) Was it made in the proper formT 
The first is a question of the subject matter; the sec-
ond, one of the agent's authority; and the third, one of 
form. The first is considered immediately following; the 
second belongs in the province of the law of Agency (see 
Volume I), the general rules of which apply to corpora-
tions as principals, as well as to individuals, or, so far as 
they are peculiar to corporations, are considered herein 
under the beadings of corporate modes of action, direc-
tors, officers, etc. The third is further considered herein 
under the subject of the corporate seal. 
§ 111. Power to contract debts and borrow money. A 
corporation may contract debts to any extent for its cor-
porate purposes that its credit will allow, unless statutes 
forbid (8). Statutes frequently fix the limit as to the 
(G) Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1; Dempster, etc. 
Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa, 80. 
(7) Na ti. Bk. v. Inc. Co., 41 Ob. St L 
(8) Bnrry '" Merchants' Ex., 1 Sandt. (N. Y.) 280. 
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amount that may be borrowed, and in such case one who 
has knowingly loaned money to the corporation, in excess 
of the limit, cannot recover the excess as against other 
creditors, unless the money was used in discharging ex-
isting valid debts. But one who, in good faith, loans 
money after the corporation has already borrowed up to 
the limit can recover, if he had no knowledge of the fact. 
It has been held that a corporation cannot borrow money 
for the purpose of purchasing its own shares, nor for the 
purpose of purchasing property not needed. Thus a sav-
ings company cannot borrow money to make an investment 
before it has received any deposits to be inves.ted (9). So, 
too, where a national bank purchases not only the draft 
with the bill of lading attached, but also the goods repre-
sented by the bill, such agreement cannot be enforced 
against the bank (10). 
§ 112. Power to issue negotiable instruments. When-
ever it is a necessary or convenient method of conducting 
their proper business, corporations, through agents hav-
ing the express or implied authority so to bind the cor-
poration, have the power to issue any form of negotiable 
instruments; but they have no power unless expressly au-
thorized to deal in notes or bonds. A stricter rule is ap-
plied in England than in the United States. If a corpora-
tion has power to issue a promissory note for any pur-
pose, a bona fide holder for ~alue, having no knowledge of 
want of authority of the agent or of other irregularity or 
that it was issued for an ultra vires purpose, will be pro-
'. 
(9) Fra.nklln Co. v. Lewiston, etc. Co., 68 Me. 43. 
(10) Leonhard & Co. v. Small, 117 Tenn. 153. 
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tected (11). Where a corporation was formed for en-
couraging athletic exercises with power to ''purchase and 
erect suitable buildings for its accommodation,'' it bad 
authority to borrow money to be used in building a club-
house (12). 
§ 113. Power to issue accommodation paper. There is 
no implied power to issue or indorse negotiable instru-
ments for the mere accommodation of an outside party; 
but, if it is done by a corporation having authority to is-
sue promissory notes, a bona fide purchaser, without 
knowledge of the fact, will be protected. Thus, where a 
manufacturing company, having authority to purchase 
property on credit and give its promissory note therefor, 
gave its note for the accommodation of X, without receiv-
ing any consideration therefor, and the plaintiff acquired 
it in due course of business before maturity, and paid full 
value for it, without knowledge that the corporation bad 
received no consideration, be rould enforce payment 
against the corporation (13). 
§ 114. Power to be surety or guarantor. There is no 
such implied power. This, and the rule relating to ac-
commodation notes, are based upon the view that neither 
the officers nor the majority of the shareholders have any 
right to give away the corporate property to the injury of 
other shareholders without their consent; nor can the of-
ficers or all the shareholders give away the corporate 
property without making provision for the payment of 
creditors. But since, where the reason ceases the rule 
(11) Monument Natl. Bk. v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 57. 
(12) Bradbury v. Canoe Club, 153 Mass. 77. 
(13) Monument Natl. Bk. v. Globe Works, 101 Mass. 6t. 
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ceases also, and persons can give away their property if 
they choose, it has been held that if all the shareho~ders 
agree, and no bona fide creditor's rights are affected, the 
guaranty will be binding (14). There are also well-defined 
exceptions to the general rule; e. g., a corporation rightly 
holding the securities of another person or corporation 
has a right to dispose of them and guarantee their pay-
ment in the ordinary course of business; so also a railway 
company may guarantee the payment of the bonds and in-
terest of the company whose road it is authorized to lease. 
§ 115. Power to form partnerships. The general rule 
is that a corporation has no such power, unless expressly 
authorized; the reason being that it would necessarily 
give to some one outside the corporation, i. e., the other 
partner, a power of management over the corporation, 
which would be inconsistent with its duty to the state. 
Of course, the corporation may be expressly authorized 
to enter into a partnership, and in California it has been 
held that if the management was left entirely to the 
corporation it might be a partner. Where a manufactur-
ing corporation entered into a partnership with three 
other similar corporations for manufacturing cotton-seed 
oil, and turned its plant over to .the partnership for the 
purpose, it can repudiate the agreement, and upon fail-
ure, after demand, to allow the plaintiff' to enter into pos-
session of its own property, an action for unlawful de· 
tainer may be maintained to recover possession (15). 
§ 116. Trusts and trade combinations. Etymologically 
the word trust comes from the same as tryst, troth and 
(14) Murphy v. Land Co., 97 Fed. 723. 
(1~) Mallory v. Hanaur OD Works, 86 Teno. ~ 
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true. In law a trust exists whenever the legal title to 
property is vested in one person, called the trustee, to be 
held or dealt with by him, for the benefit of another, called 
the beneficiary. The name of the industrial institutions 
now designated trusts is derived from the trust of equity. 
Its present use originated in 1882, when the Standard Oil 
Trust was formed by the shareholders in several differ-
ent companies transferring their shares to trustees in 
trust to accomplish certain business ends, converting the 
trust of equity into a peculiar form of business associa-
tion. Since then its meaning has even become much 
broader, and ''embraces every act, agreement, or combi-
nation of persons or capital believed to be done, made, or 
formed with the intent, effect, power or tendency to mo-
nopolize business, restrain or interfere with competitive 
trade, or to fix, influence, or increase the price of com-
modities.'' These things are not new, either in the law or 
. . 1n economics. 
Forms assumed: A rough classification, based upon 
the tie that binds them together, gives the following 
forms: 1. Friendly agreements. 2. Pools. 3. Stock-
controlling schemes. 4. Corporations. 
§ 117. Power of corporations to form trusts. In con-
sidering this subject, two principles should be kept con-
stantly in mind-one, based upon the nature of a corpora-
tion, is, that the grant of corporate power is a franchise 
granted by the state for a definite purpose, to be exercised 
in a way prescribed, and subject to forfeiture by the state 
if it is not carried out in accordance with the grant; the 
second is based upon public policy, viz., that combination 
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agreements of individuals, partnerships, or corporations, 
with the purpose and effect (with certain exceptions) of 
restraining trade, destroying competition, and resulting 
in monopoly, are unenforcible, and under some circum-
stances WTongful-tortious or crimiaal. 
§ 118. Same: Corporation must not violate its fran-
chise. The first principle, that a corporation must not ab-
dicate its purpose or prescribed method of management, 
is well expressed in Whittenton Mills v. Upton (16), by 
Thomas, J., where the question involved was whether a 
corporation could be a member of a partnership. He 
said: ''No member of the corporation, as such, can bind 
the society. In a partnership each member binds the so-
ciety as a principal. If, then, this corporation may enter 
into partnership with an individual, there would be two 
principals, the legal person and the natural person, each 
having, within the scope of the society's business, full 
authority to manage its concerns, including even the dis-
position of its property. . • . The partner may man-
age and conduct the businesg of the corporation, and bind 
it by his acts. In doing so he does not act as an officer or 
agent of the corporation by authority received from it, 
but as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and 
each capable of binding the society by the act of its indi-
vidual will." This agreement was held void. Such agree-
ments, if valid, would have the effect, as Judge FinC'h 
says, in People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. (17), to 
permit a corporation "to receive its powers and priv-
(16) 10 Gray (Hass.) 582. 
(17) 121 N. Y. 582. 
VoL vm 1t 
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ileges merely to put them in pawn; and to give away to an 
irresponsible board (or person) its entire independence 
and self-control.'' 
The above were cases of purely private business cor-
porations, not those owing any special duty to the public. 
The rule applies, of course, with more reason and more 
strictness to quasi-pttblic corporations, or those owing 
particular duties to the public. As stated by Justice 
:Miller in Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co. (18), "Where a 
corporation, like a railroad company, bas granted to it by 
charter a franchise intended, in large measure to be exer-
cised for the public good, the due performance of those 
functions being the consideration of the public grant, any 
contract which disables the corporation from performing 
those functions, which undertakes, without the consent of 
the state, to transfer to others the rights and powers con-
ferred by the charter, and to relieve the grantees of the 
burden which it imposes, is a violation of the contract 
with the state, and is void as against public policy.'' 
From these principles, therefore, it follows that all con-
tracts of a corporation, either private or quasi-public, to 
enter into combinations, whether of partnership, pool, re-
straint of trade, trust, lease, consolidation, sale or other-
wise, the necessary effect of which is to destroy its au-
tonomy in the performance of its duty to the state, are, 
or ought to be, held to be void and unenforcible, and this 
so, regardless of any other quality of the contract. And 
it is generally held so, although there are some holdings 
(18) 101 u. s. 71. 
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to the contrary, in the case of leases and sales by purely 
private corporations. 
"\Vhile a contract by a corporation violating this princi-
ple alone is not criminal or wrongful, it is ultra vi res in the 
true sense, and the state undoubtedly has a technical right 
to complain. The state, however, does not, and will not, 
complain of snch a transaction unless the contract made, 
or things done under it, injuriously affect or threaten 
public interests; then the state may interfere by quo war-
ranto to prevent or enjoin its consummation, either by 
ousting the corporation of the power usurped or annulling 
the charter. 
§ 119. Same: Contracts in restraint of trade are void 
The second principle-that contracts in restraint of trade 
(with certain exceptions) are void and un~nforcible-has 
alone, no peculiar application to corporations, but applies 
to individuals and partnerships also; this principle to-
gether with the first one above, gives the state a po~r 
over corporations in regard to such contracts that it does 
not have over individuals, viz., that the state can actively 
and of its own accord take the life of the off ending cor-
poration for engaging in such a contract, though no pun-
ishment, aside from refusing to enforce the contract, 
could be meted out to an offending individual or partner-
ship. 
What contracts restraining trade are void, is a difficult 
matter, in the present state of the Jaw, to determine. 
Judge Taft, in the Addyston Pipe case, divides contracts 
in restraint of trade and competition into three classes: 
(a) Those in which the restraining contract is wholly 
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incidental and ancillary to another main or principal con-
tract that is lawful; (b) those in which the restraining 
contract is the main or principal contract, to which others 
are only incidental, ancillary, or preliminary to this pur-
pose; (c) those in which the restraining contract is the 
only contract made. 
As to class (a) it was formerly held, perhaps, that all 
restraints upon trade were invalid. As Judge Taft says: 
''The objections to such restraints were mainly two. One 
was that by such contracts a man disabled himself from 
earning a livelihood with the risk of becoming a public 
charge, and deprived the community of the benefit of his 
labor. The other was that such restraints tended to give 
to the covenantee, the beneficiary of such restraints, a 
monopoly of the trade, from which be had thus excluded 
one competitor, and by the same means might exclude oth-
ers. . . . After a time it became apparent to the 
people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade 
that certain covenants in restraint of trade should be en-
forced.'' 
And for various reasons" covenants in partial restraint 
of trade are generally upheld as valid when they are 
agreements (1) by the seller of property or business not 
to compete with the buyer in such a way as to derogate 
from the value of property or business sold; (2) by a re-
tiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a part-
ner pending the partnership not to do anything to inter-
fere, by competition or otherwise, with the business of 
the firm; ( 4) by the buyer of property not to use the same 
in comi>etition with .the business retained by the seller; 
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and (5) by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete 
with his master or employer after the expiration of his 
time of service. Before such agreements are upheld, how-
ever, the court must find that the restraints attempted 
thereby are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment by the 
buyer of the property, good-will or interest in the pa~ 
nership bought; or to the legitimate ends of the existing 
partnership; or to the prevention of possible injury to the 
business of the seller from use by the buyer of the thing 
sold; or to protection from the danger of loss to the em-
ployer's business caused by the unjust use on the part of 
the employe of the confidential know ledge acquired in 
such business. • • • This very statement of the rule 
implies that the contract must be one in which there is a 
main purpose, to which the covenant in restraint of trade 
is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted only to pro-
tect one of the parties from the injury which, in the exe-
cution of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, be may 
suffer from the unrestrained competition of the other. 
The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure 
of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform 
standard by which the validity of such restraints maY. be 
judicially determined" (19). 
What, however, is reasonable or unreasonable de-
pends upon the circumstances of each case, and different 
courts take different views of similar circumstances, but 
total restraints in both space and time are generally held 
void; yet with improved machinery and communication, 
(19) United Statee v. Addyston Pfpe Co., S:S Fed. 271. 
192 PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
what are now reasonable for protection would formerly 
have been held to be unreasonable. 
Under class (b) when the main contract is to restrain 
trade, and this does it so unreasonably as to affect public 
interests, such main and ancillary contracts are not en-
forcible. Under class (c) there being no lawful purpose 
to forward, no rule to measure the necessity of restric-
tion, but a purpose to avoid competition which the law 
favors, such contracts should be held void. Perhaps there 
should be added to the a hove classes another that we may 
call class (d)-pub1ic service companies or occupations-
in which any restraints that prevent them from the per-
formance of their whole duty to the public are held to be 
invalid. Whether contracts in undue restraint of trade 
are anything more than unenforcible, that is, illegal as be-
ing tortious or wrongf u~ so as to be the basis of a suit for 
damages, <>r a criminal prosecution, in the absence of any 
statute regulating the matter, is in controve·rsy; but the 
weight of authority certainly is that if there is no fraud, 
coercion, intimidation, or something of the kind practised 
upon some one, there is no civil or criminal liability. 
§ 120. Anti-trust acts. Most of the states have enacted 
anti trust acts, making a civil and criminal liability for 
creating or attempting to create a monopoly. Some of 
these, especially the late Michigan, Missouri and Texas 
acts, are peculiarly stringent. 
The United States act of 1890 (26 Stat. 209)' created 
seven different crimes relating to interstate, foreign, or 
territorial trade or commerce, punishable by a penalty 
not exceeding $5,000, or one year's imprisonment, or both, 
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by providing that every person (including corporations 
or associations) who shall make (1) a contract in restraint 
of such-trade, or (2) engage in a combination in form of 
a trust or otherwise, or (3) engage in a conspiracy, in re-
straint of such trade, or ( 4) monopolize, or ( 5) attempt 
to monopolize, or (6) combine, or (7) conspire, to monopo-
lize such trade, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punish-
able as stated; and an injured party may recover dam-
ages, and the combination can be enjoined at the suit of 
United States attorneys. 
This applies not to the making or manufacture of goods 
but allows an injunction against a combination of railway 
employes to obstruct railroad commerce. It also prevents 
the formation of pools and traffic combinations among 
railroads, the direct tendency of which is to limit competi-
tion, whether reasonable or unreasonable; also such com-
binations as directly affect the sale of products that are ~ 
cross state lines. While the states have generally enacted 
these very stringent anti-trust acts, some of the states 
have with a very strange inconsistency, expressly author-
ized one corporation to acquire, own and vote shares in 
other corporrutions, whether competing or otherwise, and 
have thereby practically nullified all the supposed bene-
fits of the anti-trust legislation, and legalized in a perma-
nent form exact.ly what the anti-trust acts were designed 
to make criminal. 
§ 121 Unincorporated trnsts. With the foregoing 
principles in mind, it may be helpful to describe some of 
the forms assumed (as above specified) more particu-
larly. The unincorporated forms are the first three-
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friendly agreements, pools, and certain stock-controlling 
schemes. 
§ 122. Sa.me: Friendly agreements. The first, friendly 
agreements are numerous, and sometimes the most ef-
ficient. The tie that binds, however, is only the personal 
honor and business interest of the members. This form 
has been very effective in the Meat Packers' Association, 
a mutual understanding among some six or eight large 
corporations, based upon the personal honor of the mem-
bers, whereby (as alleged) the price of cattle and meat 
in all the important markets has been controlled for a 
number of years. It is stated on the authority of one of 
their number that there is a working agreement to the 
effect ''that they will not, to their own loss and the de-
struction of their goodwill, send more beef to a market 
than it reasonably requires. • • • Further than that 
there is no bond between any two houses as to output. It 
is not an illegal bond, nor is it intended to effect a restric-
tion of trade to the detriment of the people; it is for nat-
ural and necessary self-protection. For instance, one of 
the packing-houses calls us up by telephone and asks, 
'Are you sending any extra cars anywhere today T' We 
reply, let us say, 'Yes; we are sending six to New York, 
because we learn from the reports of our agents that the 
market there requires such a shipment.' The packer who 
called us up does not ship what extra beef he may have to 
New York, but to some other market. • • • Another 
day ~ call him up and ask him a similar question, and 
similarly abide by his answer, should it be like ours. The 
answer is not begotten of speculation as to the amount of 
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beef the market will take; it is based upon fact. We could 
not afford to send six cars of beef to New York or any-
where else upon the chance of disposing of them. A side 
of beef is marketable too short a time for that." The su-
preme court, however, held that this friendly agreement 
violated the Federal anti-trust act (20). 
§ 123. Same: Pools. The second, or pools, are agree-
ments between several to divide competitive business or 
products, either upon basis of work to be done, or earn-
ings from the same, in proportions agreed upon. In all 
other respects each party retains full control of his prop-
erty. The method of enforcement is usually by a deposit 
of money to be forfeited in case the agreement is violated. 
Pools were, perhaps, invented by the railroads, and be-
tween 1858 and 1887 a large part of the competitive rail-
road business of the country was made more or less non-
competitive by these institutions. In regard to such pools 
between connecting lines of railroad, where a division ot 
earnings is made for through traffic, if the rates estab-
Jished are not unreasonable, such transactions are valid·; 
if between competing lines and for the purpose of prevent-
ing competition they are, at common law, prima f acie 
invalid; however in England and in New Hampshire they 
have been held valid if the rates agreed upon were not 
unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce law made them 
illegal in 1887, and they were formally abandoned, but 
superseded by various rate-fixing associations. By 1897 
the country was practically parceled out into the Joint 
(20) Swift v. United Statee, 196 U. S. 37t>. 
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Traffic Association east of the Mississippi, and north of 
the Ohio and Potomac; the Trans-Missouri Freight As-
sociation operating from the Missouri to the Pacific. In 
the south there were three separate associations which 
acted in harmony. In 1897-8, the Trans-Missouri and tbe 
Joint Traffic Associations were held illegal by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, as violating the anti-
trust law of 1890. The railroads shortly after drew 
closer together than ever under some of the forms named 
below . 
.!. good illustration of the pool is the Addyston Pipe 
case, in which there was an association of six iron pipe 
manufacturing companies. A representative board was 
created" to whom all inquiries for pipe shall be referred, 
and said board shall fix the price at which said pipe shall 
be sold, and bids taken from the respective shops for the 
privilege of handling the order, and the party securing 
the same shall have the protection of all the other shops." 
When a letting was to occur, all were notified by the board 
as to what material was called for; it then fixed the price, 
say at $24 per ton for a ~,800 ton job at St. Louis; bids 
~re asked for by this board from the six companies; the 
one which offered the highest bonus, $6.50 per ton, for the 
privilege, was awarded the contract. When the public 
letting at St. Louis occurred this company bid $24 per 
ton, and since the law required three bidders, two of the 
other companies bid slightly more than $24. The bonull 
was divided among the oompanies in proportion to the 
capacities of the various mills composing the association. 
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This pool was held to violate the national anti-trust act 
of 1890 (21). 
§ 124. Same: Stock-controlling schemes. The third 
form is the stock-controlling form, or the original trust 
form. This was exclusively used to effect a combination 
among corporations. It was accomplished by the share-
holders of the several corporations to be combined deliv-
ering their shares of stock, in trust, to certain persons 
as trustees, with power to vote the same; in return, the 
trustees issued trust certificates to the former sharehold-
ers. The trust certificate holders had the power to elect 
the trustees; and the trustees had the power, by holding 
the stock of the various companies, to elect the directors 
of each company, and could, in this way, place the man-
agement of all the companies in the hands of the same 
persons. The earnings from all the companies were put 
together, and from this sum dividends were declared to 
the trust ce,.tificate holders; the former shareholders in 
the constituent companies thereby participated in the 
profits and losses of the combination, regardless of the 
financial condition of the company in which they had held 
stock. The Sugar Refineries Co. is a good illustration. It 
was organized in 1887, composed of twenty refineries, 
created "to promote economy, reduce cost so as to keep 
price as ]ow as is consistent with reasonable profit, to fur-
nish protection against unlawful combinations of labor, 
to prevent lowering of standard of refined sugar.'' The 
properties combined were capitalized at $6,690,000, but 
the trust capital was fixed at $50,000,000. It was declared 
(21) Addyston Pipe & St~l Co. v. U.S., 17(S u. S. 271. 
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illegal in 1890 by the New York courts, because it was a 
monopoly, and a partnership between corporations (22). 
It immediately incorporated in New Jersey as the Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Go. and now comes under the next 
form. 
§ 125. Incorporated trusts: Property owning class. 
The fourth is the corporate form wherein a corporation 
becomes the apparent owner, or is organized for the pur-
pose of apparently purchasing and owning, or holding, 
part or all of the stock or property of the corporations to · 
be combined. These take two general forms: 1. Property 
absorption. 2. Stock absorption. In the first, the old 
companies usually go out of existence, leaving one col-
lossal corporation as the owner of the property. In the 
second, the old companies remain. 
Of the property owning class, a good illustration is the 
Glucose Sugar Refining Company (23). This company 
was organized in New Jersey in 1897, to purchase the 
property of all kinds, of all the glucose factories within 
the "corn belt," comprised in an ellipse 950 miles long, 
and 700 miles wide, of which Peoria, Ill., was the geo-
graphical center. Cash or stock was to be issued in pay-
ment for the various properties. Each company knew 
what the purpose was. Options were given to a Chicago 
bank for a certain period, agreeing to convey all the prop-
erty to the bank or its transferee, upon request, at a cer-
tain date. The American Glucose Co., of New Jersey, 
with its plant at Peoria, Ill., had given such an option, in .. 
(22) People v. N. R. Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582. 
(23) Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. ML 
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eluding a promise on its part and those of its officers, not 
to buy, sell or manufacture glucose or its products, for a 
certain period, within 1,000 miles of Chicago; other com-
panies did substantialiy the same; these transactions were 
conducted with secrecy, and were completed, when a dis-
senting Illinois shareholder in the American Glucose Co. 
complained; the conveyance was set aside, and the carry-
ing out of the plan enjoined. Under somewhat similar 
circumstances in the Sugar trust case (24), and the Tren-
ton Potteries case (25), the transaction was held not to 
be unlawful in the manner in which the questions were 
raised. 
§ 126. Same: Stock absorption class (community of 
interest). The stock absorption plans are mainly two, 
according as their ostensible purpose is (1) managing, or 
(2) holding. The first of these subdivide into " commu-
flity of interest" plans; "bond-stock" exchange methods, 
or " stock-stock" exchange methods. Of these, the "com-
munity of interest" plan is very flexible, and does not 
yet seem to have a well defined meaning. The general 
idea is that where there are two or more competing cor-
porations, each, or the shareholders of each, acquire by 
interchange a considerable part of the shares of the 
others, so that there is a kind of" tenancy in common" of 
the whole of the competing properties. The legality of 
such plans bas not yet been tbe subject of litigation on 
the ground that they, in effect, form unlawful com-
binations. 
(2f) U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 1.U6 U. S., 1. 
(25) Trenton Potteries Co. v. Ollpbant, 58 N. J. Eq .. 007. 
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§ 127. Same: Stock absorption class (bond-stock ex-
change). The bond-stock plan is a very simple device 
for placing the management of one or more companies 
under the control of another. A Company, having power 
to issue bonds, offers to B Company to issue its bonds for 
the shares of B Company; the off er and terms of ex-
change are made known to the shareholders of B Com-
pany, and, if a majority accept, the shares are transferred 
to A Company, and its bo~ds issued to such shareholders; 
the bonds are usually secured by a deposit by A Com-
pany of the same shares with a trustee, as collateral se. 
curity for the payment of the interest on the bonds; A 
Company, however, retains the right to vote the shares, 
until default is made in paying interest. Its legality, as 
a plan of combination, has not yet been tested, but the Su-
preme Court of the United St.ates has said "it is not 
within the general powers of a corporation to purchase 
the stock of corporations for the purpose of controlling 
their management, unless permission be given them to do 
so,, (26). 
§ 128. Sa.me: Stock absorption class (stock-stock ex-
change). The stock-stock plan is substantially the same 
as the bond-stock plan, except the stock of A Company is 
exchanged for the stock of B Company. The most conspic-
uous example of this method is the United States Steel 
Corporation, formed February 23, 1901, in New Jersey, 
with an authorized capital stock of $1,100,000,000, and 
bonds to the amount of $304,000,000 or $1,404,000,000. Its 
business powers, by its charter, included manufacturing, 
(26) De I~a Vergne Ret'rtg. Co. v. German Ins. Co., 17fS U.S., 40. 
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mining, trading, building, transporting, and obtaining and 
using patents ; its trust powers, authorized it to acquire 
in any way any or all of the stocks, bonds and securities, 
or property, of companies or persons engaged in an.y or 
all of the foregoing lines of business, and bold for invest-
ment, or use, sell, or exercise, "all the rights, powers, and 
privileges of ownership, and to exercise all voting power 
thereon," and to issue its own stock or obligations, and 
make any contracts in order to do any of these things. It 
was a combination of ten of the largest concerns engaged 
in the iron and steel industry at the time; each of these 
ten was itself a large aggregation, mostly by stock owner-
ship, of many others ranging in number from six to thirty, 
several of which were made up of three or four or more 
sub-companies. The stock and bonds of the ten consti-
tuent companies at the time of formation amounted to 
$911,700,000, for which there were issued altogether $1,-
167,000,000. The stockholders that formerly composed 
the ten or more corporations have now been consolidated 
into shareholders of the United Stat~s Steel Corporation, 
and are no longer shareholders of the constituent com-
panies; practically the sole stockholder of each of the con-
stituent companies is the United States Swel Corpora-
tion; as such, it elects the board of directors of each cor-
poration, and can, if it chooses, give exactly the same 
board to all the companies; upon the other hand, the 
shareholders of the United States Steel Corporation elect 
its directors-who, if they wish, may elect themselves di-
rectors of each of the constituent companies. The result 
is the same as if the former companies, or all their share-
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holders, had entered into a permanent agreement to com-
bine their competing properties by electing the same per-
sons directors over all the companies, with power to con-
trol the management and policy of each according to the 
terms of the agreement. The business result is precisely 
the same as that of the original trust form. Its legality 
has not been attacked in the courts. 
§ 129. Same: Stock absorption class (holding com-
pany). The holding corporation is, or may be, created 
in exactly the same way as the stock-stock plan just de-
scribed. The purpose is alleged to be different, to be in-
vestment, rather than management. Its most conspicu-
ous illustration is the Northern Securities Company, 
formed (as stated) to invest in, and hold as an investment, 
Great Northern and Northern Pacific railway shares. 
These railroads are competing lines for something like 
1,000 miles, and the laws of the northwestern states for-
bade the consolidation of parallel and competing lines. 
The Northern Securities Company was organized in New 
Jersey in 1900 with $400,000,000 capital stock. It imme-
diately issued enough of its stock at par to acquire, in ex-
change, more than 90 per cent of Great Northern shares 
at $180; likewise it issued enough of its stock at par to ac-
quire in exchange a like per cent of Northern Pacific at 
$115 per share-the Union Pacific getting $80,000,000 in 
Northern Securities stock, and over $9,000,0GO cash, for 
its $78,000,000 holdings of Northern Pacific; the total 
issue of new stock was about $122,000,000 more than the 
par value of the oombined capital stock of the two com-
panies. The existence of the Securities company was to 
be perpetual 
POWERS AND LIABILITIES 203 
In deciding that the holding of this stock by this com-
pany violated the anti-trust act of 1890 the Supreme Court 
through Mr. Justice Harlan said (27): "The govern-
ment does not contend that Congress may control the 
mere acquisition or the mere ownership of stock in a state 
corporation, engaged in interstate commerce. Nor does 
it contend that Congress can control the organization of 
t state corporations, authorized by their charters to en-
gage in interstate and international commerce. But it 
does contend that Congress may protect the freedom of 
interstate commerce by any means that are appropriate, 
and not prohibited by the Constitution. It does contend 
that no state corporation can stand in the way of the en-
forcement of the national will legally expressed.'' Also, 
"although the anti-trust act bas no reference to the mere 
manufacture or production of articles or commodities 
within the limits of the several states, it does embrace 
and declare illegal every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature, and who-
ever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily 
operates in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several states or with foreign nations ; that combinations, 
even among private manufacturers or dealers, whereby 
interstate or international commerce is restrained, are 
embraced by the act; . . . that the constitutional 
guaranty of liberty of contract does not prevent Congress 
from prescribing the rule of free competition for those 
engaged in interstate and international commerce." The 
foregofog was said in reference to section 1, of the act, 
(27) Northern Securltles Co. v. United States, 193 u. S. 197. 
vo1. vm-u . 
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which forbids "every contraot, combination, or conspir-
acy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
states, or with foreign nations." 
§ 130. Sa.me: Same (continued). The second section 
reads, "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person 
or persons to monopolize" such trade or commerce shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction ''shall 
be fined $5,000, or imprisoned one year or both." In re-
gard to this, it seems pertinent to inquire whether, if the 
wealth of one person was sufficient, and he had the inclina-
tion to acquire most of the stock of the competing rail-
roads of the west, in order to prevent competition among 
them, and attempted to do so-would this act.ion violate 
section 2 T This does not yet seem to be answered by the 
courts. In Illinois, where corporations may be formed 
for any lawful p-urpose, it was held that corporations for 
purposes of this kind, which resulted in a monopoly of the 
whiskey business of the country and of the gas business 
of Chicago, were illegal and void, and could be dissolved 
by the state, although apparently there was perfect com-
pliance with the provisions of the law (28). New Jersey 
on the other hand, holds t.hat courts have no authority to 
declare such a corporation illegal, so long as the state leg-
islature has not expressly made them illegal (29). The 
Whiskey trust has passed through all possible forms 
from a pool in 1882, to an ordinary trust in 1887 ; a cor-
poration trust under Illinois law in 1890, held illegal by 
(28) Distilling Co. v. People, 156 Ill. 448; People v. Gas Trust, 130 
m 268. 
(29) Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 50'7. 
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the supreme court of Illinois in 1894; a New Jersey man-
aging corporation in 1899, formed of four others, after the 
Illinois decision; and now finally, as formed in 1902, it is a 
New Jersey Distilleries Securities Corporation, control-
ling (or trying to) all the rest. 
§ 131. Power to consolidate. Consolidation is a mer-
ger, union, or amalgamation, by which the stock of two 
or more corporations is made one, their property and 
franchises combined into one, their names merged, and 
their powers combined, so that practically one new cor-
poration results. Consent of the state and consent of 
the shareholders are essential to any consolidation. By 
the weight of authority, under a reserved power to alter 
or amend the charter, the majority of members may con-
sent to a consolidation against the wishes of the minority; 
if the state bas not reserved the power to amend, unani-
mous consent of members is essential. By consolidation 
the old companies are usually dissolved, their property 
becomes that of the new company, but their liabilities con-
tinue against the old companies, although they are usually 
enforcible against the new company; lands vest by virtue 
of the consolidation in the new company without further 
conveyance; and generally contract rights of the old com-
panies pass to the new, and it must perform the contract 
duties of the old; the new company is liable for the debts 
of the old companies to the extent of the property re-
ceived, and, if expressly assumed, to their full extent (30); 
they are also usually held liable for the torts of the old 
(30) Compton v. Ry. Co., 45 Ob. St m2, 167 U. S. 1. Compare: 
Wabash, St. L etc. Ry. Co. v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587. 
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companies. The foregoing matters are however, usua1ly 
regulated, either in the agreement of consolidation, or 
by the provisions of the statute authorizing them. In in-
terstate consolidatio.ns, the new company exists in each 
state with the powers, rights, and franchises that the con-
stituent company in that state bad, but not those that be-
long to the companies created in another state. Thus two 
companies were incorporated, one in Illinois and one in 
Missouri, to build a bridge across the Mississippi river 
at the same place ; afterward they were consolidated, by 
authority of the laws of each state, with a capital stock 
equal to the sum of the stocks of the separate companies. 
Held, Illinois could tax the new company on all its capital 
stock, since it was a separate company in Illinois (31). 
§ 132. Power to acquire and hold real property. At 
common law it bas been said a corporation had this power 
to an unlimited extent. But in this country it is generally 
held that corporations have the right to purchase and bold 
only such as is necessary or convenient to carry out their 
legitimate purposes. If a conveyance of real estate to the 
corporation is executed, none but the state can after-
wards complain; and it can only in a quo warranto pro-
ceeding to forfeit the corporate charter, unless some 
statute authorizes the conveyance to be set aside or the 
land to be eschea ted to the state ( 32). If the conveyance 
is not completed, an interested party may object in any 
suit by the corporation to perfect its title; and a court of 
equity will not decree a specific performance of a contract 
(31) Quincy Ry. Bridge C.O. v. Adams C.O., 88 Ill. 615. 
(32) Com. v. N. Y. etc. Ry. Co., 132 Pa. SL 59L 
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to convey land which a corporation has no authority to 
hold. A corporation may take any estate in land except 
an estate in joint tenancy, or such as dower, curtesy, or 
tenancy in tail. A grant of a freehold, without wordi of 
inheritance or succession, will pass a fee to a corporation 
aggregate, even if the corporate life is limited, but, in the 
case of a corpora ti on so le~ the word ''successors'' should 
be used to carry a fee. Thus, where land was granted to a 
railroad company, and its successors, the company took a 
fee, though the corporate life was limited to fifty years, 
and where it granted the land to another party before the 
coroprate life expired, the grantee took a fee (33); so also 
upon the expiration of the corporate life, under the mod-
ern rule, the land would become a part of the assets of the 
corporation, and continue an estate in fee. 
§ 133. Power to take by devise. Corporations were 
expressly excepted in the English statute of wills of 1543, 
and consequently lands could not be devised to them. This 
was however a limitation on the power to devise to a 
corporation, rather than on the power of a corporation to 
take and hold land, and was placed in the statute of wills 
as an exception, in order to prevent the repeal of existing 
statutes of mortmain forbidding corporations from tak-
ing and holding land, unless they had a license from the 
king permitting them to do so. In this country (with the 
partial exception of Pennsylvania), ~ortmain statutes 
designed to preserve feudal incidents to lords upon the 
death of their vassals are not in force. In the absence of 
a special statute to the contrary, corporations are capable 
(88) Nicoll v. Ry. Co., 12N. Y. 121. 
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of taking a devise of land for any purpose necessary in 
carrying on their business (34). In some of the states 
there is a limit placed upon the amount which may be de-
vised to them; in New York a devise in excess of this limit 
is void as to the excess, and the next of kin or residuary 
legatee or heirs may claim such excess (35); the general 
weight of authority, however, holds that only the state can 
complain, as in other cases (36). A distinction is to be 
drawn between limitations in a corporate charter and in 
statutes of wills; the former follows the corporation wher-
ever it may be, at home or abroad, whereas the statute of 
wills operates only in the state enacting it. Thus, where 
the New York statute of wills forbids the devise of land 
t-0 a corporation, a New York corporation may take land 
in Connecticut, under a will made in New York by a resi-
dent of New York, the Connecticut law of wills having 
no limitations in it, and the right to devise land depend-
ing on the law of the state where the land lies. 
§ 134. Power to acquire personal property. The 
general rule is that such personal property, but such only, 
both as to kind and amount, as is reasonably necessary 
for the corporate purposes, may be lawfully acquired; but 
there is no limit as to the amount of personal property 
that may be acquired through the profits of carrying on 
the corporate business. For example where a packet com-
pany was organized with power to own and control ves-
sels for transporting freight and passengers on the Mis-
(84) For the history of these matters, see McCartee v. Orphan As7· 
Jum, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 437. 
(35) In reMcGraws' E11tate, 111 N. Y. 66. 
(86) Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Me. 405. 
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sissippi river, and to own warehouses necessary for stor-
ing and forwarding property, and to do any and all busi-
ness incidental to transportation of persons and property, 
it had no authority to purchase 4,000 bushels of wheat to 
be transported, and could not maintain an action against 
the party for failing to deliver the wheat as agreed, al-
though payment of $1,000 had been made thereon; the 
$1,000 paid could be recovered in an action for money 
had and received (36a). 
§ 135. Power t.o acquire its own shares. In the United 
States, perhaps the weight of authority allows a corpora-
tion to purchase its own shares, so long as the security 
of creditors is not impaired thereby. There is no doubt 
that it may do so in order to prevent loss to the company. 
In England and in many of the states, however, the rule is 
otherwise. And in those states which allow corporations 
to purchase their own shares, it is said they ought not to be 
allowed to speculate in them: and such transaction must 
be not only in entire good faith, but the exchange must be 
of equal value, free from fraud, actual or constructive, 
made when the corporation is not insolvent, nor in the 
process of dissolution, and be neither injurious to credit-
ors, nor to the advantage of a few favored stockholders 
and to the injury of the others (37). The purchase of its 
own shares is not a reduction of tl1e capital, if the pur-
cha8e is made from profits; and the shares, even if pur-
chased from capital, may be sold again to replace the 
amount paid. While the corporation owns its own shares, 
they are dormant and not to be voted by it. 
(36n) Northwestern Packet Co. v. Shaw, 87 WI& 65lS. 
(37) Prince v. ~e Mt. Co. (Ky.), 32 S. W. 267. 
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§ 138. Power to acquire stock in other corporations. 
The general rule in the United States is that one busi-
ness corporation has no general or implied authority to 
acquire or hold stock in another such corporation, organ-
ized either for a similar or different purpose, as an in-
vestment, for speculation, or for the purpose of control-
ling or managing such corporation (38). There are 
some cases to the contrary, as is the English doctrine. 
When it is necessary to prevent loss or to secure the pay-
ment of a debt, such stock may be taken. It is held a par-
ent company may secure the stock of a branch company, 
and it is usual to say that authority to consolidate implies 
a power to purchase the stock of a company with which 
the consolidation might be made. Several states have by 
statute authorized corporations to acquire, own, hold, 
and vote shares in other corporations, and it is sometimes 
said that charitable, educational, insurance, and savings 
bank companies have an implied power to invest their 
funds in the stocks and bonds of other corporations. 
Where one company holds stock in another, without au-
thority, it may collect dividends, but cannot vote, and a na-
tional bank is not liable for any statutory liability on such 
stock. 
§ 137. Power to alienate property. Corporations are 
held to have the power to alienate their property in the 
ordinary course of business to any extent, if creditors, or 
dissenting shareholders, or the public, are not injuriously 
affected; if the corporation is a failing one the majority 
of members may dispose of all its property for the pur-
(88) People v. Gas Trust, 130 DL 268. 
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pose of closing out its business and paying creditors, 
against the consent of the minority; but not otherwise. 
Such property as is charged with a public trust, or which 
is essential to the performance of the duties the corpora-
tion owes to the public, cannot be sold so as to prevent 
the performance of such duties. The corporate franchise 
cannot be disposed of without special authority, and, when 
that is given, the theory is that a sale of it is in effect a 
surrender to the state and a regranting of it by the state 
to the purchaser, who takes it subject to the provisions 
of the law as they exist at the time of the purchase (39). 
The power to sell includes the power to mortgage. 
§ 138. Power to act in & persona.I relation. A corpo-
ration may take property that it has authority to own, in 
trust, and administer the trust according to its terms. In 
some states it is held that a corporation may be an ex-
ecutor, administrator, or guardian, and they are fre-
quently authorized to be such by statute. They may also 
be an agent or attorney in fact. 
§ 139. Right to sue. At common law a corporation bas 
the right to sue anywhere that it can find the defendant 
and serve him with process. States may exclude foreign 
corporations from suing in the state courts, except as to 
interstate or foreign commerce, but no state can exclude 
a foreign corporation from suing in the Federal courts; 
Federal corporations also have the right to sue in the 
Federal courts. 
§ 140. Suits a.ga.inst corporations. For purposes of 
suit in the United States courts, either by or against the 
(89) State v. Sherman, 22 0. St. 411. 
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corporation of another state, it is conclusively presumed 
to be a citizen of the state ( 40 ), and an inhabitant of the 
district, in which it is incorporated ( 41). Alien corpora-
tions, such as are formed under foreign governments, may 
J>e sued in the United States courts in the district where 
they may be found doing business. Corporations of other 
states may be sued in the state courts of any state where 
they may be found doing business, if proper service of 
process can be made upon them; and it has been held that 
a corporation is doing business in a state when a traveling 
salesman is within the state taking orders for goods, and 
service of process may be made upon him in suits arising 
out of the business done with him. It is usual to say that 
the corporation must be engaged in business in the state, 
and that the agent must stand in some representative 
character to the company in order to make the service 
of process valid, and a personal judgment against it ef-
fective ( 42). Service upon an officer temporarily within 
the state is not generally sufficient. 
§ 141. Pleading. The courts are in conflict as to the· 
necessity of alleging corporate existence; one line of au-
thorities holds that the plaintiff corporation must always 
allege itself to be such; another line holds exactly the con-
trary. One line of authorities holds that, in a suit against 
a corporation, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant 
is a corporation; and others hold just the reverse. So, 
too, one line of authorities holds that pleading the general 
(40) St. Louis, etc. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545. 
(41) Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444. 
( 42) St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350. 
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issue or a general denial raises the question of oorporate 
existence; others hold the reverse. 
§ 142. Right to have and use a seal. At common law 
it was said a corporation could contract only under its 
corporate seal ( 43) ; the rule is now otherwise, and the 
corporation is not generally required to contract under its 
corporate seal in any other case than an individual would 
be required to do so ( 44) ; signing is now generally of 
more importance than sealing, although at common law 
sealing without signing was sufficient. Any device adopted 
by the corporation as a seal will be sufficient; if the seal 
alone is present it must be proved to be a corporate seal; 
if a oontract is shown to have been executed by the proper 
officer with authority, any seal will be presumed to be the 
corporate seal. The presence of the corporate seal is 
generally held to be prima f acie evidence of the agent's 
authority and the regularity of the corporation's actions, 
but this is also denied; it is said to be evidence of a valid 
and sufficient consideration, but it does not exclude inquiry 
into those matters. If present upon a negotiable instru-
ment it does not make it non-negotiable (45). 
§ 143. Power to make by-laws. A by-law is a regula-
tion made in regard to the relation of shareholders and 
officers to the corporation, or prescribing the functions of 
officers, times and places of meeting, etc. (46). The power 
to make them is incidental to corporate existence, and re· 
sides in the shareholders, unless otherwise provided. 
(48) Horne v. Ivy, 1 Mod. 18. 
(44) Muscatine Water Co. v. Lumber Co .. 85 Ia. 112. 
(45) Chase Natl. Bk. v. Faurot, 141 N. Y. 532. 
(46) State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L 435. 
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This authority may be conferred upon directors. In the 
absence of special statutory authority, there is no power 
to provide by by-laws for forfeiture of shares for non-
payment, or to prevent the transfer of shares, or to create 
a lien upon shares that will be effective against trans-
ferees without notice, or for the expulsion of members of 
a corporation having a capital stock. 
By-laws must be reasonable, conform to the charter, 
to statutes, and to the common law; must operate uni-
formly, and not be in restraint of trade. They cannot 
modify v~ted rights, change terms as to dividends, in-
crease or decrease liability of shareholders, or enlarge 
corporate powers. Members and officers, but not outside 
parties, are presumed to have notice of their provisions. 
For example, where a by-Jaw provided that "the mem-
bers pledge themselves in their individual as well as col-
lective capacity to be responsible for all moneys loaned" 
to the corporation, and plaintiff loaned money to the cor-
poration, but had no knowledge of such a by-law until 
after the loan was made, he could not hold shareholders 
individually liable ( 47). 
SECTION 4. DocTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES AcTS. 
§ 144. Meaning of term. Ultra vires literally means 
"beyond the powers;" in its application to corporation 
law it means beyond the authority of the corporation-
the corporation may have the power but not the rightful 
authority to do the act; and, since there is no authority 
to do the act, there is no authority to ratify it, even if all 
the shareholders should consent. There are various 
( 47) Fllnt v. Pierce, 99 Maas. 68. 
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theories as to the effect of an ultra vires act; some 
authorities say such acts are void, either because of a 
legal incapacity to do the act ( 48), or because it is against 
public policy ( 49). Others say they are enforceable when-
ever it would work injustice not to enforce them ( 50). 
The reasons for the first theory are: (1) The interest 
of the public that corporations shall not transcend the 
powers granted; (2) the interest of the shareholders that 
the capital shall not be subjected to risks of enterprises 
not contemplated by the charter; and, (3) the obligation 
of everyone contracting with the corporation to take 
notice of the legal limits of its powers. The reason for 
the second theory is that no one should be allowed to re-
tain the benefits of the exercise of a power claimed, with-
out fully discharging the obligation arising thereon. The 
doctrine is now confined almost exclusively to contracts, 
and is not applied in the law of torts. 
§ 145. As to executed contracts. Ultra vires contracts, 
wholly executed by both parties, will not be disturbed on 
complaint of either; the court will generally leave the 
parties as it finds them; yet not always so, for, under 
some circumstances, it may help one party to secure pay-
ment or possession of property parted with under an ultra· 
vires agreement. Thus, where a person granted land by 
a deed delivered to a corporation having no authority 
to take the land, but which did, nevertheless, and paid 
in full for it, the grantor could not repudiate bis deed 
(48) Centrnl Trnns. Co. v. Palace Car Co., 100 U. S. 24. 
(49) Selden, J., In Bissell v. Ry. Co., 22 N. Y. 259. 
(00) Comstock, J., In the same case. 
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and recover the land (51). So where a corporation, with-
out authority to acquire or deal in lands, deeded land 
to the defendant, who paid one-third of the purchase price 
and refused to pay the balance, the court enforced full 
payment (52); so, where a corporation without authority 
to form a partnership, did so, and placed its real prop-
erty in the partnership, the corporation could withdraw 
and, after demand and refusal to deliver, could bring 
suit for unlawful detention of its property (53); but a 
court of equity will not annul an executed ultra vires 
lease upon application of the lessor ( 54 ). 
§ 146. Executory contracts. Ultra vires contra.cts 
wholly executory, that is, not performed by either party, 
may be repudiated by either party to the contract; in 
fact it is usually said to be the duty of either party to 
withdraw from them, and, when he does, no action for 
damages will lie and a court will not decree specific per-
formance. Thus where .J agreed with a corporation 
(which had no authority to subscribe for bonds of an-
other company) tD buy and sell such bonds on the joint 
account of himself and the corporation, and he did so, the 
corporation could not recover from J half the profits made 
by the purchase and sale (55). On the other hand, where 
a party, together with a corporation having no such au-
thority, became surety for a third party, the first party 
could not recover from the corporation one-half of the 
(!'>l) Long v. Georgia Ry. Co., 91 Ala. 519. 
(52) Fayette Land Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274. 
(53) Mallory v. Hanaur 011 Works, 86 Tenn. 598. 
(M) St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Terre Haute & I . Co., 145 U. S. 898. 
(55) Nassau Bk. v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 115. 
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whole sum necessary to discharge the surety obligation, 
though it was fully paid by him (56). 
§ 147. Partially executed contracts. There are two 
general views as to the legal effect of such a contract; the 
rule in England, in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and in several of the states, is that such a contract 
is absolutely void as a contract, and no action in any form 
can be maintained upon it (57). However, if the person 
who has performed his part has parted with anything of 
value, that may be recovered from the other party in any 
form of action proper for such purpose. The other view, 
held by a number of the state courts, is that the person 
who has not yet performed his part, but who accepts or 
retains any of the benefits received from the other party, 
is thereby estopped from denying the validity of the con-
tract, and consequently it is enforceable according to its 
terms by the other party (58). Thus, where a corpora-
tion loans money without authority, taking a note there-
for, it cannot maintain an action on the note by one view, 
and can by the other. So, too, where an insurance com-
pany, having authority only to insure against accidents 
in travelling, insured the plaintiff against accidents caused 
otherwise, although he had paid his premium and re-
ceived bis policy, he could not recover under his policy, 
by one view (59); although by the other. and more equit-
able, but less logical view, where a party was insured 
against destruction of his crops by hail, by a company 
(f>6) Lucas v. White Line, etc. Co., 70 Ia. ML 
(57) Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S. 24. 
(58) Bath Gas L. Co. v. Clafry, 151 N. Y. 24. 
(59) Mlller v. Ins. Co., 92 Tenn. 167. 
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authorized only to insure against destruction by fire or 
lightning, he can recover on the policy (60). 
§ 148. Who may complain of ultra vires contracts? 
(1) The state may if the public interest is injuriously 
affected; (2) the parties may, except as limited in the pre-
ceding subsections; ( 3) shareholders may enjoin the com-
pletion of an executory ultra vires contract, and, in some 
cases, if they act promptly, may have an executed ultra 
vires contract set aside (61); ( 4) creditors cannot usually 
complain, but, where the ultra vires contract would, if 
performed, make the corporation insolvent, it has been 
held that the creditor can enjoin the performance or ha\e 
it set aside ( 62). This matter is further considered below. 
Outside parties, although they may be in some way af-
fected by the ultra vires contract, cannot enjoin it.s per-
formance. 
SECTION 5. LIABILITY FOR ToRTS AND CRmES. 
§ 149. Torts. Corporations are liable for the torts of 
its officers, agents, and servants, substantially as the 
master is liable for the torts of his servant while engaged 
in the master's business; and, in this connection, the man-
agers of the corporation are practically the corporation, 
the whole of the corporate duties being vested in them. 
Corporations have been held liable for damages from 
assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, malicious 
prosecution (63), fraud and deceit, conspiracy, trespass, 
(00) Denver F. Ins. Co. v • .McClelland, 9 Colo. 11. 
(61) Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Aln. li7. 
(G2) Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583; Cole v. Iron Co., 133 N. Y. 
164. 
(G3) Goodspeed v. Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530. 
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nuisance, negligence, etc. It has been said they are not 
liable for slander, because slander cannot be committed 
by an agent, but this does not seem right, and recent cases 
repudiate this view (64). By the weight of authority, a 
corporation is liable for torts arising in a business that 
is ultra vires (65). They are liable for exemplary 
damages, as masters are for torts of their servants. In 
general, see Agency, in Volume I of this work. 
An exception is made in the case of charitable corpora-
tions, such as hospitals, etc., that receive no compensa-
tion for their services; the funds of such institutions are 
not taken to pay damages for torts committed by their 
agents, such agents alone being held; some recent cases, 
however, take a different view. 
§ 150. Crimes. Corporations are held liable for crimes 
arising out of non-feasance or misfeasance, and also for 
criminal libel. There seems to be no good reason why 
they might not be held criminally liable for many other 
offenses, even for felonies of the higher grade, except that 
the criminal laws are strictly construed, and do not 
usually provide penalties that could be applied to them. 
There is a tenden.cy to hold them liable for such crimes 
as may be punished by fines (66). 
Corporations are liable for contempt of court as in-
dividuals are, and may be punished therefor by fines im-
posed upon them (67). 
(64) Sugar Mtg. Co. v. Taylor, 130 Ala. 574. 
(65) Nims v. Boys' School, 160 Mass. 177. 
(66) People v. Rochester Ry., etc. Co .. 195 N. Y. 100. 
(67) Telegraph Newspaper O>. v. Comm., 172 Mass. 294. 
Vol VID-18 
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CHAPTER V. 
TBB CORPORATION AND THE STATE. 
§ 151. General methods of control. (1) By the courts: 
The state, by permitting actions at law and suits in equity, 
exercises general control over corporations as over other 
persons. But the state also exercises, by visitation 
through the courts or commissions, special control over 
corporations under certain circumstances. (2) By legis-
lative bodies: Certain powers, such as the general regu-
lation of all persons, whether natural or artificial, within 
the state, inhere in Congress and the state legislatures; 
other special legislative powers are frequently reserved 
to the state, when the corporation is created. The legis-
lative power of the state is limited by constitutional pro--
visions. 
§ 152. Limitations of Federal Constitution upon legis. 
lative control. (1) Upon Congress: ·No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation; direct taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the states aceording to population; bills 
of attainder and ex post facto laws shall not be passed; 
taxes or duties shall not be laid upon articles exported 
(1) State v. Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, 47 Wis. 670: People 
v. Dasbaway Assn., 84 CaL 114. 
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from any state; preferences shall not be given to the ports 
of one state over those of another, and vessels shall not 
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. Most 
of the foregoing provisions protect corporations prac-
tically the same as individuals. (2) Upon state legis-
latures: They shall not pass bills of attainder, ex post 
facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts; 
lay imposts or duties on imports or exports, or any duty 
of tonnage; nor abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within the jurisdiction of the 
state the equal protection of the laws; provisions similar 
to the last three are usually found in state constitutions 
also. They operate to protect corporations, very largely 
as individuals are protected, except corporations of one 
state are not entitled to the privileges and immunities of 
the citizens of the several states. 
SECTION 1. THE STATE AND !TS OwN CoRPORATIONB. 
§ 153. Control by the courts. There are five special 
methods available to the courts, usually authorized by 
statute, but existing at common law. These are: (1): 
Quo warranto, or an information in the nature of quo 
warranto, as it is now called. 2. Scire facias. 3. Man-
damus. 4. Injunction. 5. Indictment. While it is 
usual for the attorney-general to start these proceedings 
(except injunction), the court itself, in order to protect 
the public interest in a proper case has authority to direct 
some one to bring them (2); and, by statute in many 
(2) State v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 170. 
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states, the proceedings may be on the relation of any 
individual 
The writ of quo warranto is issued to bring a corpora-
tion before the court to show "by what authority" it 
claims or exercises corporate franchises, and is applicable 
to cases where there never has been a right, as well as 
where there has been a cause of forfeiture, by neglect or 
abuse; the same end is now accomplished in a similar way 
by an information in the nature of quo warranto; the judg-
ment is an ouster and seizure of the franchises. Scire 
facias is used generally where there is a legal corpora-
tion which has abused its authority, and it is called upon 
to "make known" why it has done so; the judgment is the 
same as in quo warranto. Mandamus is a writ issued to 
compel the performance of a definite corporate duty fixed 
by statute, charter provision, or by the common law. In-
junction is a writ issued by a court of equity to prevent 
the doing of some threatened act. An indictment is a 
criminal proceeding to punish a corporation for creating 
a public nuisance, or other misdemeanor. 
§ 154. Causes of forfeiture. Any abuse, misuse, ornon-
use, of corporate franchises to the injury of the public is 
cause of forfeiture by the state in quo warranto or scire 
facias; such as engaging in unlawful combinations; in 
illegal insurance, or banking; for fraudulent organiza-
tions; wilful or negligent non-user, etc. Also for usurp-
ation of any public franchise; or imperfect or insufficient 
organization, or exercising corporate powers after expira-
tion of charter; also for illegal intrusion into a corporate 
office. 
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§ 155. Statutes of limitation and waiver. There is an 
English rule that after six years have elapsed, subsequent 
to the cause of forfeiture, the courts will not entertain 
a quo warranto, upon the relation of a private individual; 
but no such rule applies to the state or the king-statutes 
of limitation do not run against the state, unless the state 
is expressly named. Many of the states have, however, 
provided that the states shall not bring quo warranto pro-
ceedings after a certain time, varying from 8 to 21 years. 
The legislative body may, after a cause of forfeiture has 
occurred, waive the ·state's right to complain, and the 
failure of the attorney-general to act has a similar, but 
not the same, effect; a waiver by the legislature pardons 
the offense, and the state cannot afterwards forfeit the 
charter for that offense; but the failure of the attorney-
general dQes not pardon the offense-merely postpones 
action. 
§ 156. :Mandamus. This is a prerogative writ to com-
pel the performance of a duty. Whenever a specific and 
determined legal duty is imposed upon a private corpora-
tion, expressly or impliedly, by statute, charter, or com-
mon law, and there is no other adequate remedy for its 
enforcement, mandamus will lie in a suit in behalf of the 
state to enforce the public duty, or, in case of a private 
right, on behalf of the person to whom the duty is due; 
but not to enforce a mere optional corporate privilege, or 
to control discretion. It has been used to reinstate a 
member, compel the callings of meetings, or the inspec-tion 
of books, or a transfer of shares; or to compel public ser-
vice companies, as water, gas, telegraph, railroad, etc., 
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to perform their duties to the public, or to individuals. 
For example, where a railroad company, with the power 
of eminent domain, has constructed and operated its road, 
it will be compelled by mandamus to accept and trans-
port freight, notwithstanding there is a strike of em- . 
ployees for higher wages, there being no violent inter-
ference by the employees (3). So, where a street railway 
company refused to transfer a passenger from one part 
of the road to another, without the payment of an extra 
fare, where the terms of the grant required such transfer, 
the passenger could compel the company by mandamus to 
tr an sf er him ( 4 ). But where a corporation had merely 
the privilege and not the duty of placing its car tracks 
in certain streets, it would not be compelled to place or 
keep them there (5). 
§ 157. Control by courts of equity. These courts have 
no general jurisdiction to dissolve corporations, though 
it has been held that where dissolution was necessary to 
prevent the continuance of a fraud, in a suit of which the 
court has jurisdiction because of the fraud, it could go to 
the extent of decreeing dissolution; such power, under 
similar circumstances, is frequently conferred on such 
courts by statute. Neither do courts of equity usually 
have power to enjoin ultra vires corporate acts, without 
other grounds of jurisdiction. An injunction may be 
granted upon the application of the state, whenever a cor-
poration is abusing the power given it for a public pur-
pose, or acting adversely to the public, or creating a 
(3) People v. N. Y. Central Ry. Cio., 28 Hun (N. Y.) 543. 
(4) Richmond Ry. Co. v. Brown, 97 Va. 25. 
(6) San Antonio St. Ry. Co. v. State, 90 Tex. 620. 
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nuisance, or threatening to do these; or to prevent a dis-
sipation of the funds of a public charitable trust, when 
the beneficiaries are so numerous and indefinite that the 
trust can be preserved only through the public authority. 
A shareholder may enjoin the acceptance of fundamental 
changes, the diversion of the funds, or the completion of 
executory ultra vires contracts. Where one member of a 
1!orporation obtains control of it, and fraudulently appro-
priates all its income by an excessive salary paid to him-
self as president, and by excessive rent paid to himself for 
property leased to the corporation, a court of equity may 
decree dissolution to prevent the continuance of the 
fraud (6). So, too, the state may have an injunction to 
prevent the giving of a prize fight exhibition by an incor-
porated athletic club (7). But the state cannot, by an 
injunction in a court of equity, prevent an ice company 
from manufacturing linseed oil. The remedy is quo war-
ranto in a court of law (8). 
§ 158. Indictment. This has been sufficiently con-
sidered above ( § 150), in discussing corporate li~bility 
for crimes. At common law corporations were subject 
to indictment for public nuisance, and are now generally 
for such, and for violation of anti-trust, safety appliance, 
and pure-food laws, giving rebates, and matters of a 
similar kind. 
§ 159. Control by private visitor. In the case of chari-
table corporations, the person who endowed the charity 
(6) Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 118. 
(7) Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind 98. 
(8) Atty.-Oen. v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239. 
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had, at common law, the right to appoint a visitor to see 
if the funds were applied according to the terms of the 
gift; if he did not appoint any, the right to do this re. 
suited to himself and his heirs; but, since we have 
abolished the English primogeniture rules of descent, and 
all of a man's children become his heirs, such method of 
visitation is impracticable, though, if not waived, the 
legal right yet remains. Statutes, however, usually pro-
vide other methods, and such visitorial rights, unless 
otherwise provided, are presumed to be vested in the cor-
porate trustees (10). 
§ 160. Control by public visitor. In most of the states 
there are railroad, insurance, and other commissioners, 
whose duty it is to inquire into and report upon the con-
dition of various kinds of corporations; these are pro-
vided for the protection of the public, and have been held 
to be valid methods of the state in supervising such cor-
porations as are likely to become injurious if not looked 
after in some such way (11). 
§ 161. Control by the legislature. This is either: (1) 
Ordinary, or (2) extraordinary. In the exercise of the 
ordinary legislative powers corporations are subject to 
the power of eminent domain, the police power, and the 
taxing power. In the exercise of extraordinary powers, 
under some circumstances, corporate charters may be (a) 
repealed, or (b) amended. 
§ 162. Power of eminent domain. Corporations, like 
natural persons, are subject to the power of the state to 
(10) Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 4 Wheat. CS18. 
(11) Weld v. Gae Co., 197 MaBB. 556. 
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take any of their property or their franchises for public 
purposes upon making due compensation. The general 
rule, however, is that property already devoted to a pub-
lic use cannot be taken for another public use without 
express authority; and it is sometimes said that the new 
use must be different from the old use-that is, one rail-
road company could not be authorized to take the whole 
line of another railroad company to be operated in the 
same way; horse street-railways however have been taken 
by eleotric companies, and toll-roads have been taken by 
the state and turned into free roads. And so, where a 
bridge company was incorporated with the exclusive right 
to build a toll bridge over a river and take the tolls for 
its use, such bridge and the right to take tolls may be 
taken under the power of eminent domain, and upon pay-
ment therefor may be converted into a free bridge (12). 
§ 163. Police power. Corporations are subject to the 
police power of the state, the same as individuals; al-
though they may be chartered for the express purpose of 
carrying on a lottery or manufacturing liquor, subsequent 
legislation may forbid such acts, without impairing the 
contract, for the reason that no one can obtain a vested 
right in any business that is dangerous to the public 
health, the public morals, or the public safety. The state 
cannot surrender or barter away its control over these 
subjects. Under this power, also, the rates to be charged 
by a public service company (within the limit that for-
bids depriving them of their property without due process 
of law) may be fixed or regulated; so reports from in-
(12) West River Bridge Co. v. DU:, 6 How. WT. 
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surance, trust, building and loan, bank, and other like com-
panies, may be required for the protection of the public. 
The general limits to this power are that, in case of law-
ful businesses, property cannot be confiscated by the stnte, 
vested right.a divested, nor the performance of national 
functions interfered with, by the state legislature. For 
example, where a lottery company paid five thousand 
dollars to the state, and agreed to pay one thousand dol-
lars as an annual tax for the privilege of carrying on a 
lottery, for twenty-five years, the state could revoke this 
privilege at any time, without specifically reserving the 
right to do so, and without repayment to the corporation 
of any money received (13). Or, a state can pass a law 
repealing an existing license law, and forbid the further 
manufacture of liquors and sale of liquors made prior to 
the prohibitory Jaw, without "depriving any one of his 
propel'ty without due process of law" (14). 
§ 164. Taxation. The state's power to tax corpora-
tions is the same as in the case of individuals. The cor-
porate elements of taxation are (15): (1) the primary 
franchise; (2) the secondary franchises; (3) the prop-
erty, real or persona~ tangible or intangible; ( 4) the 
capital stock authorized, subscribed, or paid in; ( 5) earn-
ings, gross or net, or profits; ( 6) the shares of stock owned 
by shareholders. It is possible that all of these might 
be taxed at one time without being illegal, though it would 
be what is in some sense double, or treble, or quadruple 
(13) Stone v. Mfssfsslppl, 101 U. S. 814. 
(14) Mugler v. KaDSas, 123 U. S. 623. 
(15) Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679. 
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taxation. The matter is statutory, and there is but little 
uniformity in the statutes or the decisions of the various 
3tates upon the subject of corporate taxation. 
§ 165. Taxation of franchises. It is not usual to sep-
arate the primary franchise-the right to be a corpora-
tion and exercis~ corporate powers-from the secondary 
franchises, such as the right to occupy the streets by a 
street railway, for the purpose of taxation. Some courts 
seem to think that, since the state charges a very small 
fee or none at all for incorporation, the primary fran-
chise has no value (16) ; the proper view, however, seems 
to be that its value is whatever it adds to the convenience, 
efficacy, and safety of conducting the business by the cor-
porate form of organization over other forms; in other 
words, what would those who have it give for it rather 
than do without it (17). Its value is diffu!ult to estimate, 
and many rules for ascertaining its value have been sug-
gested. Without attempting to separate the primary and 
secondary franchises, these two methods of valuation have 
been approved: ( 1) Find the market value of all the 
shares and bonds of the corporation; from this subtract 
the assessed value of all the real and personal property, 
and the balance will be the value of the franchise. (2) 
Ascertain the total net earnings (usua1ly the average for 
a pe·riod of years); capitalize these at the average rate of 
interest upon short loans; from the total amount so found, 
subtract the assessed value of the real and personal prop-
erty, and the balance represents the value of the fran-
(16) Detroit Citizens Ry. v. C.Ommon Council, 12!S Mich. 678. 
(l'l) Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal 276. 
230 PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
chise; both of these in fact are based upon the earning 
capacity of the capital of the corporation, and is the busi-
ness man's estimate of its value ( 18). 
The situs of the secondary franchise, such as operating 
a street railroad, for purposes of taxation, is where the 
line is operated; the same is true as to a railroad cor-
poration. The situs of the primary franchise is usually 
considered as being at the principal office of the corpora· 
ti on; it undoubtedly can be, however, considered as hav-
ing a situs wherever the corporation does business, in pro-
portion to the business done; and it is usually so con-
sidered when business is done in two or more states. 
§ 166. Taxation of property. The corporate property 
of whatever kind is subject to taxation, the same as that 
of individuals. There is a tendency now to consider the 
property as a unit devoted to a special purpose, and to 
have all of it assessed by one state board instead of by 
local assessors. After it is assessed by the state board, 
the apportionment may be, and frequently is, made among 
the various local subdivisions of the state, in proportion 
to the business done in these districts, or mileage therein, 
in the case of railroad or telegraph companies, etc. In 
administering taxing laws it is not usual to consider that 
the term ''property, real and personal,'' includes '' fran-
chises'' unless expressly so provided, yet the legislature 
may so direct, and provide a method of valuation (19). 
And where the statute required all property to be taxed 
at its true value in money, and directed the assessors, in 
(18) Spring Valley W. W. v. Scbottler, 62 Cal. 69. 
(19) People v. State Board, 174 N. Y. 417. 
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determining the value of express, telegraph, and tele. 
phone companies, ''to be guided by the value of said prop-
erty as determined by the value of their entire capital 
stock," such proportion of the total value of the capital 
stock of an express company could be considered as lo-
cated in Ohio, as the value of the tangible property in 
Ohio bore to the total value of all the tangible property 
of the company, wherever located (20). Patents and 
copyrights are not the subjects of state taxation, but good 
will may be taxed where the corporation does business. 
Patented articles and copyrighted books, etc., are taxable 
as property. The states cannot tax the franchises of a 
national corporation without the consent of Congress, nor 
can they tax any national government agency. 
§ 167. Taxation of gross or net earnings. These may 
be the basis of taxation by the state in the case of corpora-
tions not engaged in inters·tate commerce, or upon such 
earnings as are not derived from such commerce. But the 
states cannot directly tax corporations upon the monthly 
or yearly earnings derived from such commerce, though 
of course they can tax them upon any money or property 
found actually in their possession on the assessment day, 
from whatever source derived; this is a tax on property 
and not earnings. It has been held also that corporations 
may be taxed upon their capital stock, and the tax rate 
may be graded according to the gross or net earnings, 
or dividends, whether they are partly derived from in-
ters·tate commerce or not; this is on the theory that the 
(20) Adams Ex. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, 100 U. S. 185. 
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tax is on the property and not on the earnings for any 
period (21). 
§ 168. Taxation of shares. These are taxable, although 
the property or capital stock is taxed, and whether this 
is at its actual or at its face value. In several states 
this is held not to be double taxation (22), though others 
bold otherwise. The situs of shares for the purposes of 
taxation is usually the domicile of the owner, but the state 
may make their situs to be that of the domicile of the cor-
poration, and tax them there, even though their owner 
lives in another state and is taxed there on the same 
shares (23). It bas been held that alien owners may be 
taxed higher than resident owners, but this is not the case 
if the owner is a citizen of the United States residing in 
another state. 
§ 169. National taxation of state corporations. The 
national government bas the same power to tax state cor-
porations and their property, as it bas individuals and 
their property. The Federal taxing power can be used 
for the purpose of regulation as well as raising rev-
enue (24). 
§ 170. Repeal and forfeiture. These have already been 
mentioned under dissolution. If there is no power re-
served to the state legislature, it cannot repeal any cor-
porate charter, although Parliament and possibly Con-
gress may do so; if the power to repeal is reserved with-
out qualification, it may be exercised at any time, with or 
(21) Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217. 
(22) Thrall v. Guiney, 141 Mich. 392. 
(23) Tappnn v. Merchant's Bank, 19 Wall. 490. 
(24) Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 633. 
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without giving any reason for so doing. Vested property 
rights are not destroyed however by such repeal (25); 
if the power to repeal is reserved upon the happening of 
some condition, some cases hold that there must be a 
judicial determination that the condition has happened, 
before the legislature can act; other cases hold that the 
matter is wholly within the power of the legislature to 
determine. The courts are not altogether in accord as to 
the effect of the repeal of general corporation laws-
whether they affect the existence of corporations formed 
under them or not. If the power to repeal is reserved, 
the effect of such repeal seems to be merely a question 
of legislative intent, with the presumption that existing 
corporations are not affected, unless clearly so intended. 
No reserve power is necessary for forfeiting corporate 
franchises for abuse or non-use; this power is implied 
from the nature of a franchise, and can be enforced only 
in the courts after a proper judicial determination of the 
facts. A court of law alone has the power to dissolve for 
breach of duty, and generally only on the complaint of 
the state by the attorney-general. 
§ 171. Amendment. Since a charter is a contract, the 
general rule here is that it can be amended only by con-
sent of both parties, that is, the state and the corpora-
tion; and further, since there is also contained in the 
charter a contract between the corporation and each mem-
ber, the corporation cannot accept an amendment unless 
each member consents; and this is the rule in this country 
concerning material amendments, when the state has not 
(25) People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. L 
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reserved the power to amend. Under the transcendent 
power of Parliament, however, a material amendment 
could be imposed upon the corporation without its con-
sent or that of its members-or they could be required t-0 
stop business. Perhaps Congress bas a like arbitrary 
power as to corporations created by it. Under a reserved 
power to amend, the states have much the same power as 
Parliament-that is an amendment, even though ma-
terial, may be tendered, and, if not accepted, the state may 
take away the corporate life (26). But in this connection 
it has been held that what the state offers must be an 
amendment, not something wholly new and different, such 
as requiring a banking company to build a railroad. 
Two views are taken, al so, as to the power of the ma-
jority to accept an amendment, if the power to amend is 
reserved to the state when the corporation is formed. One 
line of cases holds that the majority have the power to 
accept what are generally considered material amend-
ments, against the dissent of the minority; other cases 
hold that unanimous consent is necessary. The difference 
here is more as to what constitutes a material amendment, 
than as to the rules relating to its acceptance. One case 
holds that extending a railroad from 60 to 90 miles is im-
material, and a majority may accept such an amend-
ment (27) ; while another holds that extending a 5 mile 
railroad to 12 miles is material and requires unanimous 
consent ( 28). 
(26) Yeaton v. Bank, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 593. 
(27) Buffalo, etc. R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336. 
(28) ?Albrlskle v. Hackensack Ry. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178. 
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SECTION 2. THE STATE AND NATIONAL CORPORATIONS. 
§ 172. In general. National corporations are not for-
eign corporations in any state, unless they are created to 
operate in one of the territories or in the District of 
Columbia; in which case their status is substantially the 
same as if created by the legislature of one of the states, 
Congress merely acting as the local legislature in these 
cases. But corporations created by the national govern-
ment to perform its national functions, to operate in any 
state, are not foreign corporations in any state. By the 
national banking act, a national bank located in any par-
ticular state is for most purposes treated as a citizen or 
inhabitant of that state; it, however, cannot be taxed in 
such states, or the exercise of its powers be restricted by 
the state where located, in any other way than as is ex-
pressly authorized by the national laws. For example, 
where the statutes of Pennsylvania provided that no 
foreign corporations should have an office in that state, 
without obtaining a license from the state, for which an 
annual charge was made, it was held that a railroad com-
pany chartered by Congress to build a road from Texas 
to California, and having an office in Philadelphia, was 
not a foreign corporation in that state, and subject to the 
license law thereof relating to foreign corporations (29). 
SECTION 3. THE STATE AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. 
§ 173. Right of & foreign corporation. Strictly speak-
ing the states of the Union are foreign to each other in 
most matters relating to corporation laws; the owner-
(29) Comm. v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 98 Pa. St 90. 
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ship of property, so long as it is legal in any state, by a 
corporation organized in another state, is protected as the 
property of an individual is, and, so long as its acts within 
the state are legal, it is protected by the national constitu-
tional provisions. Its rights, however, to do business 
(except interstate commerce) in another state than the 
one creating it, is based upon mere comity and cannot 
be claimed as a legal right; it bas the power to do busi-
ness anywhere (if not limited by its charter), but its right 
to do business, in any other state than the one creating 
it, depends upon the consent of the state where it seeks to 
do business. Thus, where a Georgia bank had a general 
power to purchase bills of exchange, a purchase made by 
it in Alabama, without objection on the part of that state, 
is a valid exercise of corporate powers (30). So, an 
Indiana corporation, which through an agent in Louisiana 
sells meats in that state, can be charged an annual license 
tax upon the business done locally by the agent in the 
state (31), though the license tax is higher than the license 
tax charged to domestic corporations engaged in the same 
business. But where the goods are shipped by a foreign 
corporation, in distinct packages, to one in another state 
who took orders for them, and who examines them, and, 
if found all right, delivers them, collects the price, and 
remits to the corporation, such transactions are interstate 
commerce, and cannot be prevented or taxed by the 
states (32 ). 
(30) Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet 519. 
(31) State v. Packing 0>., 110 IA 180. 
(32) Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 501. 
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§ 174. Right to engage in commerce. While the general 
rule, as stated above, prevents a foreign corporation from 
entering, and establishing a place of business, and exer-
cising its corporate franchise there, without the consent 
of the state, any corporation, just as a natural person, 
under the national Constitution, has the right to engage 
in interstate or foreign commerce-and this cannot be ex-
cluded or controlled by any state. Thus, where an Ohio 
manufacturing company, through its agents, made a con-
tract in Colorado to make in Ohio and deliver in Colorado, 
an engine, the corporation could sue in Colorado for the 
price, though it had not complied with the statutes of 
Corolado in regard to doing business in that state as a 
foreign corporation ( 33). The questions, what is inter-
state commerce, when it begins and ends, and what inci-
dents of it may be regulated by the state, are fully dis-
cussed in Constitutional Law, Chapter XIV, in Volume 
XII of this work. 
§ 175. Right of state to exclude. Within the limits 
above given, any state has a legal right to exclude or dis-
criminate against any corporation organized in another 
state (that is not an agent of the national government), 
for any reason or without any reason. And, after it has 
once granted a license to do business in the state, this 
license can be revoked at any time, though a valuable con-
sideration was paid for it, without violating the national 
constitutional provisions; but, if the grant indicates a 
"contract right to do business in the state, during the cor-
porate lifetime without being subject to any greater lia-
(83) Cooper l\ffg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 1'1:1. 
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bilities than then were or might be imposed upon domestic 
corporations,'' the state cannot change the terms without 
consent of the foreign corporation, nor exclude it for not 
consenting (34). As an illustration of the general rule, 
it was held that where foreign insurance companies had 
been licensed to do business in the state, and had done so 
for many years, paying the license tax regularly, a new 
license tax could be imposed upon such corporations from 
other states of 2112 7o, and on those from other countries 
of 31/2 7o , upon premiums paid in the state, although 
domestic corporations were required to pay only one per 
cent (35). 
§ 176. Methods of exclusion or restriction. The stat-
utes usually provide: (1) That, before doing business 
in a state, a foreign corporation sha1l appoint some one 
within the state, upon whom service of summons in suits 
against the corpo-ration shall be made; (2) that, when the 
corporations of state A are excluded by state B then 
state A will exclude the corporations of state B-these 
are called retaliatory laws; (3) that suits against such 
foreign corporations shall not be removed by it to the 
Federal courts. While a provision of this latter kind 
cannot prevent the removal of a suit to the Federal courts, 
the state may afterward exclude the foreign corpora-
tion, that so offends, from doing business in the state (36). 
Certain penalties are usually provided for violating 
these provisions. The state can collect the penalty or 
(34) American S. & R. Co. v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 103. 
(35) Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 91 Fed. 711. 
(38) Doyle v. Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535. 
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oust the corporation for non-compliance. Much contro-
versy has arisen as to the validity of contracts made with 
a corporation that has failed to comply (37) ; the weight 
of authority probably is that if a penalty is imposed, 
either on the offending corporation or its agent, that is 
the exclusive remedy, the validity of the contract is not 
affected, and it may be enforced; this is particularly true 
when the complaining party, who seeks performance of 
the contract, is the person contracting with the corpora-
tion, since such a provision is specially designed for his 
protection; and, if the corporation is complainant, many 
of the cases hold it can enforce a contract made by it be-
fore it complied with the law, but others hold otherwise. 
Another view is that, if there is no penalty and the cor-
poration bas not complied, the contract is void and un-
enforceable by either party to it. This does not seem 
reasonable, so far as complaint is made by one contract-
ing with the corporation, since the law is designed for his 
protection instead of his injury. The courts also are 
not in accord upon what is "doing business," in violation 
of these statutes; one line of cases holds a single act of 
the kind the corporation was formed to do, if done without 
eompliance with such statutes, violates them; while others 
hold there must be several acts, amounting to "carrying 
on'' business. 
§ 177. Visitorial power over foreign corporations. In 
general, a state has no visitorial power over the internal 
concerns of a foreign corporation doing business within 
its territory, except so far as it has compelled it to be-
(37) Toledo Tie Co. v. Thomas, 33 W. Va 566. 
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come a domestic corporation, as a condition of doing busi-
ness within the state. It may, of course, oust it from the 
state, but cannot dissolve it; it may appoint a receiver for 
such corporations as are doing business within the state 
and have property there; but, if it has no place of busi-
ness within the state or no officers or no property there, 
it cannot do so. What are "visitorial powers" and what 
are ''internal concerns'' are not very definitely settled: 
but to compel an assessment upon the stock; or ''to enter-
tain an action to dissolve a corporation; to determine the 
validity of its organization; to determine which of two 
rival organizations is the legal one, or who of rival 
claimants are its legal officers; to restrain it from declar. 
ing a dividend, or to compel it to declare one; to restrain 
it from issuing bonds or from making an additional issue 
of stock-would clearly all be the exercise of visitorial 
powers over the corporation, or an interference with the 
management of its internal affairs" (38); yet, to compel 
the issue of a new certificate of stock to replace a lost 
one, or to direct the corporation to allow a member to in-
spect the corporate books already in the state, are not 
such as are beyond the power of the state to enforce 
SECTION 4. THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE 
CORPORATIONS. 
§ 178. Ta.xing power. Under the taxing power of the 
United States government, it has been held that state 
banks with power to issue bills and notes can be taxed 
by the national government so heavily as to make it im· 
(38) Guilford v. W. U. Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332. 
' 
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possible for them to do a profitable business of this kind, 
and this is true even if the national government did this 
for the express purpose of protecting the national bank 
issues and destroying the state bank issues (39). This 
power bas been suggested to be such that state corpora-
tions which engage in interstate commerce can be taxed 
so heavily by the national government upon such busines~ 
that they cannot profitably do such business, and, in that 
way, the national government can control, by naming 
conditions or requiring a license, the recent corporate 
trusts. No case bas yet been decided, but the legislation 
of Congress just enacted as a part of the tariff pro-
gramme, providing a tax upon corporate net earnings, 
may be the first step in that direction. In the case of the 
bank it was allowed to reorganize as a national bank and 
thereby come directly under the national control (40). It 
seems that this method might be used to compel corpora-
tions engaged in interstate commerce to incorporate as 
national corporations, if a Federal law were enacted for 
that purpose. Much of the vexatious variety of state 
legislation, now casting a great burden of expense upon 
such corporations in order to comply with it, might be 
avoided and uniformity obtained thereby. 
§ 179. Adopting state regulations. Undoubtedly, 
though Congress bas exclusive regulation of interstate 
commerce, it may adopt regulations made by the states 
that have the effect to exclude corporations or others from 
carrying on business that they otherwise would have the 
(39) Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533. 
{40) Casey v. Galll, 94 U. S. 673. 
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right to do, against the state's consent, as interstate com-
merce. In this way the national law make3 it illegal to 
sell interstate liquor in any state that has a prohibitory 
liquor law. contrary to that law. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
SPECIAL RELATIONS. 
SECTION 1. THE CORPORATION AND ITs PaoMOTEBS. 
§ 180. Duties of promoters. The promoters owe to the 
corporation the general duty to take no advantage of it; 
if they, while engaged in promoting the company, buy 
property for the corporation, they must let the corpora-
tion have it at the price paid by them for it; this is be-
cause they are in a relation of trust toward the unborn 
corporation, when they are acting for it (1). If they 
own property, and purchase it from themselves for the 
corporation, while engaged in promoting the corporation, 
they must not pay more than the property is worth. If 
they own or acquire property for themselves, while not 
acting for the corporation, they have the perfect right 
to sell it to the corporation at any price they can obtain, 
provided they do not themselves, or by their dummies, 
represent the corporation in making the purchase. These 
last two statements, however, are probably subject to the 
qualification that, if the promoters are themselves the 
only parties interested in the corporation at the time and 
no public subscription for shares is to be called for, or, 
if all the shareholders know all the facts and ratify the 
acts or do not object, a large amount of stock may be 
(1) Chandler v. Bacon, 30 Fed. 538. See 54 Am. L. Reg.~. 128. 
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issued for property of little value, and purchasers of 
shares from original shareholders, who took their shares 
with full knowledge of the facts, cannot complain. Only 
creditors, without knowledge, can complain that the stock 
is unpaid, when the corporate funds are insufficient to pay 
their claims. There are however some conflicting views 
upon these matters. 
§ 181. Same: Illustration. T and A on January 20 
signed articles of incorporation of a railroad company; 
on February 17 bought 40 miles of a graded railroad bed, 
with right of way, for $15,000; on February 20 filed the 
articles of association, at which time corporate life began, 
the company to have $3,600,000 capital stock; immediately 
thereafter organized by electing themselves and two 
others, to whom they had sold an interest in the roadbed, 
directors and officers of the company; in May offered to 
sell the roadbed to the company for the $3,600,000 capital 
stock and $200,000 in money; in November this offer was 
accepted by the directors and the stock ordered trans-
ferred to the owners of the roadbed·; this was then done; a 
little later at a meeting of the stockholders, who so received 
their stock, all being present, a resolution was unani-
mously passed approving and ratifying the foregoing 
transactions. In a suit by the company, after these par-
ties had sold their stock to others, to have these trans-
actions set aside, and the stock and money, above the 
$15,000 paid by the parties for the roadbed, returned to 
the company, it was held there was no liability (2). 
(2) 8t. Louis, etc. Co. v. Tiernan, 37 Knn. GOO. Compare Old Do-
minion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315, and Old Dominion Copper 
Co. ''· Lewlsoho, 210 u. S. 206. 
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§ 182. Liabilities to corpora.tion or its shareholders. 
For all profits made by them in promoting the company, 
or while acting for it, promoters are liable to the corpora-
tion or its shareholders, when the public are to be called 
on generally for subscription to shares and full informa-
tion is not given to the subscribers, or they are misled into 
believing no profits are made or to be made. Thus, where 
K obtained an option from V to purchase a tract of land 
for $31,000, and then associated P with him for the pur-
pose of organizing a corporation for the purchase of the 
same land for $55,000, and prepared a subscription paper 
so worded as not to disclose the true ownership of the 
land, but to induce the signers to believe it belonged to 
V, and to bind them to join in forming a corporation to 
purchase such land for $55,000; and, in order to induce the 
signers to believe that Kand P purposed to become stock-
holders on the same basis as the others who joined in the 
apparently mutual enterprise, each signed for $10,000 ot 
stock, and the corporation was formed, K and P elected 
directors and managing officers, and the sale was com-
pleted, ostensibly by V, for $55,000, but really for $31,000, 
K and P dividing the difference- the other subscribers 
· may in equity have the contract rescinded and recover 
their money, or may charge K and P as trustees for the 
profits and have an accounting, or may sue them at law 
for damages for fraud (3). On the other band, where the 
promoter similarly acquired an option on property for 
$6,000 and organized a corporation to purchase it, but, 
in his subscription paper, described the land proposed to 
(3) Hebgeu v. Koefll.er, 97 Wis. 313. 
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be purchased and stated "I hold the option and agree to 
sell all my rights therein to said company for $8,500 when 
it is organized," neither the company nor any subscriber 
could complain that the promoter made a profit of $2,500, 
since he did not pretend to be selling the property of an-
other party, and going in with the subscribers on a pre-
tended equality to purchase it at a price not known to 
them but known to him to be false ( 4). 
§ 183. Liability to party dealt with. Promoters are 
personally liable to one dealing with them, even though 
their dealing is in the name of the corporation, for the 
reason that there is in fact no principal in existence that 
they can represent (5). This liability perhaps can be 
excluded by drawing the contract in a way that makes the 
corporation alone liable, if any one. 
§ 184. Liability among themselves. As between them-
selves, so far as they act in forwarding the scheme of in-
corporation in accordance with their agreement, they are 
substantially partners fort he particular purpose, and one 
is bound by the acts of the others in carrying out the 
scheme in the way contemplated. But, as to the other 
matters, only those who authorize, consent, or ratify the 
acts of the others become liable therefor (6). 
§ 185. Liability of corporation for acts of promoters. 
Inasmuch as the corporation does not come into existence, 
until after the promoters' acts bring it into existence, it 
(4) Richardson v. Graham, 45 W. Va. 134. 
(5) Weatherford, etc. Co. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 850; HJnkle7 v. Oil 
Co., 132 Ia. 396. 
(6) Plrtsch v. Mllbrath, 123 Wis. 647; Roberts, etc. Co. v. SchlJck. 
62 Minn. 332. 
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cannc t be a party to a contract made for it by its pro-
moter, and so is not liable thereon, unless it expressly or 
impliedly adopts the acts or contract after it has come 
into perfect existence (7). The adoption of a promoter's 
contract by the corporation is really making a new con-
tract, which dates from the time of adoption and must be 
entered into with all the formalities then required to bind 
the corporation (8); and this is not properly termed a 
ratification, for that implies the existence of a principal at 
the time the agent makes the contract. See Agency, § 22, 
in Volume I of this work. 
SECTION 2. THE CORPORATION AND ITS 0FFICEBS. 
§ 186. Genera.I relation. There are three theories as to 
this relation: (1) That the officers, including directors, 
are merely agents of the corporation or the shareholders; 
this is not quite correct, for the directors have the power 
to act in good faith in a way that does not coincide with 
the shareholder's view. (2) That they are trustees; this 
view is not entirely correct, for there is no separation of 
the titles to the corporate property into legal and equit-
able, and a vesting of the legal title in the trustees and 
of the equitable title in the corporation, as there would 
be in the case of a true trust. (3) That they are man-
dataries; this is not altogether correct, for there is no 
vesting of the legal possession of the corporate property 
in them as a special property, as there is in the case of 
bailees. The truth is the relation of directors and officers 
(7) See note 5, above. 
(8) McArthur v. Times Co., 48 Minn. 319. 
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is sui generis, involving relations analogous to all of the 
above, but not exactly the same as either. 
These theories may be illustrated thus: A shareholder 
brought an action on the case for damages against the 
director of a bank for loaning money without security. 
Held, such suit could not be maintained-the corporation 
must sue, for the director was its agent (9). A receiver 
of a corporation brought a bill in equity against a director 
for misappropriating the corporate funds to his own use; 
held, in Illinois, that the director was the trustee of an 
express trust, and could not successfully plead the statute 
of limitations for that reason (10). On the same facts, 
Tennessee holds the directors are only implied trustees, 
and statutes of limitations run in their favor (11). 
§ 187. General rule as to duties. They owe the corpo-
ration the duty to exercise diligence and care and a 
reasonable business judgment and prudence in managing 
the corporate affairs, and, for failure in this direction, 
they may be held in an action for damages by the cor-
poration (12); some cases say they are liable only for 
gross neglig;ence in managing the corporate affairs, or 
selecting unfit servants, or failure to use ordinary care to 
supervise their acts afterward (13); they have no right 
to any profits made by them while working for the cor-
poration; all such belong to it and may be recovered by it. 
§ 188. Right to remove corporate officers. There is no 
(9) Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456. 
(10) Ellls v. Ward, 137 III. 509. 
(11) Wallace v. Snv. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630. 
(12) North Rud. Bldg., etc. Assn. v. Childs, 82 Wis. 460. 
(13) Swentzell v. Penn. Bank, 147 Pa. St. 140. 
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well-defined power to remove elected officers-as direc-
tors, president, etc.-wbo are elected for terms fixed in 
the charter, general law, or by-law, before the term bas 
expired (14); this may be provided for by by-law pro-
vision allowing it; a court could, upon proper showing, 
remove such officer if he were violating bis trust, in a way 
similar to the removal of other trustees. Agents, though 
hired for a definite time, may be removed, subject to lia-
bility for damages if removed without cause before their 
time of service has expired; if not hired for a definite 
time, they can be removed at any time by the corporation 
without making itself liable for damages. 
§ 189. Rights of officers to manage the corporate busi-
ness. So long as corporate officers act in good faith, with 
due care, and keep within the corporate powers and 
those conferred upon them, they cannot be prevented from 
managing the business according to their best judgment, 
and neither shareholders nor the courts can interfere ( 15). 
§ 190. Right of officers to deal with the corporation. 
The general rule here is that the officer cannot rightfully 
represent both himself and the corporation in making a 
contract with it; any such contract is voidable by the cor-
poration or its members, even though in fact it was fair 
and reasonable, by one line of cases (16); but by another 
and perhaps the better view, if the contract is made in 
good faith and free from fraud, it is not so voidable (17). 
If the corporation, however, is represented by other 
(14) In the Matter of Election of Directors, '33 N. J. L. 168. 
(15) Blood v. La Serena. 113 Olli!. 221. 
(16) Mull80n v. Ry. Co., 103 N. Y. 58. 
(17) Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587. 
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officers that have power to act for it in the transaction, 
there is nothing forbidding an officer from dealing with. 
it, and such contract is valid. The same rule applies to 
corporations having common directors or officers (18) 
dealing with each other through such officers; if they are 
represented by non-common officers who could bind it by 
their action, the contract is valid ; otherwise voidable. 
§ 191. Right to salary. The general officers of corpo-
rations, including directors, are supposed to serve in 
their capacities as such without compensation, and hence, 
after they have so acted, they cannot, without consent of 
shareholders, be voted salaries as back pay (19), for such 
a thing would be giving away the corporate funds. For 
any extraordinary service not included in the ·ordinary 
functions of the office, there is an implied promise to pay, 
and in such case the directors have the right to fix the 
amount. The shareholders usually reserve the right to 
themselves to fix the sala1ies of the general officers, and 
leave to the directors the right to fix other salaries. There 
is an implied promise to pay any officer or any person, 
who devotes his whole time to the service of the compan~ 
in ways other than merely performing the duties of his 
office. 
§ 192. Right of ofticers to resign. A corporate officer 
may resign at any time, even though the statute provides 
they shall continue in office until their successors are ap-
pointed, and this may be done without giving notice to 
the public or to those dealing with the corporation (20). 
(18) Aldlne, etc. Co. v. Pbllllps, 129 Mich. 240. 
(19) National Loan, etc. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 Fed. 33G. 
(20) Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132. 
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No acceptance of the resignation is necessary to make it 
effectual But the resignation of officers for the purpose 
of preventing the bringing of any suit, or the service of 
process, or of enabling a receiver to be appointed, is 
ineffective. Salary and liability cease with the resigna-
tion (21). 
§ 193. Right of officers to deal with shareholders. 
There is some conflict upon this matter. It is usual to 
say that directors and officers do not stand in any rela-
tion of trust and confidence toward individual sbare-
·bolders, and consequently can deal with them as if they 
were strangers, and are not obliged to give them any in-
formation unless called for, that may affect the value of 
the shares, even though they seek to buy shares from such 
shareholders (22); but there are some recent cases to the 
contrary, including a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, reversing a decision of the supreme court 
of the Philippine Islands (23). It was held here that the 
managing director of a church-landowning corporation, 
having shares, and whose lands were about to be pur-
chased by the government at a price that would greatly 
enhance the vaJue of the shares, was under a duty to in-
form a shareholder from whom be sought to purchase 
shares, of the facts known to him concerning the probable 
sale of land to the government. 
§ 194. Right to contribution. Where directors wrong-
fully pay dividends out of capital to shareholders who 
know the facts, and such directors are held liable to 
(21) 7.eltner v. Brewing Co., 174 N. Y. 247. 
(22) Denderlck v. Wilson, 8 Baxter (Teno.) 108. 
(23) Stroll!-! v. Replde, 213 U. S. 419. 
Vol. VDI-18 
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creditors for the amount so paid, they can recover the 
amount from the shareholders who knowingly received 
it; but, if the shareholders did not know the facts, they 
would not be compelled to refund (24). And where direc-
tors jointly wrongf nlly waste the corporate funds, one 
who has been compelled to make good the loss cannot en-
force contributions from the others (24), the ordinary rule 
relating to joint wrong-doers applying. 
§ 195. Liability of officers. The liability of officers to 
the corporation is considered above, and to the share-
holders and creditors hereafter. To third parties, or to 
those who deal with the corporation, the corporate officers 
are liable for their own wrongful acts, and cannot shield 
themselves behind the liability of the corporation as their 
principal. Thus, where an officer, without authority to 
issue a note for the company, falsely claimed he had such 
authority, he is liable to an innocent holder of the note; 
but, if he had authority to issue notes for a proper pur-
pose and abuses that authority, he is liable not to the in-
nocent holder but to the company, which is liable to the 
holder (25 ). So, too, where the manager of a lumber 
company put a known inexperienced workman to work 
with a defective machine known to be dangerous, whereby 
the workman was hurt, the act of the manager was not 
mere non-feasance, but a misfeasance for which he is 
liable (26). So, also, a manager who keeps giant powder 
(24) Moxham v. Grant, 69 J,. J. (Q. B.) 07. 
(26) Dexter Sav. Bk. v. Friend, 90 Fed. 703. 
(26) Greenberg v. Lumber Co., 90 Wis. 225. 
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in a dangerous quantity and place, for a corporation, is 
liable for the damage due to explosion (27). 
SECTION 3. THE CoRPOBATION AND ~TS SHAREHOLDERS. 
§ 196. In general. The corporation has a right not to 
have its existence denied by its shareholders-they are 
es topped; it has a right to issue pref erred stock under 
some circumstances; to regulate transfers; to carrj on 
the enterprise as the majority of the directors shall direct; 
to accept amendments, under some circumstances by a 
majority vote, and, if in failing circumstances, to dissolve 
itself. These matters have been considered. 
§ 197. Right of corporation to· collect subscriptions. In 
all the states except those of New England, every sub-
scription to stock that does not so state otherwise is con-
sidered as including an implied promise to pay for the 
shares when the corporation needs the money (28); it is 
not usually a debt due immediately upon the subscription 
(though some statutes make part of it such), but on1y an 
agreement to pay when demanded by the proper corporate 
authorities. 
§ 198. Calls. Before any particular amount is due 
upon any subscription a caU is to be made by the direc-
tors; this at common law was simply passing a resolution 
saying that a certain per cent of the amount subscribed 
should be due and payable at a certain time (29). Every 
shareholder was supposed to take notice of such resolu-
(27) Cameron v. Kenyon Connell Co., 2'2 Mont. 812. 
(28) Gettysburg Natl. Bk. v. Brown, 95 Md. 36'7; Hughes v. Mtg. 
Co., 34 Md. 816. 
(29) Budd v. Multonomab Co., 15 Ore. 413. 
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tion, and was in default if he did not comply with it; it is 
usual now to require notice of some sort to be given of the 
fact of making the call, and also of the time and place it 
shall be payable. It becomes a debt due the corporation 
as soon as due, and may be sued for by the corporation; 
to be valid, calls must operate equally and be uniform on 
all. There is no right, unless expressly conferred, to call 
for any more than the face value of the amount sub-
scribed, or the amount agreed to be paid in the subscrip-
tion contract (30). Calls should be made by directors 
legally elected (31). 
§ 199. Evidence of membership. The cases are not 
agreed as to this; one line of authorities holds that the 
corporate records, such as the stock and transfer books, 
are prima facie evidence as to who is a member, even 
against one who does not claim membership (32); the 
better view is otherwise (33). Such records would prop-
erly be evidence of membership against the corporation, 
and, with some propriety, might be considered such in 
favor of corporate creditors. Such records are not, how-
ever, conclusive. A certificate of shares is not necessary 
to constitute one a shareholder. 
§ 200. Right to vote. At common law every member 
had a right to one vote on every proposition, and no more. 
Voting was not according to shares owned; now, by cus-
tom, by-law, and statute or charter, the rule is almost 
universally the other way, and a shareholder has one 
(SO) Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Moffitt, 58 Neb. 642. 
(31) Moses v. Tompkins, 84 Ala. 613. 
(32) Glenn v. Orr, 96 N. C. 413. 
(83) Carey v. Wllllams, 79 Fed. 906. 
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vote for each share owned (34). Preferred stock may 
be issued without the right to vote, though the statute 
says each share shall be entitled to one vote (35 ). The 
holder of the legal title has the right to vote; executors 
and administrators vote the stock belonging to the estate 
before distribution; the corporation cannot vote its own 
shares held by itself; a shareholder can vote as he sees 
his personal interest, even though such is in conflict with 
the corporate interest; but, if he owns a majority of the 
stock, he must not commit a fraud, or deprive the minority 
shareholders of their legal rights in the corporate busi· 
ness and profits. 
§ 201. Proxy. At common law the member, unless the 
charter expressly authorized, had no right to vote by 
proxy, but must vote in person (35); now, statutes uni-
versally allow voting by proxy, which is simply the ap-
pointing by the shareholder of some one to be his proxy or 
attorney in fact to attend a certain meeting and vote all 
the shares that his principal owns, upon all questions 
lawfully coming before that meeting, as fully as the owner 
could if he were present. No special form is essential, 
unless by-Jaws, charter, or statutes expressly so require. 
§ 202. Irrevocable proxy. There have been some at-
tempts to make proxies irrevocable-but they cannot be 
so made, even for a consideration; they are considered 
such a separation of the interest in the stock and in its 
control as are contrary to public policy; hence, anyone 
(34) Comm. v. Detwiler, 131 Pa. St 614. 
(35) State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561. 
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that has given an irrevocable proxy can cancel it at any 
time (36). 
§ 203. Voting trusts. Voting trusts are agreement.a 
among shareholders to vote all the shares they own in 
the way the majority of the parties to the agreement 
direct, or in the way some trnstee or outside party shall 
direct; when entered into for the purpose, and having the 
effect of placing the control in a minority of the share-
holders, they have generally been held voidable and unen-
forceable at the option of any party to the agreement (37). 
In some cases, where they serve the purpose of sustain-
ing or preserving rights that otherwise might be in peril 
they have been upheld (38); and they are generally up-
held in California and New York, the latter having ex-
pressly legalized them by statute. 
§ 204. Cumulative voting. This is a method author-
ized by statute, which allows the minority of shareholders 
a chance to obtain representation upon the directorate. 
If A owns ten shares of stock in a corporation having five 
directors, he would have the right to vote ten shares for 
each director separately, and this is the usual and the 
only way unless some other method is expressly provided. 
The cumulative method would permit A, instead of cast-
ing 10 votes for each of five directors, to cumulate them 
and cast the entire 50 votes for one and none for the oth-
ers, or 25 for each of two directors to be elected, or in any 
other way to divide his votes, not exceeding 50 in all (39). 
(86) Cook, Stock and Stockholders, H 610, 622. 
(87) Hnrvey v. Llnvflle Co., 118 N. C. 693. 
(88) Smith v. San Francisco, etc. Co., 11CS Callt. Ci84. 
(89) Pierce v. Comm. 104 Pa. St. 100. 
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Under the reserved power to amend, a corporate charter 
can be amended, and the amendment can be accepted by 
a majority of shareholders against the protest ci the 
minority, authorizing cumulative voting ( 40). 
§ 205. Dividends. A dividend is a sum set aside out 
of the corporate profits to be divided among the share-
holders in proportion to their holdings; dividends must, 
in order to be valid, be declared out of the corporate prof-
its- that is, the balance after all current expenses of ope-
ration are paid, and fixed charges and losses in capital are 
provided for. When the corporation has earned profits 
which could be applied to the payment of dividends, and 
also has the power to increase its shares of stock, it may 
keep the money and declare a stock dividend by issuing 
shares instead, to an amount in face value equal to the 
profits to be divided ( 41). Before dividends belong to 
the shareholder and cease to be the property of the 
corporation, they must be declared by the board of direc-
tors, and the funds set aside to pay them; from that time 
the shareholder is considered part owner of the fund so 
set aside, though not yet due ( 42) ; without this setting 
aside of a particular fund or amount, out of which pay-
ment is to be made, the shareholder is a mere creditor to 
the amount declared, and must share with the other credi-
tors in case insolvency afterward occurs before payment 
( 43). The shareholder must, however, demand payment, 
before the corporation is in default for non-payment; 
(40) Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46. 
(41) Williams v. W. U. TeL C.0., 93 N. Y. 162. 
(42) Le Roy v. Globe IDB. Co., 2 Edw. Cb. (N. Y.) 667. 
(48) Hunt v. O'Shea, 69 N. H. 600. 
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after that, he can sue the company for refusing to pay, 
either in assumpsit or debt. The power to declare divi-
dends resides in the directors, and, so long as they act in 
good faith in furthering the interests of the company ac-
cording to their judgment, a court will not control their 
discretion in compelling the declaration and payment of a 
dividend; but, where they fraudulently withhold payment 
out of funds available, the court may order a distribution 
( 44). And where preferred shareholders are entitled 
to receive their dividends annually, out of the profits 
earned during any one year, which are non-cumulative, a 
court of equity will order a dividend to be made, when 
there are net earnings properly divisible ( 45 ). 
§ 206. Who are entitled. to dividends? This of course 
is a matter of contract between the transferrer and the 
transferee; but, in the absence of any stipulation to the 
contrary, the owner of the shares at the time the divi-
dends are declared is entitled to them, and it makes no 
difference when they were earned or when they are to be 
paid. As between the pledgor and the pledgee of shares, 
the latter is entitled to the dividends paid during the exist-
ence of the pledge, to be credited on his claim against the 
pledgor If A is the owner of shares when a dividend is 
declared, it belongs to him, though it does not become due 
until after A has transferred bis shares to B. So, too, 
if A sells to B before a dividend is declared, it of right be-
longs to B, though it is declared before the transfer on the 
books is made to B; in this case, however, the corpora· 
(44) Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167. 
(•CS) Hazeltine v. Railroad Co., 79 Me. 411. 
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tion will be justified in paying A, if it has no knowledge of 
B's claim; and generalJy the corporation is protected if 
it in good faith pays to the registered owner. As between 
successive owners of shares, the rules given in the previ-
ous subsection relating to setting aside the dividend fund 
do not apply. The declaration, not the setting aside, is 
the important point. 
Thus, where preferred stock was guaranteed a ten per 
cent dividend before the common stock, and no dividends 
were paid between 1857 and 1863, but afterwards such 
dividends were paid regularly and a large surplus accu-
mulated; in 1870, P acquired 40 shares of preferred stock, 
and, in 1880, the corporation proposed to declare divi-
dends out of the surplus on the common stock; P claimed 
that he was entitled to the dividends that should have been 
declared and paid in 1857-1863, and the court so held; since 
they were not then declared, the right to them passed to the 
successive owners of the stock until declared (47). Bon 
April 1 agreed to sell shares to L on or before July 18, to be 
paid for on delivery, nothing being said about any divi-
dends; July 3 a dividend was declared, payable August 
1; L exercised his option July 16, and paid for the stock. 
Held, B was entitled to the dividend as he was the owner 
of the shares at the time it was declared ( 48). 
§ 207. Between life tenant and rema.inder man. The 
cases are in conflict as to this; one rule is, that if the divi-
dend is a money dividend, it is always to be paid to the 
life tenant as income; but, if it is a stock dividend, it is all 
(47) Jermain v. J ... S. & M. ~. Ry., 91 N. Y. 484. 
(48) Bright v. Lord, 51 Ind. 272. 
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to be paid to the remainder man as a part of the estate. 
Another rule is that if the dividend is ordinary; i. e., one 
arising from the ordinary operations of the company, it 
will all go to the life tenant; but, if extraordinary, such as 
declared out of capital when the stock is lawfully reduced, 
all of it should be paid to the remainder man. Another 
rule is that the intention of the corporation shall govern 
-what it declares to be earnings shall be treated as in-
come and go to the life tenant; and what it considers capi-
tal shall be so considered and go to the remainder man. 
Another rule, and the one having the weight of authority, 
is that the courts will investigate when the fund was 
earned; if earned before the death of the person creating 
the tenancies for life and in remainder, it will go to the 
remainder man, as a part of the corpus of the estate; if 
in fact it represents earnings accumulated afterward, it 
will go to the life tenant, whether paid in money or 
stock (49). 
§ 208. Transfer of shares. Right to transfer. The 
general method of transfer bas been described. The cer-
tificate of stock usual1y says, "transferable in person or 
by attorney on the books of the corporation upon the sur-
render of this certificate." On the back, a blank form of 
assignment is usually present, reading, ''For value re-
ceived I hereby sell, assign, and transfer to ------
all my interest in ------- shares of stock repre-
sented by this certificate and I hereby irrevocably ap-
point ------ my attorney to transfer the same on 
(49) McLouth v. Huot, 154 N. Y. 179. See note, 118 Am. St. R. 
162. 
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the books of the corporation, with full power of substitu-
tion;" when this is signed by the owner, the certificate 
will pass by deli.very without filling in the other blanks, 
and any subsequent holder can fill in the blanks and have 
his name put on the corporate books as owner, and get a 
new certificate in bis own name to that effect (50). It bas 
been said that writing is essential to the transfer of shares, 
since they are mere choses in action; but, while a written 
assignment is the universal custom, in the absence of spe-
cial provision so requiring it is not necessary by the 
weight of authority. The right to transfer is an incident 
of the ownership of the property in the shares-and the 
corporation, unless the statute expressly allows, cannot 
prevent such transfer, although it may regulate it by rea-
sonable provisions for the protection of the corporation 
(51). But at the time the subscription is made, the sub-
scriber may, in some states, agree to offer his shares to 
the corporation or other members before selling to out-
side parties (52). There is no right generally recognized 
in this country to transfer shares after insolvency, or to 
an incompetent or insolvent person for the purpose of 
evading liability. 
§ 209. Registration of transfer. There are two theo-
ries as to the necessity of the registration of th" transfer 
on the books of the corporation; one is that the legal title 
does not pass by delivery of the certificate duly indorsed 
and assigned- registration being essential to pass the 
legal title, and only an equitable title passing without 
(50) Keller v. Mfg. Co., 43 Mo. App. 84. 
(51) Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129. 
(52) Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476. 
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(54); the other is that, as between the parties themselves 
and all other parties claiming through them, the whole 
title passes with the delivery of the certificate duly en-
dorsed, with a power of attorney to have the transfer 
made on the books of the company (55). This latter is 
certainly supported by the great weight of authority. 
As between t.he corporation and the transferror or trans-
feree, until the registration is made on the books of the 
company, the corporation may, until it is satisfied of the 
right of the transferee, recognize the registered owner 
(56 ). The above rules are of importance in the case of 
attaching creditors of the transferror, and give exactly 
opposite results. As between pledgor and pledgee, regis-
tration is unnecessary. But the pledgee, in order to pre-
vent the possibility of loss, usually has the stock regis-
tered in bis name. Where P indorsed his certificate of 
shares in blank and delivered it to B his broker to secure 
a balance of account of $3,000, and B, without authority, 
pledged the same shares by delivery of the indorsed cer-
tificate to a bank, to secure a loan of $8,000 to B, the bank, 
having no knowledge of the wrongful act of B, could hold 
the shares as against P, until the $8,000 loan was fully 
paid {57). But, if instead of claiming to own the shares 
and borru:wr1ng for himself, B had represented he was P's 
agent and wished to borrow for him, and had pledged the 
indorsed shares to the bank as security, and, after secur-
ing the money, appropriated it himself, P could recover 
(54) Perkins v. Lyons, 111 Ia. 192. 
(55) Westminster, etc. Bank v. Electric Works, 73 N. IL 465. 
(5G) People's Bank v. Exchange Bk., 116 Ga. 820. 
(57) McNeil v. Tenth Natl. Bk., 46 N. Y. 325. 
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the shares and the bank would lose, since it relied on B's 
false representation of agency (58). 
§ 210. Transfer upon forged power of attorney. Since 
certificates of shares are not negotiable, this bas no legal 
effect upon the rights of the original owner-be cannot 
be deprived of bis property by the forgery, unless be is 
chargeable with negligence (59). If the corporation ac-
cepts and cancels a forged certificate, and issues a new 
one in its place, a bona-fide purchaser of the new certifi-
cate is protected, and, as against the corporation, may 
claim membership, unless the corporation bas issued all 
the shares it can; but, if the corporation has issued all the 
shares it has a right to issue, the purchaser bas an action 
for damages against the corporation. The certificate is a 
continuing representation of the validity of the shares, 
when made to an innocent party; the original owner can 
claim the rights of membership; the forger or the person 
who induces the corporation to act is liable to it for any 
loss it sustains. The same rules apply to lost certificates 
not due to the fault of the owner. Thus, where a certifi-
cate was issued to D and by him sold and indorsed in 
blank to P, from whom it was stolen without bis fault by 
an unknown person, who transferred it to brokers who 
sold it to M, P can recover the shares and M and the 
brokers must look to the thief (60). 
§ 211. Transfers in breach of trust. vVhen A bolds 
shares in trust for B, and there is nothing in the certifi-
cates or on the register to show that a trust exists, a bona 
(58) Merchants' Bk. v. Livingston, 74 N. Y. 223. 
(59) Telegrupb Co. v. Da,·enport, !Yi U. S. 3GO. 
(60) East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565. 
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fide purchaser from A gets a good title as against B, and 
B must look to A. If the certificate or register shows a 
trust exists, the purchaser takes it subject to the trust 
(61); if the corporation has knowledge of the existence 
of the trust and of any limit on the power of the trustee 
to transfer, and it negligently allows him to transfer con-
trary to his authority, the corporation is liable to the 
party injured (62). 
§ 212. Gift. A gift of shares may be made by delivery 
of the certificate for that purpose, without indorsement. 
Registration is not essential to the validity of the gift, 
though perhaps the full legal title is not complete, until 
indorsement on the certificate or transfer is made on the 
corporate books (63). 
§ 213. Effect of transfer. The general rule is that the 
transferror is no longer a member, and is no longer in any 
way liable to the corporation or its creditors, even though 
the shares are not fully paid; the purchaser, on the other 
hand, assumes, if he has knowledge of the facts, all the 
obligations and is entitled to all the rights of the seller 
(64). If he has no knowledge that the shares were not 
paid up, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, he 
is not liable to the corporation or to its creditors-he has 
a right to presume they are paid up, though the certificate 
does not so state, and he is not obliged to inquire into the 
matter ( 65). In such case it would seem the transf error 
(61) Winter v. Gas T,fgbt Co., 89 Ala. 544. 
(62) Loring v. Salisbury Mills, 125 Mass. 138. 
(63) First Natl. Bk. v. Holland, 99 Va. 405. 
(64) Vfsalfa, etc. R. R. Co. v. Hyde, 110 Cal. 632. 
(~) West Nasbvllle, etc. Co. v. Nasbvllle, etc. Bank, 86 Tenn. 262. 
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would remain liable to the corporation, at least so far as 
necessary to protect creditors. The matter is regulated 
by statutes in many states. 
§ 214. Remedyforrefusal to transfer. This is an action 
to recover the value of the shares, as damages-usually 
at the time of refusal, but, by some decisions, the value at 
the time of trial or the highest value at any time between 
the refusal and the trial (66); under some circumstances, 
where shares cannot be obtained, a court of equity, or a 
court of law by mandamus, will compel a transfer (67). 
The reason why the courts will not ordinarily compel a 
transfer is because there is no necessity of possessing 
the identical shares ; by recovering the market value of 
them, they can usually be replaced. 
§ 215. Right to inspect books. At common law a share-
holder had the right to inspect the corporate books, when-
ever there was a real matter of controversy between him 
and the corporation, or its officers, or shareholders, which 
made it necessary to see the books ; now, by statute gen-
erally, he has the right at reasonable times to see the 
books and take copies of the entries by himself or his 
agent, without there being an actual controversy exist-
ing; it must be exercised at a reasonable time; if refused, 
an action for damages will lie, or the custodian may be 
compelled by mandamus to permit inspection. Recently, 
even without statute, the courts have applied a much 
more liberal rule than formerly. Thus where a share-
holder was simply "desirous of learning the true condi-
(66) Burdick, Torts, p. 205. 
(67) Cushman v. Thayer, etc. O:>., 76 N. Y. 366. 
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tion of the affairs of the company and the value of his in-
terest therein," the corporation was compelled to allow 
the inspection ; the reason being that the shareholders are 
in substance part owners of the corporate property ( 68) . 
§ 216. Right to share in increase of stock Where the 
corporation has the right to increase its capital stock, 
each shareholder has a right to subscribe at par for such 
proportion of the new stock as his holdings are of the old 
stock, in preference to outside parties. Thus, where the 
corporation voted to increase its stock and off er it to 
shareholders at twenty-five per cent premium, in propor-
tion to their holdings, and, if it was not taken by a certain 
date, to sell it to new stockholders; and the plaintiff of-
fered to take bis proportion at par, tendered the money, 
and was refused; he was entitled to a mandamus to compel 
the company to issue him bis proportion of the new stock. 
The reason is that the shareholders are really the owners 
of the corporate concern, and any other rule might di-
minish the value of each share of old stock by letting in 
other parties to an equal interest in the surplus and good 
will of an established business (69). 
§ 217. Right to sue for wrong done the corporation. 
The general rule is that shareholders have no such right, 
the corporation being the proper party-but in some cases 
there would be a failure of justice if they were not al-
lowed to sue. Whenever the corporation is unable to sue 
for a wrong done it, then a bona fide shareholder may, 
upon behalf of himself and all others, sue to have the 
(68) State v. Pacific Rrewing Co., 21 Wash. 451. 
(69) Hammond v. Bdlson Illuminating Co., 131 Mich. 79. 
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wrong righted. The wrongs for which suit may be 
brought are the ultra vires acts of the agents, resulting in 
damages to the corporation; the fraudulent acts of the di-
rectors, or their acting in their own instead of the cor-
porate interest; and oppressive or fraudulent acts of a 
majority of the stockholders. The plaintiff must allege 
and show that he tried to have corporate action taken 
through the proper corporate agencies to have the wrong 
righted, and that they refused, or that the wrongdoers 
were the corporate officers themselves who had authority 
to have the corporation sue. If the offense charged is one 
that the shareholders could ratify, the courts will not in-
terfere until they have been called to pass upon the mat-
ter, unless delay would be perilous if a right existed (70). 
SECTION 4. CREDITORS OF THE CORPORATION. 
§ 218. Creditors and the state. As a general ruh~, the 
state, unless it has reserved the power to repeal or amend 
a charter cannot repeal or change the statutory contract-
ual liability of shareholders, so as to impair the security 
of existing creditors; but the penal liability of sharehold-
ers may be repealed or changed, and, if the state bas re-
served the power to repeal, the contractual liability may 
be changed. Dissolution by the state does not affect cred-
itors' rights; they are enforceable against the assets of 
the corporation. Remedies may be modified, provided 
they are not substantially taken away. Contractual and 
penal liabilities are defined below. 
(70) Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 400. 
Vol VIII-19 
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§ 219. Creditors and the corporation. Creditors have 
all the ordinary rights to enforce their claims against the 
corporation in the usual way in courts, that they would 
have against individuals; except that such property as is 
necessary for the corporation to perform some public 
duty cannot be taken on execution; but the income from it 
may be sequestrated in equity or otherwise to pay the 
claims (71). Creditors have no right to interfere with or 
dictate the manner in which the corporation is managed 
(72). The reason for this is that they have no interest in 
the matter, other than to be paid what is due them when it 
is due. 
§ 220. Preference of creditors. The corporation, by the 
great weight of authority, has the same right to prefer a 
creditor in case of insolvency that an individual bas; 
where this rule applies, a bona fide shareholding creditor 
or a director-creditor can be preferred also (73). In some 
of the states it is held that, as soon as insolvency occurs, 
the assets of the corporation become a trust fund for dis-
tribution among all the creditors in proportion to their 
claims, and the corporation can give no preferences (74). 
§ 221. Assets as a trust fund (75). The general doc-
trine is that the capital of a corporation is a fund set 
apart for the protection of creditors, and cannot be given 
away or distributed among shareholders, until creditors 
are fully paid; that there is included in this fund not only 
(71) Loulsvllle, etc. Ry. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 511. 
(72) Pond v. Framingham, etc. Co., 130 Mass. 194. 
(73) Corey v. Wadsworth, 118 Ala. 488. 
(74) Rouse v. Merchants' Bank, 46 O. St 493. 
(76) Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 008; Hospes v. Car Co.. 48 Minn 
174. 
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any property the corporation has, but the sums unpaid 
by the shareholders upon their stock subscriptions, so far 
as necessary to pay creditors who have relied thereon; 
also all claims due to the corporation from whatever 
source can, in some form of proceeding, be recovered and 
applied to the payment of creditors ' claims ; al so all capi-
tal of the company distributed to the shareholders, that 
has the effect of reducing the property below the amount 
of capital stock that the corporation is to have, can be 
recovered so far as necessary to pay creditors who have 
relied thereon before extending credit, and provided the 
shareholders did not innocently receive it. A creditor, 
who becomes such before an increase of stock is made, 
cannot complain of its non-payment-for he does not 
rely on it; so a subsequent creditor can not complain of a 
previous improper disposition of the corporate property,. 
if he did not extend credit in reliance upon the corpora-
tion still having such property. 
§ 222. Right of creditor to prevent dissipation of funds. 
:As has been stated, the creditors have no right to inter-
fere in the corporate management; but the cases have 
generally recognized the right of creditors to enjoin 
threatened wrongs which would destroy the creditors' se-
curity, or enjoin waste of the corporate funds, or have 
conveyances in fraud of their rights set aside. In such 
cases the creditor must first establish his claim by a judg-
ment at law, or in some other way obtain a lien upon the 
corporate assets, before a court of equity will give him 
euch relief, and he must usually sue in such form as will 
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allow other creditors to join him, and have the asset! 
administered for the benefit of all (76). 
§ 223. Oreditors and officers. So long as officers keep 
within their authority, they do not make themselves 
liable to creditors upon contracts they make for the com. 
pany; if they exceed their authority, they become liable 
to those with whom they contract; if they commit a tort 
while acting for the company, they are liable therefor to 
the person injured, although the corporation may be also; 
the directors may be liable for tort for permitting such 
managemeBt of the corporation as creates a nuisance; 
under some circumstances, if they are negligent in man-
aging the corporate affairs so the corporation would have 
an action for damages against them, upon insolvency, 
such a claim for damages is an asset which the creditors 
have a right to have enforced against the officers, if nec-
essary to pay their claims. 
§ 224. Statutory liability of officers. In some of the 
states where officers fail to make certain reports, or make 
false ones, or incur debts in excess of a certain amount, 
they are made liable for the debts of the corporation; in 
such cases the statutory method of recovery, if any is 
fixed, must be followed; but courts will allow recovery 
in some of the ordinary forms of proceeding, if no special 
form is provided. 
§ 225. OrediU>rs and shareholders. Creditors have no 
rights against shareholders, in the absence of a special 
statutory liability, provided the corporation is de jure, 
(76) Holltns v. Brlerfleld Coal Co .. 160 U. S. 37L 
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the face value of the stock has been fully paid in, and 
there has been no distribution of the capital stock before 
creditors are paid. The liability of shareholders arises 
in one of two ways: (1) From the common law; and, (2) 
under special statutes. The common law liability arises 
principally under three circumstances: (a) Imperfect or-
ganization; (b) failure to pay in the full amount sub-
scribed; (c) payment of dividends out of capital instead 
of profits. 
§ 226. Common law liabilities of shareholders to credit-
ors. The first of these, arising out of imperfect organi-
zation, is based upon the rule that, when a number of per-
sons undertake a business transaction and fail to become 
incorporated, the common Jaw partnership liability re-
sults; as we have seen, if the corporation is de facto, the 
weight of authority bolds that there is no other than the 
corporate liability, and not the partnership; and so too, 
where there is an estoppel against a particular creditor, 
he cannot hold the members to an individual partnership 
liability. 
Second, since the capital stock is a fund for the protec-
tion of the creditors, it is in the nature of a fraud for the 
corporation or its shareholders to claim to have a capital 
stock up to a certain amount, which it has never received; 
the courts say that, for the protection of creditors and 
when necessary for the payment of those relying upon it, 
the shareholders will be required to tnake this represen-
tation good by making payment-this is what is usually 
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meant by saying that such subscriptions are a trust f·and 
for the creditors' security (77). 
In the third place, if the shareholders divide the cor-
porate assets among themselves, before paying the credit-
ors, the result is the same as if the capital bad never 
been paid, and creditors who became such before the di-
vision have a right to have the sum so distributed paid 
back, so far as necessary to pay their claims. But share ... 
holders who have innocently received dividends paid out 
of capital instead of profits, before insolvency, will not be 
required to refund (78 ). 
§ 227. Same: Procedure. In these last two cases the 
creditor's rights arise only after he has established his 
claim by judgment against the corporation, bas taken 
out execution against the corporate property, and has 
had it returned unsatisfied or partly so. Then be has the 
right to sue the shareholders in equity to have the sums 
due the corporation paid in to discharge bis claims; be 
must usually bring a creditor's bill in such a way that the 
other creditors can come in and share in the proceeds in 
proportion to their claims (79). Judgment against the 
corporation is conclusive as to the debt of the corpora-
tion, and an assessment against the shareholders by the 
court cannot be questioned by the shareholder; but be 
can contest bis liability on the ground that be is not a 
member, or that the judgment was fraudulently obtained. 
A receiver is usually appointed by the court, who can sue, 
(77) Hospes v. Car Co., 48 Minn. 174. 
(78) Davenport v. Lines, 72 Conn. 118; McDonaJd v. WllUams, 174 
u. s. 897. 
(79) Lawrence v. Greenup. 97 Fed. ~ 
.,~ 
t 
. 
I 
I 
SPECIAL RELATlONS 
by himself or by an ancillary receiver, any shareholder 
who owes the corporation, in any state to recover the 
amount so due; the liability of the shareholders is several, 
but it is usual in the suit to join all, though some are out 
of the jurisdiction of the court (80). 
§ 228. Non-payment of shares. Under (b) in § 225, 
above, difficult questions arise as to the liability of share-
holders who have an agreement with the corporation by 
which they are not to pay in full for their shares. Such 
agreements are valid as between the corporation and the 
shareholders, but are generally invalid as against credit-
ors, so the creditor can require full payment for bis 
protection. 
There are four exceptions : ( 1) When the shareholder 
has purchased from another shareholder, in good faith, 
shares that were not in fact fully paid but which be sup-
posed were, he is not liable to creditors for the unpaid 
amount. (2) When the corporation is in failing circum-
stances, but bas the power to increase its stock, and it 
does this under stress of circumstances and in good faith 
to re-establish itself, it may sell such stock at its market 
value, or issue it as a bonus along with bonds issued, to 
tide over its difficulties; and those who take the stock or 
bonds or both, in good faith at their market value then, 
will not be held to any further liability in favor of sub-
sequent creditors (81). (3) It is held in New York and 
Illinois that a corporation like a railroad company may 
issue its shares below par, or at their market value, in 
(89) ~toddard v. Lum, 159 N. Y. 265. 
(81) Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417. 
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payment of a construction company for the construction 
of its road, and such company is not liable to subsequent 
creditors for the difference between the face value of the 
shares, and the price at which they were taken (82). (4) 
In case shares are paid for in property, it is generally 
held that, so long as there is no actual fraud in valuin1~ 
the property, whatever price it is taken at, even if it is an 
over-valuation, shall be final and creditors cannot com-
plain; other states, notably Missouri, hold that l\ny over-
valuation, though made in good faith, must be paid back 
to the company by the person receiving the shares upon 
that basis, if necessary to pay creditors who have relied 
on the company having the capital it pretends to have. 
Many cases also hold that an excessive over-valuation 
is prima facie fraudulent, and the discrepancy will be 
required to be satisfactorily explained, or made up (83). 
Perhaps good will is property with which shares can be 
paid, if it really exists in the particular case; labor, ser-
vices, patents, franchises, etc., are property within the 
rule. 
§ 229. Statutory liability of shareholders to creditors. 
This is a liability placed upon shareholders, over and 
above their common Jaw liability, for the protection ot 
creditors; it is not generally a part of the corporate funds 
for the purposes of carrying on its business, but it is a 
security for creditors alone; as to its legal character, it 
is either ( 1) contractual, or (2) penal. The contractual 
may be either (a) a joint and several, unlimited, primary 
(82) Van Cott v. Van Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535. 
(83) State Trust Co. v. Turner, 111Ia.66f. 
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liability; (b) a joint and several, unlimited, secondary 
liability; or, (c) a limited, primary or secondary liability. 
If primary, the liability arises at the time the liability 
of the corporation does; if secondary, only after the cor-
poration is unable to pay; if unlimited, it is substantially 
that of a partner; if limited, then it extends only to the 
limit, which is usually a sum equal to the amount of the 
subscription in addition thereto, or such a proportion of 
the debts as the shareholder's shares are of the total 
shares. If it is primary, the statute of limitations would 
run at the same time it does against the corporation. If 
secondary, only after it was established that the corpora-
tion could not pay. It may be provided in constitutional 
or statutory provisions; if it is provided in constitutions, 
it will be self-executing whenever it is fixed in amount, 
and no special machinery for its enforcement is necessary. 
§ 230. Contractual and penal liabilities. A penalty is 
a punishment for doing something that is forbidden, and 
is to be recovered by the state; it can be changed or modi· 
fied at any time, and it is not enforcible outside of the 
state; some of the statutory liabilities are similar in form 
to penalties, but, if they are designed for the protection 
of creditors in such a way that the offender becomes a 
debtor to the creditor by his failure, they will be consid-
ered contractual in nature, so as to allow suits to be 
brought in other states for their enforcement in favor 
of the creditor. If the liability is contractual, subsequent 
creditors have a vested right in it for their protection, 
such as cannot be taken away from them without their 
consent; such a liability also survives and attaches to the 
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estate of a deceased shareholder, and may be enforced 
against it, or the representative of a deceased creditor 
can enforce it against shareholders (84). If a true pen-
alty, such rules do not apply. 
§ 231. Enforcement in other jurisdictions. If a special 
remedy is provided in the state creating the statutory 
liability, of such a nature that the right cannot be sepa-
rated from its accompanying procedure, and this is dif-
ferent from the procedure in the state where it is sought 
to be enforced, it will not be there enforced (85); but, if no 
special remedy is provided, or if it is of a kind that can 
be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction according to the ordi-
nary procedure there, it will be enforced there. The usual 
method is through a creditor's bill or receiver, as de-
scribed above ( § 227) in connection with the c-0mmon law 
liability (86). The same rules also apply as to the effect 
of judgments. The true penal laws of one state, however, 
are not enforced by the courts of another state (87). 
(84) Huntington v. Attrlll, 146 U. ~. Gt>7. 
(85) Marshnll v. Sbermnn. 148 N. Y. 9. 
(86) Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179. 
(87) Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265. 
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